The book highlights the motivations, limits and leverage of international community’s intervention in the Sudan civil wars, linking the western intervention in both North/South and Darfur conflict with the post-9/11 event and the War on Terror. Whilst in the case of North/South war, the western intervention helped the parties to reach a feasible agreement (the CPA - Comprehensive Peace Agreement), the DPA (Darfur Peace Agreement) brought more damages than good. Indeed, when in July 2002 the Machakos Protocol was signed the North/South conflict was a ‘mature’ civil war: the rebels were represented by only one movement and leader and both parties were ready to compromise. When the international community pushed for a negotiated settlement in Darfur the time was not right because the parties were divided and not interested in peace. Moreover, the debate over whether or not define the violence in Darfur as genocide distracted the attention of the international community from peace. Finally, the international community appeared to be interested in signing an agreement on Darfur mostly to allow the government to accept the presence of UN troops on the ground and that was another mistake of its mediation effort.