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If the Soviet Union is suspicious of the Italian Communist party (PCI) as well as of other Eurocommunist parties, it is certainly not because of the gradualist and parliamentary strategies these parties have adopted. Since the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in 1935, it has never been a problem for Moscow to acknowledge the legitimacy of policies based upon the alliance of Western Communist parties with nonproletarian parties and social classes. Indeed, the a priori refusal to utilize the institutional framework existing in Western "bourgeois democracies" is branded by Soviet ideologists as "ultraleft deviationism" of a Trotskyite or Maoist kind. Even in Stalin's time, the defeat of Bolshevik-type revolution in capitalist Europe had brought the Communist movement to recognize (though often belatedly, as in the tragic case of the German Communist party between 1919 and Hitler's advent to power) that the political situation existing in the West cannot be easily modified by storming "winter palaces," or through sectarian strategies of an orthodox Leninist brand.

The difficult task of outlining an ideology and a political strategy capable of allowing all due flexibility in the "operative" field while maintaining ideological purity has produced a set of vague and tautological formulas. The Soviets, for instance, while accepting the inevitability of concessions in the framework of a policy of alliance, like to stress in pedagogical and warning tones that "concessions cannot affect matters of principle." They admit that in today's world situation, the variety and complexity of the "revolutionary process" have increased, but insist that this has not abrogated "the general laws of
development of proletarian revolution." Relying on the authority of their only two quotable top leaders, they recall that Lenin "always considered the general and the particular in dialectical unity," and they quote Leonid Brezhnev's speech at the East Berlin Conference of European Communist Parties: "In the experience of each brother party, together with the unique specific aspects linked to national peculiarities there is always the presence of common traits that are of interest for the whole of our movement." Evidently, these are all vague formulas that, in practice, allow the Soviet leadership to judge on a case-by-case and moment-by-moment basis the performance of individual Communist parties. It would, therefore, be a mistake to see only the dogmatic aspect of Soviet attitudes vis-à-vis Western Communist parties (CPs). As far as Moscow is concerned, nothing succeeds like success: this means that apart from—and at times in contradiction with—the "immutable principles" proclaimed by Moscow, individual CPs are judged pragmatically on the basis of their concrete performance. In short, it can be said that Soviet acceptance and approval of "deviant" strategies on the part of nonruling Communist parties is directly proportional to their political success (and vice versa, as the Chilean case has shown).

Moreover, one has the impression that, lately, the Soviets have been trying to develop a more sophisticated and flexible ideological and propagandistic approach to the problem of relations with Western Communist parties, especially with the PCI. This is a typically "centrist" approach that, starting from an apparent theoretical concession to Western CPs (there are no models, no revolutionary formulas to be passively reproduced), prefers to speak of "historical experiences" that it would be impossible—worse, irresponsible—to ignore. In this approach, the implicit threat to the "irresponsible" is no longer excommunication, but rather the inevitable and tragic defeat that awaits those who think it possible to overlook such historical experiences (essentially, the Soviet model). At times, the reference to PCI strategy (the "historic compromise") is evident: "In revolutionary action, as demonstrated by the experience of the October Revolution and the international communist movement, changes in tactics and compromises aimed at winning new allies are possible. But sacrificing principles in order to gain tactical advantages has never brought anyone anything but defeat." In its most "liberal" formulation, the absolute limit set by Moscow to the experimenting of "national roads to socialism" boils down to an axiom formulated by Lenin and quoted by Brezhnev in his speech at the Twenty-Fifth Soviet Party Congress: "the revolution must be capable of defending itself."

The matter is much more complicated than some—who still speak of a "make believe" divergence or, on the contrary, cry "excommunication" with every new criticism—would like us to believe. While disapproving of the dangerous ideological innovations introduced by certain Western Communist parties, and especially by the PCI, the Soviets would like to avoid shifting
themselves off from the possibility of actively following, and if possible influencing, the major changes that might be looming in the political situation of Western Europe. To the ideologues' indictment, they at times substitute the historian's academic warning, pronounced from the heights of "real socialism," that is, of a socialism that, as Moscow time and again emphasizes, has the certain advantage of existing and of having crushed its internal enemies (unlike some alternatives, it is added, that so far are of a mere verbal kind).  

