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INSIDE THE OSCE

PAPERS FROM THE SEMINARS FOR ITALIAN UNIVERSITIES ON THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE

edited by

Stefano Baldi

Editoriale Scientifica

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Papers from the Seminars for Italian Universities
on the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

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INTRODUCTION

THE 2022 CYCLE OF OSCE SEMINARS

Stefano Baldi

This publication is based on some of the interventions made in the framework of a cycle of seminars titled: "The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) as a model for multilateral regional diplomacy of the 21st century", organised by the Permanent Mission of Italy to the OSCE together with some Italian universities in 2022.

The seminars took place from March to May 2022 in virtual format and aimed at promoting the knowledge and the role and activities of the OSCE, at strengthening cooperation between diplomacy and the Italian university system. All the lectures were given by diplomats of the Permanent Mission of Italy to the OSCE and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, by Italian officials serving at the OSCE, by university professors and by experts of the Organization. Around 60 university students from nine Italian universities participated in the cycle.

The cycle of seminars was held in English and covered a total of 20 hours of training, divided into lectures on the functioning of the OSCE and workshops/interactive sessions for in-depth analysis of specific topics related to the Organization's activities ("case studies"). By using a pragmatic approach to promote and develop the critical thinking of the participants, the "case studies" aimed at fostering a better comprehension of certain aspects and tools of multilateral diplomacy, in relation to the work of the OSCE. Students were encouraged to actively participate in the seminars and ask questions to the speakers. Whenever possible, detailed reading material and background readings were made available before each seminar.

At the end of the cycle of seminars, students acquired the necessary knowledge and instruments to enable them to: recognize and understand the main features of regional multilateral diplomacy, in particular in the OSCE context; evaluate and analyse the different tools

and strategic approaches envisaged and implemented within the OSCE; identify and assess the OSCE strengths and shortcomings in the domain of international relations and regional geopolitics.

Based on the positive feedback received, the initiative was repeated in 2023.

This publication would not have been possible without the valuable insights and work of the students who actively attended the cycle of seminars and enthusiastically took part in the resulting debates. Special thanks go to them and also to their professors for having contributed to the success of the workshops.

As editor of this publication, I wish to underline that all views, thoughts and opinions expressed in the contributions are the authors' own. They do not necessarily reflect the official analyses and positions of the Organizations they belong to. Only the individual authors are responsible for any errors, ambiguities, and omissions. Lastly, it should be noted that the contents of each article were up-to-date at the time of the corresponding lecture (March-May 2022) and might no longer be current.

PART I

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

THE PERMANENT MISSION OF ITALY TO THE OSCE

Massimo Drei – Vito Mosè Pierro – Tullio Baietti

CONTENTS: 1. Introduction. – 2. The OSCE Permanent Council. – 3. Agreeing EU Statements. – 4. The Permanent Council informal subsidiary bodies and the OSCE annual flagship events. – 5. The Forum for Security Co-operation.

1. *Introduction*

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is the largest regional security organization in the world (from Vancouver to Vladivostok), and has its origins in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). Bringing together 57 participating States with the aim of building a security community that is common, comprehensive, equitable, and indivisible, the OSCE is an important platform for multilateral dialogue and cooperation, based on shared principles and commitments across the three dimensions of its comprehensive concept of security (the political-military, the economic-environmental and the human dimension). Governed by the rule of "consensus", it is characterized by a constant tension to reach agreement among all 57 participating States.

Italy is among the main contributors to the OSCE, both in terms of political support to the Organisation (most recently exemplified during our 2018 Chairmanship) and with regard to the provision of financial and human resources. Italy is among the top five participating States contributing to the OSCE unified budget and among the first in terms of seconded personnel. Italy also provides valuable financial support to the projects and initiatives implemented by the Secretariat, the Autonomous Institutions and the field missions, through extra-budgetary voluntary contributions.

The Permanent Mission of Italy to the OSCE in Vienna, headed by Amb. Stefano Baldi, oversees – in close coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in Rome – all aspects related to Italy's participation to the OSCE. A key task of the work of the Mission, among many others, is the participation in the meetings of the OSCE decision-making bodies and their related subsidiary committees and working

groups, to ensure that Italy's position and interests – in close coordination with the other EU Member States – are effectively promoted and represented.

The present chapter will briefly present the functioning of the main OSCE decision-making bodies in Vienna (the OSCE Permanent Council and the Forum for Security Cooperation) and other important OSCE meetings and events, from the perspective of the Permanent Mission of an OSCE participating States.

2. *The OSCE Permanent Council*

The Permanent Council (PC) is the main OSCE decision-making body for regular political consultations and for the daily operational work of the Organization. Chaired by the Permanent Representative of the participating State holding the rotating annual Chairmanship, the Permanent Council is composed of the Permanent Representatives of the 57 participating States and the European Union Delegation in Vienna. The representatives of the OSCE Mediterranean and Asian Partner countries for Cooperation, as well as the representatives of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, are also allowed to attend and address (with permission of the Chair) the meetings of the PC. The meetings are held in all six official languages of the OSCE (English, French, German, Russian, Spanish and Italian) with simultaneous interpretation.

The PC normally meets weekly on Thursdays at 10:00. If necessary, the Chair may also convene special or reinforced (i.e. with participation of senior officials from capitals) PC meetings, to discuss specific or urgent issues of common interest. In 2022, following Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine on 24 February, the Polish Chair convened 13 special and 3 reinforced PC meetings in addition to the regular ones.

A typical agenda of a PC meeting includes the discussion of a report by an invited speaker (e.g. the Head of an OSCE field mission, of an OSCE Autonomous Institution or the Secretary General of the Council of Europe), followed by the so-called "current issues" which are issues of political relevance that any participating State can bring to the attention of the Council. Two current issues have regularly been on the agenda of the Permanent Council, since 2014: one raised by Ukraine ("Russia's ongoing aggression

against Ukraine and the illegal occupation of Crimea") and one by Russia ("The deteriorating situation in Ukraine and continued non implementation of the Minsk agreement"), exemplifying the opposing and conflicting narratives on the conflict in and around Ukraine. Following Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the Polish chair added the topic "The Russian Federation's ongoing aggression against Ukraine" as a regular stand-alone agenda item.