This more flexible and sophisticated approach, while real and substantial, is, however, far from being unequivocally and irrevocably predominant. It is enough to read party leader Mikhail Suslov's speeches, as well as many of the second-rate ideological articles that crop up daily in the Soviet press (especially in newspapers like the ministry of defense's Red Star), to realize that, in spite of all "modernizations," dogmatism is alive and well in Moscow, and that probably the "liberal" approach to Eurocommunism is not very deep—and not particularly widespread.

Moreover, as Moscow's attitude toward the Spanish Communist party leader, Santiago Carrillo, has shown, there are levels of "provocation" to which the Soviets can only react automatically with their habitual ideological hardness. This is so because of their evident inability to replace the big guns of condemnation and desecration with the fencing sword of ideological polemics typical of Western political culture (and by now, also of Western CPs).

If we move to a more specific analysis of Soviet attitudes toward PCI strategy, we are first confronted with the issue of gradualism versus violent revolution. A quote from a "liberal" article may be helpful in revealing the limits of Soviet flexibility on this matter:

In France, Italy, Japan and many other countries conditions are ripening for the advent of a revolutionary situation. It seems to me very important to stress that it is not a revolutionary situation of a socialist, but of a democratic kind, and that an important role in bringing it about will be played by political forces which consider socialism a desirable but not imminent perspective. . . . This on the other hand does not rule out the possibility that some future catastrophe, a deep national crisis, may raise the possibility of a socialist revolution in an industrialized country. The possibility of such an event cannot be ruled out, but Manist-Leninists, in contrast with "ultra-revolutionaries" do not set their hopes upon disastrous cataclysms, do not start from the inhuman principle "the worse, the better."  

As Soviet sources never tire of repeating, any bona fide and self-respecting Communist party must be capable of shifting rapidly from one method of struggle to another. The "peaceful road to socialism" is desirable, but far from being guaranteed, given implacable class antagonisms; the enemy is ready to do anything in order to maintain his own power. If necessary, every party must be capable of rapidly changing its strategy and be ready to use all
forms of struggle—peaceful and nonpeaceful, legal and illegal. One must add at this point that, for the Soviets, the only sort of violence ruled out by the "peaceful road" is of a military type (civil war). Still acceptable, however, and even by and large inevitable, is a kind of possibly violent mass pressure that Pravda has not hesitated to call "peaceful violence." Moreover, in Soviet ideology, it is always unequivocally clear that "democratic struggles are but the prelude to socialist revolution, a preparatory stage after which a revolutionary 'qualitative jump' will necessarily have to take place, since it is not possible to reach socialism within the framework of the bourgeois state, of bourgeois democracy." Reform is therefore seen as "transitional forms, intermediate stages necessary for the approaching of the revolutionary process to its climax: the conquest of power on the part of the working class . . ." 

An analysis of Soviet concepts on the question of the relationship between principles and tactical concessions brings us to what can be considered the hard core of Leninist ideology:

There is no socialism without collective property, without the introduction of socialist criteria in work and the distribution of goods, without the subordination of the whole of production to the interests of the masses, without a definite shift towards social equality. There is no socialism without the political power of the working class, without a wide participation of the masses in the direction of the state, without complete democracy. In a word, there is no socialism without socialism.

Putting aside some rhetorical flourishes, and especially keeping in mind actual Soviet practice, we can identify two basic criteria: proletarian dictatorship (that is, political monopoly of the party), and state ownership of the means of production. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the evolution of the PCI (and other Eurocommunist parties) hinges on a revision of these basic tenets.

We shall quote extensively from the most recent official document summarizing PCI ideology and strategy, the "Theses for the Fifteenth PCI Congress." 

First of all, the PCI maintains that pluralism should not only be upheld in the (capitalist) present, but also guaranteed in the (Socialist) future:

Even when society will have been transformed in its economic basis, and its division into antagonistic classes abolished, different interests will continue to exist, and various ideological, political, cultural and religious tendencies will maintain their importance and their value.

Whereas democratic freedoms are seen by the Soviets as possible but not necessary in the difficult march toward a Socialist "qualitative jump," in the view of Italian Communists, they are not only an indispensable means, but also an end and, given the social and economic realities of advanced capitalist countries, a necessary foundation for the building of socialism itself. The revol..
utionary moment, the "qualitative jump," fades into the gradual and incremental introduction of "elements of socialism" into the capitalist structure.

Also the concept of a mixed economy is considered by the PCI to be applicable not only to a transitional stage, but to socialism itself:

In order to attain the goals and values of socialism, a global nationalization of the means of production is not necessary. There will have to be public sectors of the economy as well as sectors where private enterprise operates.

Even on the level of ideological formulas, the breach with Soviet orthodoxy is by now no longer a matter of nuance. Thus, the Fifteenth PCI Congress ratified the decision already made by party leaders to scrap the expression "Marxism-Leninism" from the party statutes. To quote once more the theses: "... we have long been convinced that the formula 'Marxism-Leninism' does not express the full richness of our theoretical and ideological heritage."

No amount of pragmatism or flexibility can be considered sufficient to render these pronouncements, this tampering with the fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist ideology, as acceptable or even tolerable for Moscow. Thus, in a Soviet booklet that contains one of the few explicit criticisms directed toward the PCI, we find the following statement:

Only a nationalist-oriented petty-bourgeois can think that socialism in one country can be different from socialism in another country not in detail but in substance, that is, that in one socialist country there will be the power of the working class, proletarian dictatorship, whereas in some other this will not exist, that in one country the means of production will be socialized whereas in some other private enterprise will go on existing.

Usually, Soviet attacks on "revisionism" are not explicitly aimed at the PCI, but there can be no doubt about their real target. Take, for instance, a warmed-up quotation from Lenin (who was at the time writing against Bernstein), defining the essence of opportunism:

Upholding the theory of class collaboration, abandoning the concept of social revolution and of revolutionary methods of struggle, making a fetish out of bourgeois legality, abandoning a class approach in the fear of antagonizing "the wide sectors of the population" (i.e., the petite-bourgeoisie): here you have without any doubt the basis of opportunism.

Insofar as all Eurocommunist parties, in their ideological evolution, have arrived at a revision of tenets that Moscow considers essential for any party that wants to continue defining itself as "Communist," Soviet attitudes vis-à-vis each one of them should be substantially the same. However, this is not the case: the Italian Communists are obviously treated with much more re-
spect, tact, and patience than their Spanish or French Eurocommunist comrades. Why this is so is not difficult to understand. In the first place, Moscow is evidently much more lenient when dealing with those who have the merit of being strong; and the PCI is by far number one among all Western CPs. Second, the PCI, while being the real “ringleader” of the Eurocommunist heresy, has decided to avoid all blatant “provocations” and has opted, in its relations with the CPSU, for a “diplomatiization of divergences.” So far, the Soviets seem to have accepted this approach, and their way of dealing with Italian Communists has almost taken up the forms and protocol of interstate relations.

The idea of “bringing back to the fold” the deviant Italian comrades is an alluring one for Soviet Communists, but they cannot, of course, ignore how difficult and unlikely this objective is. They are quick to spot—and to magnify—any hint that a more pro-Soviet or more orthodox line might be about to develop within the PCI. In the fall of 1978, for instance, they welcomed Enrico Berlinguer’s Genova speech and its more uncompromising tones and, while apparently not necessarily enthusiastic about the failure of the Andreotti government and the opening of an Italian government crisis in early February 1979, they quoted with approval every manifestation of “party pride” and anti-Christian Democrat polemics by the PCI. As for supporting pro-Soviet factions within the party (practically nonexistent, apart from a few old Stalinist diehards such as Ambrogio Donini), Moscow is very realistic and will not let itself be tempted, as long as the PCI is as strong as it is today, by major factionist operations against it.