During the meetings of the PC, participating States present their national positions on any given topic of the agenda. EU Member States normally do not speak in their national capacities, but with a single voice through the European Union Delegation, in line with the provisions of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In practice this means that the EU Member State holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU takes the floor and passes it, with permission of the OSCE Chair, to the EU Delegation, which then delivers a statement on behalf of all 27 Member States (and other aligned countries). It is still possible for individual EU Member States to take the floor in a national capacity on issues of particular national interest, or sometimes when it is important to have additional voices reinforcing the EU common message.

3. *Agreeing EU Statements*

EU statements need to be agreed by the 27 EU Member States prior to each PC meeting.

Agreeing statements of the European Union for the Permanent Council is a rather complex process requiring extensive coordination among all Permanent Missions of the 27 Member States and the EU Delegation on a tight timeline.

The cycle starts on the Friday before the meeting of the Permanent Council of the following Thursday when the EU Delegation circulates the preview of the statements. The preview outlines the key points and messages that the EU wants to make in each statement. It is worth noting that due to capacity issues, the EU Delegation cannot draft all the statements. Member States' diplomats step in and, based on a previously agreed division of labour by subject matter (known as "chef de file" system), provide the drafts.

At the regular meeting of the EU Heads of Mission on Monday after-

noon, the previewed statements are agreed. Ambassadors can ask for changes to be made to the outlines, for example by proposing the addition of language on a specific issue.

On Tuesday morning the EU Delegation circulates the first drafts of the statements (so-called DV1) asking for eventual comments by Member States by Wednesday before 8:00. The Permanent Missions forward the DV1s to the respective capitals for comments and clearance. Based on all comments received by the Member States, the EU Delegation circulates the second drafts (so-called DV2) on Wednesday by 12:00 noon, under a rather short silence procedure ending at 14:00. If silence is not broken the statements are considered agreed and the EU Delegation sends them for alignment (to the candidate countries, potential candidate countries, EFTA countries, Andorra, Monaco, and San Marino). If silence is instead broken, the EU Delegation tries in the first instance to reconcile the points of contention with the interested Missions and issues a third draft (DV3) under a short silence procedure of usually one hour. If this option does not prove successful, a coordination meeting at the level of Deputy Heads of Missions is convened by the EU Delegation to discuss the points where silence was broken and come up with compromise language agreeable to all 27 Member States. If the Deputies fail to find agreement, the issue is taken up by the Heads of Mission in a coordination meeting just before the Permanent Council on Thursday morning at 9:00. Over the past 4 years only once it proved impossible to find an agreement.

This "miracle" of EU coordination is repeated week after week, allowing the European Union to speak with a single voice on all issues discussed at the Permanent Council.

4. *The Permanent Council informal subsidiary bodies and the OSCE annual flagship events*

In addition to contributing to the Permanent Council meetings, the Permanent Mission also covers the work of the PC informal subsidiary bodies, namely: the Security Committee, the Committee on Economic and Environmental issues and the Human Dimension Committee. These Committees are informal and are chaired by one of the 57 Permanent Representatives on behalf of the Chairmanship. In 2022, the Security Com-

mittee was chaired by Canada, the Economic and Environmental Committee by Austria and the Human Dimension Committee by Norway. Attended at expert level, the Committees discuss and analyse in more technical details issues of common interest across the three dimensions of the OSCE comprehensive concept of security. The Chairs of the Committee, following consultations with all participating States and trying to strike a difficult balance between conflicting views and priorities, identify a work programme for the year and formally present it to the Permanent Council. Each Committee meeting has a set agenda; external speakers or experts from the participating States are invited to make presentations on the chosen topic and the representatives of the participating States are encouraged to ask questions, share best practices and other national initiatives. This is one of the ways in which the OSCE works as a platform for dialogue and cooperation. As in the PC and other official meetings, the EU Delegation usually speaks on behalf of the EU Member States on the basis of previously agreed lines to take. In the run up to the OSCE Ministerial Council (i.e. the annual meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs), from October onwards, the Committees also discuss and negotiate the so-called Ministerial "deliverables", i.e. draft decisions or declarations to be submitted to Ministers for adoption. The EU Delegation plays again an active role in the negotiations, based on previously agreed EU common positions.

The OSCE Rules of Procedures include three other important informal subsidiary bodies of the Permanent Council: 1. the Preparatory Committee (PrepComm), the most important one, which usually convenes on ad hoc basis to verify whether there is consensus on specific draft decisions and submit them to the PC for formal approval; 2. the Advisory Committee on Management and Finance (ACMF), chaired by the Chairmanship – where the unified budget and all other financial-related matters of the Organisation are discussed; 3. the Mediterranean and Asian Partners of Cooperation Groups. Additional informal working groups can be established by the Chair to discuss specific issues of interest: e.g. among others, the Informal Working Group on Civil Society Participation at OSCE events, the Informal Working Group on Strengthening the Legal Framework of the OSCE and the Informal Working Group on cyber issues (see below para 5 for more info).

In addition to these meetings, which are open only to the representatives of the participating States, the OSCE hosts major flagship annual

events. These meetings are important because they are attended not only by government representatives, but also allow for the participation of civil society organizations, business associations and academia. They are also live streamed. Some of these meetings require the adoption of a formal decision of the Permanent Council (i.e. require the consensus of the 57 participating States) on the topics and agenda of the meeting; others are organised autonomously by the Chairmanship.

The main annual event in the political-military dimension is the Annual Security Review Conference ASRC, held before the summer recess based on a formal PC decision, with the aim of fostering the exchange of information and strengthen cooperation on issues related to the OSCE first dimension. For the second dimension, there are two main annual events: the Economic and Environmental Forum, which takes place in Prague usually in the first week of September, and the Economic and Environmental implementation meeting, which takes place later in the autumn (October/November) in Vienna. Both meetings require a PC decision. In order to describe the difference between the two events, one could say that the Economic and Environmental Forum (EEF) is a forward- looking event, i.e. it focuses on one or more issues which are considered a priority by the Chairmanship and could be the object of new commitments at the following Ministerial Council. On the other hand, the Economic and Environmental Implementation Meeting (EEDIM) is backward-looking: participating States can share what they have done to implement previously-agreed commitments. By commitments, we refer to the decisions adopted by the Ministerial Council. Within the EEF cycle, there are two further preparatory meetings: one usually held in Vienna in February, and the other one usually hosted by the Chairmanship in their own country in May.

In the human dimension, there are three different annual events. The biggest and most important one is the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM): this is a two-week event that takes place in Warsaw (where the headquarters of ODHIR are based) usually between the last week of September and the first one of October. HDIM is the largest human rights-focused event in the OSCE area, gathering government representatives and civil society organisations. The Human Dimension Seminar (HDS) is required to take place once per year on a specific topic proposed by the Chairmanship. The agenda, topics and organisational modalities of HDIM and HDS must be agreed by consensus. For this reason, HDIM

has not taken place since 2020: the first time because of COVID-19 and in 2021 because of the opposition of the Russian Federation to the proposed topics and agenda of the meeting. The Human Dimension Seminar has not taken place since 2013 with only only exception. In 2021 participating States managed to reach consensus on the topic of the fight against violence against women and girls and the Seminar took place in November in Warsaw. Finally, three Supplementary Human Dimension meetings (SHDMs) are held every year in Vienna before the summer recess under the responsibility of the Chairmanship that chooses the topics of discussion and decides the agenda. All these meetings are open to civil society participation.

5. *The Forum for Security Co-operation*

The Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) is an autonomous decision-making body focused on the OSCE political-military dimension of security. Its main objectives are to discuss the implementation of arms control agreements, disarmament and confidence-building measures, to military hold regular consultations and strengthen cooperation on matters related to military security. It brings together the representatives of the 57 OSCE participating States plus the EU Delegation and it is usually convened on Wednesdays. The typical agenda of a meeting covers issues of political relevance that any participating State can bring to the attention of the Forum. The FSC Chairmanship differs from the OSCE Chair, since it rotates every four months among all 57 participating States. Depending on the acting Chairmanship, FSC meetings may include dedicated discussions, called "security dialogues" on political and military topics of common interest. The FSC has two standing working groups, attended by all OSCE participating States at the expert level. These working groups are tasked with drafting and coordinating the paperwork for the subsequent adoption of FSC decisions.

In addition to the FSC, there are two main bodies related to the implementation of specific treaties of the arms control regime: the Joint Consultative Group, which meets on a monthly basis and deals with the questions related to the implementation of the "Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe"; and the Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC), the implementing body of the "Treaty on Open Skies". It also

has several informal working groups at expert level for the discussion of technical issues such as those related to sensors, notification and formats, aircraft certification and rules and procedures.

Further important fora in the political-military dimension include:

- the Informal Working Group Structured Dialogue, whose aim is to facilitate the relaunch of conventional arms control in Europe and to discuss the challenges in the wider politico-military sphere;
- the Informal Working Group on cyber/information and communication technologies (ICT) security, whose aim is to step up national and collective efforts to address security in the use of ICTs in a comprehensive and cross-dimensional manner. It operates under the auspices of the Security Committee and is tasked inter alia to elaborate a set of draft confidence-building measures (CBMs) to enhance interstate co-operation, transparency, predictability, and stability, and to reduce the risks of misperception, escalation, and conflict that may stem from the use of ICTs;
- the Sub-Regional Consultative Commission, which usually meets twice a year and oversees the implementation of the Sub-Regional Arms Control Article IV of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which has become one of the key mechanisms for preserving and promoting security and stability in the Western Balkan region.

THE INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE OF THE OSCE

Luca Fratini

I served from 2017 to 2019 as Deputy Permanent Representative of Italy to the OSCE in Vienna and Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee during the Italian Chairmanship in 2018. Afterwards I took over my current position as Director of the Office of the OSCE Secretary General.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe is the world largest regional security organization and a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Derived from the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), which agreed on the Helsinki Final Act signed in 1975 by the original 35 participating States, the OSCE currently counts 57 participating States, the most recent to join the Organization being Mongolia in 2012.

The Helsinki Final Act was structured in three main "baskets", respectively focusing on politico-military, economic – then expanded to include environmental issues, and human rights, which today are referred to as the three dimensions of OSCE. In addition, the Helsinki Final Act entails an explicit recognition of the importance of Mediterranean security, which is recognized as inextricably linked to security in Europe and as a fundamental component of the OSCE work. The Helsinki Decalogue contains the ten fundamental principles governing the behavior of States towards their citizens, as well as towards each other. The principles are the following: sovereign equality, refraining from the threat or use of force, inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity of States, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intervention in internal affairs, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, equal rights and self-determination of peoples, co-operation between States, and fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.

The institutionalization process leading from the CSCE to the OSCE started in 1990, when the CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension held in Copenhagen adopted a document to reiterate the need for protection and promotion of human rights. Later in the year, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe and the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) were also signed, marking a turning point in the history of the Organiza-

tion in the post-Cold War era. In 1991, the Secretariat, the Conflict Prevention Centre (later absorbed by the Secretariat upon its transfer to Vienna) and the Office for Free Elections (later ODIHR) were established in Prague, Vienna and Warsaw, respectively. It was at the Budapest Summit in 1994 that it was agreed to rename the CSCE as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to reflect its actual work, reinforcing the role of the Secretary General, the Secretariat, the High Commissioner on National Minorities and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.

The CSCE/OSCE Summits constitute the highest level of political representation of the Organization: Helsinki 1975, Paris 1990, Helsinki 1992, Budapest 1994, Lisbon 1996, Istanbul 1999 and the Summit in Astana in 2010, which produced the most recent document signed by OSCE Heads of State and Government. The OSCE presents a complex structure with its executive bodies: the Chairmanship with its Personal and Special Representatives, the Secretary General and the Secretariat with its departments, the Field Operations, the OSCE autonomous institutions: the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) and the Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFoM).

After the Summits, the Ministerial Council is the central decision-making and governing body of the OSCE, convened once a year in December in the country holding the Chairmanship. The Permanent Council (PC) and the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) take place once a week in Vienna and are supported by subsidiary bodies, such as the Preparatory Committee, the Security Committee, the Economic and Environmental Committee and the Human Dimension Committee (for the PC), and two working groups (for the FSC). OSCE Field Operations also reflect the very dynamic structure of the Organization and its continuous and ongoing efforts to promote security at country level.