As the East Berlin Communist Conference of June 1976 showed, because of the constant reduction in the degree of ideological unity within the international Communist movement, the field of foreign policy has remained the last possible common denominator acceptable for all parties. Brezhnev spoke in East Berlin more as a head of state than as a party chief; accordingly, Soviet comments on the results of the conference have not concentrated on the strictly ideological field, but rather on issues of foreign policy (peace, detente, disarmament), to the point of defining the East Berlin Conference as “another Helsinki.”

It is no secret that, in the Soviet view, Communist parties the world over are bound by a duty of allegiance and subordination, not only to the CPSU, but also to the Soviet state. That this is still so, in spite of the less blatant and blunt language of the 1970s, is shown by some assertions made even today.

The experience of historical developments during the past 60 years has clearly demonstrated the correctness of the beliefs of Marxist-Leninists. That is, the help and support given by the CPSU and the Soviet state to all revolutionary forces in foreign countries, are the essence of a true international solidarity, the measuring stick of the true revolutionary spirit of each individual socialist movement. Experience has shown...
that in a situation of world-wide antagonism between the two opposing social systems no progressive movement can develop successfully without relying in some way or another upon the help and support of the CPSU and of the Soviet state; likewise, no movement can subsist as progressive if it slides into an attitude of hostility towards the USSR and opposes its own political platform to the policies of the CPSU and of the Soviet state.\textsuperscript{20}

Soviet pretensions and demands have not changed, but it is also evident that, together with the constant reduction of Communist "brotherhood" and ideological unity, the convergence between the CPSU and Western CPs in matters of foreign-policy interests has recently become much more vague and less specific than it used to be. Let us take, for instance, the open divergence on the concept of "proletarian internationalism," which, for the Soviet Union, is but a convenient shorthand for what is considered the duty of subordination of all Communist parties to the CPSU in matters of foreign policy. Even the uninform Soviet reader has been told that the PCI has rejected this fundamental concept. In July 1976, the Russian edition of the World Marxist Review (sold at every newsstand in Moscow) published an article written by the Italian representative on the journal's editorial board, where one could read: "...we think that the expression 'proletarian internationalism' is limited with regard to both form and content, and that it is no longer satisfactory in today's situation."\textsuperscript{21} Also, the theses for the Fifteenth PCI Congress do not mention "proletarian internationalism," and speak instead of "a solidarity and an internationalist commitment that goes beyond communist parties."

The PCI pays homage—and will probably continue to do so in the future—to the "policy of peace of the USSR," while it supports disarmament and opposes the arms race in tones that are similar to those employed by Moscow; it also follows a line that has considerable convergence with the Soviet line as far as the Third World and national liberation movements are concerned. However, when moving from the general and the obvious (who does not want peace and the liberation of the oppressed?) to the specific and the directly political, the picture changes. To the decade-long campaigns in favor of Italy's detection from NATO, the Italian Communists have substituted a view of the Atlantic Alliance as a necessary element in today's world balance of power. "breaking unilaterally today's equilibria... would complicate, instead of facilitate the process of detente. This makes it necessary for Italy to stay in the Atlantic alliance, which must operate for exclusively defensive purposes within the precise geographical area for which it was created." Similarly, the acceptance of the European Community by the PCI also clashes with the persistent hostility shown by the Soviet Union toward European integration: "The PCI has given, and it intends to go on giving, its own contribution to the building of a democratically transformed European community."
Even as far as the Third World is concerned convergence is far from complete. To cite but two examples of the late 1970s: the PCI refused to side with Ethiopia against Somalia, keeping instead a neutral attitude of mediation based upon good relations with both sides of the conflict; the victory of pro-Vietnamese (and pro-Soviet) elements in Cambodia raised more doubts and worries than enthusiasm in the PCI, and even prompted the party’s "foreign minister," Giancarlo Pajetta, to say rather bluntly that "the doctrine of limited sovereignty is inapplicable anywhere in the world, and that includes Southeast Asia."28