The OSCE has a comprehensive approach to security through the work of its three dimensions. At the same time, the OSCE faces major threats: armed conflict, polarization, politicization, transnational threats, including terrorism, violent extremism, organized crime and trafficking in cultural property, as well as human trafficking, alongside the ever-growing challenge of ensuring efficient use of the increasingly scarce financial resources available. On the side of the opportunities, the OSCE membership

includes the geographical area from Vancouver to Vladivostok: the structured dialogue, which was established in 2016, the renewed European Security Dialogue proposed by the 2022 Polish Chairmanship, the common set of rules including all the documents the participating States have committed to, such as the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter, and the co-operative approach to security are all assets which can be the key for effective multilateralism.

The OSCE is a unique platform for dialogue and offers the possibility for regional co-operation and the promotion of good governance within States. It also disposes of a conflict cycle toolbox and represents a model for other regions of the world.

OSCE CONFLICT PREVENTION TOOLS AND PROCEDURES

Lamberto Zannier

CONTENTS: 1. Addressing armed conflicts in the 21st century: challenges and prospects for multilateral diplomacy. – 2. Lessons from the crisis in and around Ukraine. – 3. The geopolitical divide reappears. Is there more need for inclusive spaces for dialogue and joint action like in the OSCE?

1. *Addressing armed conflicts in the 21st century: challenges and prospects for multilateral diplomacy*

Multilateralism works effectively when there is a strong investment by governments in the organization and a strong leadership. The CSCE Conference was born out of a convergence of interests between NATO and the Warsaw Pact: it was, in practice, a space for dialogue between enemies and it was the result of two years of difficult negotiations in Geneva, where the members of the two opposing alliances ultimately showed (with a strong facilitation by the neutral and non-aligned countries) that they had chosen the path of dialogue to address the diverging security perceptions that might have led to renewed conflict in Europe. Today, the space for dialogue is no longer there and the willingness to use the space for dialogue and the tools of the organization to build confidence and prevent conflict is no longer apparent. The OSCE has a large toolbox; there are many things that can be done, as long as the political will to use the organization's instruments is there. There are mechanisms of the organization that have been activated, to try and prevent the war in Ukraine, but key players refused to engage in using these mechanisms at decisive moments. Dialogue is increasingly replaced by a series of monologues, often with propagandistic accents.

The OSCE is a regional organization which has a format that transcends its geographic limits. It is a European Organization with a Euro Atlantic dimension, as it encompasses the whole NATO membership. It has also a Eurasian dimension, as it incorporates the whole of the former Soviet

Union, including the Central Asian countries, with the subsequent addition of Mongolia.

As a security organization, preventing and managing conflicts is one of the core tasks for the OSCE. Many of the mechanisms that have been established with the aim of preventing conflicts are, in many ways, addressing the potential root causes of conflicts and have proven their effectiveness when countries have not tried to create artificial obstacles to their functioning. An example is the work of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, whose mandate is primarily focused on promoting a healthy and balanced relationship between minorities and majority in areas where, if left unaddressed, societal tensions might provoke crises and conflict. Well integrated, diverse societies are a key element of stability in an increasing complex and diverse world. More broadly, the strong OSCE attention to the human dimension does not only reflect the importance of defending human rights and promoting democratic institutions as a key UN priority, but must also be seen from a security perspective, because societies operating in a democratic manner are more stable and secure societies. And a stable society is generally peaceful. As a matter of fact, for conflict prevention to be effective, it is not enough to be prepared to act by fielding mediators and promoting dialogue and negotiations when there are signs that a possible conflict is about to start. An effective policy of conflict prevention is a very long-term policy: you have to recognize those factors which, if left unaddressed, will over time produce tensions and potentially conflicts. The issue of integration of minorities is moreover an issue that is not only about the stability of the society, but also about relations between countries.

2. *Lessons from the crisis in and around Ukraine*

There are many areas where one can operate to prevent conflict. If you do not have a favorable political environment facilitating the application of those mechanisms, they simply do not work. Even before the explosion of the conflict in the Donbass, in 2014, I was telling the Ukrainians that, following Maidan, there was a need for a broad dialogue at the national level in Ukraine to help the country overcome potentially disruptive internal divisions. It should have been a dialogue involving society, so that everybody could in a way contribute to decisions on the next steps, recognizing them-

selves in the new set-up. I developed a project to promote that dialogue, but the Ukrainian leadership's support for it was very lukewarm. In the absence of a unifying agenda, the country remained divided and the Russian exploited that by encouraging the fringes of opposition that had been the political basis of Yanukovych, particularly strong in Crimea and in Donbass. When separatist rebels started to attack Ukrainian facilities in the East, the Ukrainians decided to activate a mechanism of the OSCE on "Unusual military activities", and invited for a visit to the region by a group of high level military observers from all interested OSCE countries. These observers travelled to Slavyansk in a couple of buses to monitor this situation, but got stopped by the separatists because were seen as somehow representing NATO and the West. They were then taken hostage for over a week, as separatists did not recognize arrangements agreed by OSCE States (nor did the Russians, who were supporting them, intervene to discourage them). This is an example of a mechanism that is well built but, if used in a context where the consent of its application it is not present, than it simply does not work. In this case, this mechanism was used on the initiative of Ukraine, but obviously it was seen by Russia as running contrary to its own interests.

This was a precedent that was taken into account when establishing one of the largest OSCE operations ever, the Monitory Mission in Ukraine (SMM). It was imperative to try to persuade Russia that a future international monitoring mission was also in their interests. As part of these discussions, there was a negotiation on the specific number of Russian monitors that would have been part of it (as I suggested, the number would have been proportional to the quota of financial contribution by the Russian Federation to the OSCE). However, the Ukrainians did not want to have Russians among the monitors, and would have preferred an EU or NATO operation anyway. But that would have been politically unsound and problematic, as the Vienna Document incident had shown: in fact, it was mainly thanks to the presence of monitors from former Soviet republics that the operation managed to have quite a bit of access in Donbass. This was an important lesson: if an operation is based on the decision of a group of countries that has its own agenda, then this operation may not be seen by everybody as legitimate, and can find obstacles on the ground to the detriment of its effectiveness. The EU has sometimes this problem (e.g. the European Monitoring Mission in Georgia, which is very popular with the

Georgians but, contrary to the previous OSCE and UN Missions, has virtually no access to the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia).