In international relations, as in politics in general, intentions have only a limited value. Leaving aside the puzzling question of whether Eurocommunists are "sincere" in their acceptance of the Western system, there is no doubt that, for Moscow, the most interesting scenarios and projections are related to the objective impact that a real sharing of power by Eurocommunist parties in the governments of Western European countries would have upon the strength of the Western European countries and in general upon East-West relations. At this point, we should ask ourselves what is, from a Soviet standpoint, the most desirable scenario for the political evolution of Western Europe. To say that every great power prefers having opponents who are weak and disunited, is obviously true but insufficient. First, in Europe, the Soviet Union is an essentially conservative and realistic power, and it does not appear to be aiming concretely and actively at territorial expansion and military occupation of countries that are members of the Atlantic Alliance. Second, given the Soviet growing need for Western technology, it does not seem that Moscow considers the social and economic collapse of the West a desirable event. Even though all formulas are reductive and should be handled with caution, it may be basically correct to say that, for Moscow, the best possible evolution of Western European countries would be their "finlandization," rather than, as some believe, their invasion by Soviet tanks "invited" by a local Communist party (or a faction of it).

An Italian government with full Communist participation would probably produce (and this for reasons that go beyond PCI intentions) a certain "slackening"—at least in a first wait-and-see stage—in some of the ties existing between Italy and NATO. The attitude of NATO toward Portugal in 1974–1975 can be seen as a case in point. There can be no doubt that Moscow considers such developments interesting and positive. Yet, participation of Communist parties in government coalitions in Western Europe is not for Moscow the only or even the most promising cause of less cohesion and additional problems for NATO. Communist participation in a Western European government, for instance, could hardly produce more divisive effects (both on NATO and on European integration) than those that for years came out of de Gaulle's policies. Greece and Turkey have caused, and go on causing, tensions within the Western alliance that have little to do with...
Eurocommunism. Similarly, the reluctance in Europe to accept openly the deployment of theater nuclear weapons on their respective territories has been shown by governments that hardly have anything to do with Communists.

To be sure, the Soviet Union is interested in the potential centrifugal consequences of a reduced political homogeneity among Western countries. But such consequences—that is, primarily, a lesser degree of cohesion in the opponent's ranks—can just as well, and probably even better, be produced by strongly nationalistic governments that have as their absolute priority the carrying out of a purely national "mission." Accordingly, should there be a choice between, on the one hand, a Communist party that is increasingly pro-European and accepts the Atlantic Alliance because, among other reasons, it fears the Soviet reaction to Communist experiments with new "roads" (as Berlinguer said once, "I feel safer being on this side"), and, on the other hand, a political force similar to French Gaullism, it is likely that Moscow would opt for and support the latter.

As recent history again demonstrates, Moscow often prefers to deal with conservative Western forces and leaders on a basis of predictability and stability, rather than with progressive forces that are not directly under its control and whose behavior might be unpredictable. Moreover, Moscow cannot but consider with extreme wariness the hypothesis of crises and destabilizations that might lead to further cohesion in the West and a reduction of today's political flexibility.

Moscow's attitude vis-à-vis the PCI is made even more uncertain by another set of factors. Just as problems for the Western alliance go beyond Eurocommunism, Italy's political problems cannot but sap the country's strength and undermine its contribution to the Western alliance and to European integration. Thus, the growth of the PCI can indeed contribute, as far as Moscow sees it, to additional splits in the West. But the Soviets cannot rule out the possibility that the final outcome of this process—following an inevitable difficult stage of adaptation—might be the integration of a new, powerful political force into the Western system. That is, such a process, as Moscow may understand it, might in the end strengthen rather than weaken the West and the PCI—as the Soviets never tire of warning, however indirectly—may end up irreversibly "trapped" in the Western system.