This is where the inclusive nature of the OSCE, with mandates adopted by consensus by the whole membership, can prove to be key to providing access to these "grey areas", where self-declared independent entities, generally confrontational towards some of the western European institutions, were not opposing the action of the OSCE as long as countries they considered friendly supported the OSCE action, thus providing it with the needed legitimacy. Once again, to reach this perception of legitimacy is quite difficult: the leadership of the organization has a key role in this regard, to promote, through dialogue and negotiation, the conditions for a consensus decision on setting up the operations. This is why some of the mechanisms of the OSCE that were adopted in the early 90s, when the rule of the "consensus minus one" was used to suspend the participation of Yugoslavia as a result of the conflicts in the Western Balkans, no longer really work. At that time, a number of non consensual mechanisms were created: the Vienna mechanism, the Moscow mechanism etc. They are still active today. However, the increasing geopolitical confrontation has progressively turned them into confrontational mechanisms, and this has undermined their legitimacy and effectiveness: as the country targeted by the mechanism does in fact not cooperate, and this lack of cooperation attracts even more blame to the country, the effectiveness of the mechanism is in practice compromised and the results become highly politicized.

3. *The geopolitical divide reappears. Is there more need for inclusive spaces for dialogue and joint action like in the OSCE?*

We are back into a situation where the community is divided, the geopolitical gap is growing wider and wider, and mechanisms that are not consensual do not work. The other half of the problem is that mechanisms that are consensual are difficult to activate because consensus is very difficult to reach. This is the limit of the action of the organization in these days, even though we have quite a few examples of successful operations. As I was Director of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Center, in the early 2000s, we set up a large border monitoring operation with hundreds of highly skilled observers on the border between Chechnya (RF) and Geor-

gia, high into the mountains. These monitors were equipped with advanced and sophisticated observation equipment: they had infra-red binoculars to spot in the distance, just looking through the woods and into the valleys, people walking across the border, and then patrols would be sent out to check who they were and report back. This operation was agreed by everybody, including Russia. There were observers coming from all OSCE countries, and Georgia particularly benefited from it, until Russia decided to pull the plug in 2005. Another example of a successful operation has been the Security Community Initiative that was launched in Kyrgyzstan in 2010-11. There were disorders in south Kyrgyzstan, where the Uzbek minority felt increasingly disenfranchised and discriminated by the Kyrgyz, and this led to rebellion and a major crisis, which only magnified the problems. The OSCE, through its Security Community initiative, started a training programme for the police by promoting the notion of multiethnic policing (which unfortunately was never fully endorsed by the Government, for a number of reasons) and training the police on how to operate in a volatile and diverse environment. At least, it raised the awareness of the problem, even though it did not really solve it completely. Repeated discussions with subsequent Ministers of Interior of Kyrgyzstan helped shed light on the issue and attempts were made over time in discussions with Uzbekistan to give a better protection to the Uzbek community. These are positive examples of engagement to prevent recurrence of conflict.

When we talk about conflict prevention, this kind of dialogue and this kind of engagement with the government at every level, identifying the issues, promoting appropriate legislative and administrative measures and encouraging dialogue among countries on issues that are sensitive is always a positive way to address problems which, if left unaddressed, will down the line and lead to a potential conflict.

Specifically on conflict prevention, there is a decision that goes back to 2011 (the Vilnius Ministerial Council decision on elements of the conflict cycle), which enumerated all areas where the capacity of the organization needed to be improved, leading to a number of initiatives over the years to improve the effectiveness of the organization in this area: among these, I would mention the establishment of a mediation support unit in the Conflict Prevention Centre to undertake systematic training, analyze best practices and lessons learned, ensure gender balance, engage with civil society, liaise with partner organizations such as the UN and the EU, and so on.

But all this took place in an environment where the geopolitical divide was already growing, making it difficult to gather universal support and consensus, and where it was relatively easy to develop the tools and to have a good roster of mediators, but very difficult to put them to good use: as a consequence, it became almost impossible to find enough support and consensus in the organization to deploy early warning teams or, even if deployed, to make sure they could get appropriate results. This is the key gap between early warning, which is relatively easy if you have good understanding of realities on the ground, and early action, for which there is a need for specific support or at least a "green light" by the membership.

The best early warning is through a good medium- to long-term presence on the ground, with people who understand the political processes. Having really sound people on the ground is what makes the difference. This is what will produce reliable signs of early warning and, as the head of an institution, allows you to start planning possible responses: but this is also where one needs the support and the space to adopt the necessary initiatives, and for that an alignment of the members of the organization – even with different motives – is imperative. If you intend to take action, you often find the State concerned minimizing the problem and stating that it is an internal issue on the way of being solved: so you need a coalition of countries, including countries friendly to the country in question, to help create positive conditions for a positive decision and the beginning of the operation. In a divided environment, as the one we witness today, where even basic agreed principles governing interstate relations are put into question and where the use of force tends to replace dialogue and negotiation, these favorable conditions will not likely emerge. Therefore, there is a limit to how much a multilateral institution can take an initiative even with a strong leadership accepting to take some risks: one can always send a small fact-finding team, or have a mediation group ready to intervene as soon as everybody is ready to start talking, but, at the end of the day, the support from both sides remains key. When I was working with the UN in Kosovo, I engaged in negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina with the aim of transferring some of the UN competencies to the EU, as it had more leverage with the sides through a European perspective for the entire region. In fact, these successful negotiations opened the way for the deployment of an important EU operation on the ground, in line with the UN Mandate. To achieve this result there was a need to somehow bring

the European Union under the umbrella of the UN mandate. This was at the center of months of negotiations (proximity talks, because the Kosovars would not engage in direct dialogue with Belgrade if not recognized, and Belgrade would only talk to the UN, considered by them as the legitimate international authority over Kosovo, in line with UNSCR 1244). When the negotiations were successfully concluded, their result was encapsulated in a Report I presented to the Security Council at the end of 2008, which was adopted by the Council through a Presidential Statement, opening the way for the deployment of the EU operations. It was the first tome the UNSC adopted a consensual decision on Kosovo since the adoption of Resolution 1244 in 2001, and this was also the result of a continuing parallel engagement with the key Members of the Council throughout the negotiations to ensure their support for the final result: the Security Council was divided because key members had different visions on what the final objective was, and, in particular, keeping the Russians and the Chinese on board was essential. Sometimes you need to build your own dynamics in a negotiation, the ultimate goal being to find a point of alignment of all (the Kosovars were not too enthusiastic about this outcome, but their main supporters intervened to convince them that it would be in their best long-term interest). The transfer of competences in a vast range of functions in the rule of law area followed immediately, the EULEX Mission became operational, but the result were not as good as it was expected (partly due to differences within the EU regarding the final status of Kosovo but, more importantly, as a result of the regional complexities which affected the overall engagement of the EU in the region).