Undoubtedly, the Soviet Union would be much more willing to tolerate the ideological deviations and political autonomy of Eurocommunism if it was clearly a potential source of division within the Western alliance. However, in addition to the complexity of the phenomenon and the unpredictability of its final impact on the West, it is hardly possible in today's world to maintain such political and ideological phenomena within closed geographic compartments. Thus, the situation in Eastern Europe cannot be other than a source of serious concern for Moscow. Although they are careful not to overstep that invisible,
but real, boundary whose existence was dramatically revealed in August 1968, Eastern European countries are trying to reckon with their own problems and internal needs in ways that are potentially dissonant with Moscow's interests and conceptions.

Eurocommunism has entered this picture as a factor that should not be underrated. In effect, not only Eastern European "dissidents," but even the political establishment seem increasingly determined to utilize the existence of Eurocommunism as an additional card to be played in the difficult search for a wider margin of autonomy from Moscow.\textsuperscript{24} In this context, Moscow cannot consider it a coincidence that the PCI is very actively developing close and "comradely" ties with the Polish, Hungarian, and Romanian parties—all of which are, for different reasons, relatively independent minded—whereas its relations with the most orthodox Eastern parties (those of East Germany and Bulgaria) are less intense, though diplomatically correct. More significant still is the fact that relations between the PCI and Czechoslovakia—the least independent of all the Eastern European countries—are very bad and are practically nonexistent.

Even less acceptable to the Soviets is the hypothesis that the influence of Eurocommunism might eventually be felt within the borders of the Soviet Union itself. While Soviet obsession with ideological monolithism is well known, the deep, though unconfessed, sense of ideological inferiority that accompanies it is often overlooked. This further explains Moscow's wary attitude in the face of the possible penetration of Eurocommunist (and especially PCI) ideas within the USSR. The idea is not so farfetched as it might have appeared until a short time ago. Let us take, for instance, the evident "linkage" between the political concepts of one of the most prominent Soviet dissidents, Roy Medvedev, and the PCI.\textsuperscript{25} Medvedev and, presumably, other less-known "political nonconformists" in the Soviet Union believe that only the backing of Western CPs, and especially the PCI, can help those who criticize the Soviet system carry on a political struggle (one that aims at its radical reform, rather than at mere dissent) that may have at least some chance of resisting the overwhelming might of the regime.

To all this, we should add that, in order to give more substance and more credibility to their own political-ideological alternative, the Eurocommunists are more and more obliged to settle accounts, so to speak, with the Soviet Union and its history. Thus, for Moscow, Eurocommunism ends up infringing upon the very core of the regime, debating the undeniable; doubting the undeniable; and doing so, not only on the basis of the experience of Western countries, but also on the basis of Soviet history itself. Indeed, it is remarkable that the only explicit attacks on Eurocommunists published by the Soviet press are those prompted by books that deal with Soviet history from an "unorthodox" point of view.\textsuperscript{26}

As far as the PCI is concerned, its analysis of Soviet history is by now rather...
advanced and sophisticated. Still more serious for Moscow—because it is more official though less blunt than judgments voiced in academic or quasi-academic occasions—is the explicit criticism contained in the theses for the PCI Fifteenth Congress.

The October Revolution and the building of new societies in Russia and later in other countries have meant a historical rupture in the system of imperialism and capitalist exploitation, and have given impulse to national and social revolutions... On the other hand, this great historical experience has shown limits, contradictions and mistakes which bear heavily upon the internal life (both political and economic) of each country, especially as far as democracy is concerned. These limits, contradictions and mistakes also bear heavily upon the relations between socialist countries, and mar the attractiveness of the ideals of socialism all over the world. In any case it is self-evident that the paths and models followed in these countries are not applicable to the socialist transformation of countries such as those in Western Europe, and of Italy in particular... The heavy price paid during the process that was opened in Russia by the October Revolution derives from the objective conditions in which the first proletariat revolution took place, but at the same time also from faults and mistakes in political and economic approach and leadership, from choices such as that of rigidly centralized planning, from the total nationalization of the economy, from the methods and rhythms of farm collectivization, from the identification between party and state. All this caused deep negative repercussions upon class and political relations and upon the very nature of Soviet institutions. There came about, and still exists, a serious contradiction between economic development, the raising of the cultural level of the masses and the democratic potential implicit in the socialist revolution on the one hand, and the protracted existence of forms of organization in the economic, social and political life of the country that hamper the unfolding of a truly democratic life, the exercise of some freedoms and fundamental rights and full participation on the part of the workers.