These examples show very clearly that the political environment and circumstances are more important than the mechanism itself. The OSCE, for example, is an organization without legal basis, which increases flexibility and makes it possible to adapt the mechanisms of the organization to achieve the desired results, when you see that there is a need to move in certain directions. But this becomes a problem when there is a need to engage rapidly in a complex environment. An example was the establishment of the Special Monitor Mission in Ukraine (SMM), which required a solid protection for OSCE staff on the ground, in light of the volatile security conditions. As the OSCE has no legal personality, this protection could only be given on the basis of an MOU (memorandum of understanding) with the country where the missions were deployed. As the Swiss Chairmanship was negotiating the

SMM mandate with the Participating States, I sent my legal advisers to Kiev to negotiate a draft MOU. As the SMM deployed, the MOU was agreed, but it still took a few months for the Ukrainians to ratify it, and I had to deal with another hostage crisis while the members of the Ukrainian Rada were still arguing about the MoU. It then only took me 5 minutes to sign it once the ratification procedures by Ukraine were completed. Achieving recognized legal personality for the OSCE by all its members would greatly facilitate quick deployments, but persisting internal divisions make this prospect very unlikely for the foreseeable future.

THE OSCE OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (ODIHR)

Matteo Mecacci

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1. *What is the OSCE comprehensive approach and what were the main historical steps that created the OSCE and ODIHR?*

The OSCE's comprehensive concept of security includes, in a single definition, the political/military, the economic/environmental and the human dimensions of security. The mandate of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) was established under the human dimension.

The OSCE was the first international organization to state that there is a clear connection between human rights and security. There is a dimension connected to International Security, where the respect for human rights principles and democratic standards is recognized as an integral element of the international security framework. There is also the element of national security, where respect for human and civil rights is the foundation of a national democratic society, achieving stability and security by peaceful and non-repressive means. Finally, there is individual security, where the protection of individual human rights allows for the enjoyment of security and participation in public life, ensuring pluralism and the protection of the most vulnerable groups in society.

The Helsinki Final Act (1975), which was signed after countries reached out to each other in the middle of the Cold War, is a milestone in

the history of human rights. In its Decalogue, the Helsinki Final Act contains acceptance by all countries of the principles of democracy and human rights as a cornerstone of this concept of comprehensive security. Between 1975 and 1989, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) developed into the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) that we know today, adding more permanent structures:

- the Secretariat, based in Vienna, was given operational capabilities through departments and structures working on a permanent basis;
- the establishment of independent Institutions, the first of which was the Warsaw-based Office for Free Elections in 1991 that later became ODIHR, followed by the High Commissioner on National Minorities in The Hague (HCNM) and the Representative on Freedom of the Media in Vienna (RfOM);
- the establishment of Field Operations across the OSCE region, currently numbering 15, ranging from the Western Balkans to Central Asia.

In the 1990s, the OSCE expanded, along with the commitments made in the human dimension, which included the creation of ODIHR. There were a number of milestones leading up to its establishment:

- The first step was the decision taken, in 1990 in Paris, to establish an office with the mandate to observe elections across the OSCE region, which is still a key feature of ODIHR's mandate. In 1992, the mandate of the Office was expanded and its name was changed to the "Office for Democratic Institutions and Human rights", making it the main institution in the human dimension. The office is located in Warsaw with some 150 staff members from over 30 countries. It has a budget of 16.1 million euros, but can also rely on extra budgetary contributions where needed.

2. *What are the human dimension features of the OSCE?*

The OSCE is the only pan-European institution dealing with comprehensive security, with 57 participating States on both sides of the Atlantic. The OSCE is the only forum in which human rights issues are discussed at regional level. Similar discussions also take place at the Council of Europe, but there, the United States acts only as an observer and the Russian Fed-

eration withdrew from it in 2022 shortly before it would have been excluded from the organization.

The OSCE Human Dimension commitments are undertakings in the fields of human rights, democracy and rule of law that participating States have agreed to honour. These commitments form the basis on which OSCE institutions can assist participating States in the human dimension of security. Commitments are developed jointly and adopted unanimously by all participating States, who make a political commitment to implement them. They go far beyond traditional legally binding human rights instruments, since they recognize pluralistic democracy based on the rule of law as the only system of government that can effectively guarantee human rights. However, there are still some players who do not fully endorse this principle and suggest that human rights can also be guaranteed without democracy.

3. *The OSCE commitments as a process*

Since its inception, the OSCE has followed a "process" approach, which is very important for understanding the OSCE human rights framework. OSCE commitments take the form of documents adopted by consensus at OSCE summits or ministerial meetings, each of which takes place in a particular political climate and context. The Organization then follows a "process" approach, providing for regular follow-up conferences and meetings to discuss the implementation of the standards agreed in previous meetings. When looking at the sets of documents agreed over the years, one can see a consequential approach that builds on previous documents and tries to expand these commitments, sometimes leading to new decisions that further improve the protection of democracy and human rights. However, because of the rule of consensus, it is not always possible to achieve unanimous commitment on issues such as human rights, gender equality or discrimination against minorities in the way one can within the European Union or the Council of Europe. The majority of the European Union's member states are mostly like-minded when it comes to rule of law or democracy and human rights, while within the OSCE there are countries that have different interpretations of some of the commitments that ODIHR took on in the 1990s. The OSCE has a very flexible and dynamic norm-creating process in the field of human rights, which has advantages and disadvantages.

There is a group of countries that are not completely like-minded, but once decisions are taken by all countries, they are adopted by consensus usually at summits or ministerial meetings, which take place at the end of each year, convened by the country that holds the rotating OSCE chair.

OSCE commitments are more than a simple declaration of will or good intentions, but rather a political pledge to comply with these standards. OSCE commitments are not legally enforceable norms or principles. Unlike many other human rights documents, OSCE commitments are politically, rather than legally binding. Given the political nature of the OSCE commitments, once consensus among the participating States has been achieved, decisions enter into force immediately and are in principle binding upon all OSCE States.