In sum, it is clear that, for Moscow, Eurocommunism is the source of interesting possibilities, but also worrisome scenarios, since it is simultaneously an element of potential division in the opponent's field, especially in the short run, and a source of potential ideological and political infection in its own. But Moscow's uncertainty on how better to cope with this phenomenon is not just of an objective nature. Even facing the Eurocommunists, as in the case of the West's campaign on human rights, the Soviet regime is displaying its inability to handle a true political-ideological debate in the open, as well as its inability in Europe, at least, to exercise a hegemony of the ideological type beyond the sphere of military control. That is, the Eurocommunist phenomenon is magnifying the gradual loss of the characteristic that made the Soviet Union "special": its being not only a great power, but also the center of a worldwide movement and the model of a type of development that was proposed to the whole of mankind.

The challenge of Eurocommunism, and the way in which the USSR will
cope with it, may well be an important test case. It will show whether the Soviet Union will shift itself more and more into a conservative and ideologically defensive attitude—necessarily combined with a dangerous stress on military might and internal monolithism—or whether it will instead try to face, by renewing itself, the political and ideological challenge of the West, of which Eurocommunism is actually but one of the aspects.

Notes

1. Even Konstantin Zarodov, in an August 1975 article that was widely cited because of its hard-line Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy (“Lenin’s Strategy and Tactics in Revolutionary Struggle,” Pravda, August 6, 1975), called “leftwing deviationists” those who demand “socialism right away” and reject any intermediate strategy.

2. “Marxists-Leninists deem it inadmissible to accept, in order to win over some newly or a few thousand extra votes, compromises that imply the loss of the party’s revolutionary characteristics.” See V. Zagladin, “World Transformations and the Communist Movement,” Rabochii Klass i Soversennyy Mir, no. 5, 1975.


8. “Even if there was just one possibility out of one hundred for a successful attempt to carry out a peaceful transition to workers’ power, one should not discard it. This was Lenin’s position.” S. Titerenko, “Towards Armed Insurrection: The 60th Anniversary of the VI Party Congress,” Pravda, August 8, 1977.

9. “The experience of all revolutions shows that until now the ruling classes have never and nowhere given up voluntarily their power to the workers, that on the contrary they have always and everywhere resorted, as a general rule, to counter-revolutionary methods of struggle. Up to now, none of the ‘peaceful’ revolutions (for instance Finland in 1918, Hungary in 1919, and Chile in 1973) has been able to survive armed opposition on the part of the class enemy.” P. Golub, “The Historical Experience of the CPSU in organizing the Defense of the Revolution,” Voprosy istorii KPSS, no. 10, 1977.

11 Ibid
12 Ibid
18 See, L’Unità, September 18, 1978. The speech was favorably commented in an article by V. Goncharov published by Sovetskaya Rossiya on October 8, 1978.
23 Interview to the Corriere della sera, July 15, 1976.
25 It is the PCI publishing house, Editori Riuniti, that prints Medvedev’s books in Italy.
27. For instance, the setting up of the “Centro di studio e documentazione sui paesi socialisti” (Center for Studies on the Socialist Countries), a subsection of the party’s Gramsci Institute. In January 1978, the center organized a seminar on “Problems of the History of the USSR,” in which extremely unorthodox views on the USSR were voiced. The papers presented at the seminar are published in Momenti e problemi della storia dell’URSS (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1978) One should also mention the books by PCI historian Giuseppe Boffa, Storia dell’Unione Sovietica (Milan: Mondadori, 1976); Dialogo sullo Stalinismo (with Gilles Martinet), (Bari: Laterza, 1976).