4. *What are the key documents of the OSCE?*

In the years following the end of the Cold War, the OSCE had the advantage of being a political forum where countries could act fast, with no lengthy ratification of decisions by national parliaments. Once consensus was reached, the commitments were immediately binding, and this allowed the OSCE to play an avant-garde role in setting standards after the Cold War. Documents were agreed that would have been unthinkable a few years before, and some would say that it is unlikely they would be agreed upon today.

The Copenhagen Document (1990) is an extensive text that explains the human dimension, stating that human rights, democracy, and the rule of law are interrelated. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, a unique political climate was in the air, with aspirations for democratic change. Copenhagen gave all States in the region the opportunity to work together to turn those aspirations into clear standards that tied together concepts like democratic elections, rule of law and respect for human rights. It insists that these three concepts are closely interrelated and that none can exist without the other. In other words, no State can claim to be in a democracy without respect for human rights; human rights can only be guaranteed in a democracy; and the rule of law goes far beyond formal respect for the law[1]. This concept is enshrined in this quote: "Full

[1] The Copenhagen Document defines the Rule of Law as "justice based on the su-

respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the development of societies based on pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are prerequisites for progress in setting up the lasting order of peace, security, justice and co-operation."

The Copenhagen Document also included far reaching commitments on national minorities, acknowledged for the first time the particular problems faced by Roma and Sinti and established a commitment on conducting democratic elections that laid the groundwork for future OSCE activities in election monitoring.

The Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990): the commitments signed in Paris not only established a vision of Europe for all states to work towards, no matter how difficult that path would prove to be, but also gave the OSCE a toolbox to help them get there. This included the establishment of the Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna and the Office of Free Elections in Warsaw that would later become ODIHR. The Charter states: "Human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all human beings, are inalienable and are guaranteed by law. Their protection and promotion is the first responsibility of government" and it undertakes to "build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations."

The Moscow meeting (1991) states that "participating States categorically and irrevocably declared that the commitments undertaken in the field of human dimension of the OSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned." This commitment revolutionized international relations to a considerable extent: within the OSCE, States accepted that the situation of human rights in a country is a matter of concern to all. This commitment is at the core of what makes the OSCE special, and forms the basis for much of the dialogue that takes place in the Permanent Council and in the work of the Institutions.

This is also a key commitment for the mandate of ODIHR: assistance to participating States is provided on the basis that ODIHR is an international institution and is accepted by participating States as a forum for dis-

preme value of the human personality and guaranteed by institutions providing a framework for its fullest expression".

cussing and analysing the implementation of commitments in the human dimension. Without this, it would be easy for some to say that ODIHR should not interfere in the internal affairs of participating States. One concept linked to this is the Moscow mechanism, which this year was activated three times in the context of the war in Ukraine.

The Istanbul Charter for European Security (1999): the Charter states, "respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law is at the core of the OSCE's comprehensive concept of security." The Charter also clearly states "participating States are accountable to their citizens and are responsible to each other for the implementation of their OSCE commitments", meaning that States are held to account by their peers, with vertical accountability towards citizens and horizontal accountability to peers.

The concept of vertical and horizontal accountability is also contained in the Astana Commemorative Declaration of 2010, which does not contain many new undertakings but rather reiterates the existing vision and commitments in clear and simple terms.

5. *ODIHR thematic programme*

The mandate of ODIHR is largely devoted to assisting and monitoring the implementation of the commitments made by participating States in the fields of fundamental freedoms and human rights, rule of law, tolerance and non-discrimination, civil society and free media, minority rights and democratic institutions.

The activities of ODIHR are currently divided across five main programmatic lines, which correspond to the Office's five thematic Departments: elections, democratic institutions and rule of law, human rights, tolerance and non-discrimination, and Roma and Sinti.

5.1. *Elections*

Election observation is one of ODIHR's key activities, fittingly for an organization that began as the Office for Free Elections in 1990. ODIHR's election activities cover three main phases:

- Observation: assessing the extent to which electoral processes in OSCE participating States respect fundamental freedoms and are characterized by equality, universality, political pluralism, confidence, transparency and accountability, in line with the OSCE commitments and other international obligations.
- Follow-up: assisting States in improving their electoral processes based on the recommendations of the ODIHR observation mission by providing technical expertise and legal reviews.
- Additional support: enhancing the capacity of citizen observer groups, training international observers from participating States, publishing handbooks to build the technical expertise of electoral actors, including citizens and international observers.

Since its inception, ODIHR has conducted more than 400 election observation missions. In 2021, ODIHR observed 19 elections in 16 participating States, including deploying over 1,200 short-term observers to six full election observation missions. Prior to an election in an OSCE participating State, ODIHR conducts a Needs Assessment Mission to determine if the Office will observe and, if so, what type of team is needed. Missions vary from expert teams (2-3 experts) to election observation missions involving experts and long- and short-term observers, (e.g. 30 long-term and 200-250 short-term observers). In 2022, elections took place in OSCE participating States including the Netherlands, Malta, Portugal, Hungary, Serbia, France, Sweden, Italy, Slovenia, Latvia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Austria and the United States. Challenges include early elections announced shortly before they are run and, for 2022, the high number of elections in EU countries that other OSCE participating States might not prioritize in their decision to send observers.

5.2. *Democratic Institutions and the Rule of Law*

When it comes to democratic institutions and the rule of law, ODIHR provides:

- Rule of law and legislative support: assisting a State with judicial, legislative and institutional reforms; promoting democratic law-making, transparent, and human rights-compliant criminal justice systems; and trial monitoring.
- Democratic governance: strengthening parliaments, legislation process-

es and promotion of parliamentary ethics, increasing the level of participation of women in politics and decision-making.
- Migration and freedom of movement: helping participating States formulate and implement migration policies and legislation that are gender-sensitive, protect the fundamental rights of migrants, support migrant integration and facilitate freedom of movement and cross-border mobility.

All ODIHR legal opinions are collected in Legislation online, a free-of-charge online legislative database created to assist OSCE participating States in bringing their legislation into line with relevant international human rights standards, by obtaining examples and options from the legislation of other countries to inform their own choices.

5.3. *Human Rights*

Human rights are also a key feature of ODIHR's work. The Office provides expert advice both to States and to civil society through:
- monitoring governments' respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, providing expert advice to, and building the capacity of state and non-state actors;
- advising on human rights and counter-terrorism, combating human-trafficking, reform of human rights and gender in the security sector, freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of religion or belief and prevention of torture; and promoting human rights through human rights defenders, national human rights institutions and human rights education.

5.4. *Tolerance and Non-Discrimination*

ODIHR also combats discrimination by:
- providing tools to address discrimination, hate crimes, anti-Semitism, intolerance against Muslims, Christians and members of other religions;
- advising on policies and providing training for law enforcement personnel and prosecutors, civil society and educators; and
- collecting official and civil-society data on hate crimes and supporting civil society to monitor hate crimes and incidents. This data is published in a yearly report on hate crimes published on a dedicated website: https://hatecrime.osce.org/.

Each year, the OSCE Chair appoints three personal representatives on freedom of religion and belief:

- Personal representative on Combating anti-Semitism;
- Personal Representative on Combating racism, xenophobia and discrimination, also focusing on intolerance and discrimination against Christians and members of other religions; and
- Personal representative on Combating Intolerance and discrimination against Muslims.

5.5. *Roma and Sinti*

The fifth programmatic department is the contact point for Roma and Sinti. It is important to note that ODIHR is the only international institution with a specific office in charge of issues related to Roma and Sinti. Activities include:

- assisting national and local governments, civil society and international organizations in improving the situation of Roma and Sinti, including women, girls and youth;
- assessing progress in the implementation of policies to improve the situation of Roma and Sinti in the OSCE area; and
- sharing expertise to build the capacity of Roma and Sinti civil society.

6. *ODIHR's strategic approach*

ODIHR's activities focus on support to participating States. The Office also serves as a watchdog for violations, but is not in the "naming and shaming" business. Its goal is to create space for cooperation and to serve as a bridge between States and civil society, and to assist both on matters related to the human dimension. It seeks ways to monitor and report on human dimension issues through a large number of reports and publications. When OSCE Participating States face particularly serious human rights or humanitarian crises, ODIHR also uses public diplomacy tools with statements or social media posts to inform the public and all stakeholders. In addition, the databases ODIHR runs on Legislation and Hate Crimes or the public reports and statements published on election related issues, available on the ODIHR website, are good examples of the constructive approach that

ODIHR adopts in its relations with participating States and civil society. Moreover, more recently, the Office has placed increased focus on education and capacity-building (e.g., training police on how to recognize and respond to hate crimes).

7. *Cooperation with the Chairpersonship-in-Office*

ODIHR enjoys a close relationship with the Chairpersonship-in-Office (CiO), which in 2022 was held by Poland and this year is held by North Macedonia. The CiO is the political leader of the organization as agreed by the 57 participating States, and sets the main objectives for the organization annually in line with OSCE values and commitments. The CiO is also the formal representative of the 57 states of the OSCE for the year any given Chair is in office.

While ODIHR has a continuing relationship with the CiO throughout the year on issues of political significance relating to its mandate, a primary area of cooperation is the organization of the main Human Dimension events. These encompass the annual Human Dimension Implementation Meeting and the Human Dimension Seminar, organized by ODIHR under the guidance of the CiO, and the Supplementary Human Dimension Meetings, which are Chairpersonship conferences organized with the assistance of ODIHR.

8. *Cooperation with Civil Society*

Civil society plays a vital role in the promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law across the entire OSCE region, and is a key part of our work. Civil society organizations are consistently involved in ODIHR projects, and are fundamental interlocutors in every stage of our activities.

It has become increasingly apparent that, despite the recognition by all OSCE countries of the important role that civil society plays in our societies, human rights defenders and civil society organizations are under pressure in several countries. The use of excessively broad counter-terrorism and anti-extremism legislation to restrict the legitimate activities of NGOs is having an increasingly negative impact. This makes ODIHR's coopera-

tion with civil society and its role as a bridge-builder between state authorities and those working independently to increase respect for human rights all the more important.

The most high profile activity organized by ODIHR for civil society is the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, a two-week meeting in Warsaw for CSOs and governments to review the OSCE commitments in the Human Dimension. HDIM is the most significant meeting of its kind in the OSCE region. HDIM did not take place in 2020 due to COVID, nor in 2021, due to the lack of consensus among participating States. Given the lack of consensus again in 2022, the CiO decided to organize a Conference on the Human Dimension in Warsaw on the same dates envisaged for the HDIM.

The human dimension remains a sensitive topic in the OSCE, which is also proof of its profound importance for the Organization.

ODIHR and the crisis in Ukraine

Since the onset of the military attack by the Russian Federation in Ukraine, ODIHR has expressed its strong concern for the human impact of the war and underscored the importance of safeguarding human rights as well as the protection and safety of the population.

Given the magnitude and tragedy of events in Ukraine, ODIHR expressed grave concern about the millions of people fleeing Ukraine and the many others are still trying to find safety by crossing international borders or moving within the country. As the security situation worsens and displacements increase, it is important to acknowledge the vulnerable groups that are suffering particularly from the armed conflict in Ukraine, including women and children, people with disabilities, Roma and Sinti and many others.

The impact of the war on Ukraine's democratic institutions is alarming. ODIHR has issued statements condemning the removal of elected officials in Ukrainian cities, reiterating that preserving the integrity of democratic institutions and processes is an obligation in line with commitments made by all OSCE countries. ODIHR also expressed concern about the illegal annexations of Ukrainian territories, which run contrary to the peremptory norm of international law prohibiting the acquisition of territory by force.

Relevant ODIHR commitments

In this context, it is useful to recall three commitments at the core of the ODIHR mandate that are relevant for the response of the Office to the war in Ukraine:

- ODIHR remains committed to its mandate to support OSCE participating States in implementing their human dimension commitments. All OSCE participating States have expressed "their determination to fulfil all of their human dimension commitments and to resolve by peaceful means any related issue, individually and collectively, on the basis of mutual respect and co-operation" (Helsinki 1975);
- In the event of armed conflicts, OSCE participating States have also committed to "in all circumstances respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law including the protection of the civilian population" (Helsinki 1992); and
- Reaffirmed commitment to comprehensive security, "which relates the maintenance of peace to the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms", and that these "norms, principles and commitments" have enabled us to move us "closer to democracy, peace and unity throughout the OSCE area" (Astana 2010).

ODIHR programmatic response

Moscow Mechanism: On 3 March 2022 and following consultations with Ukraine, 45 OSCE participating States invoked the Moscow Mechanism, dispatching a mission of experts to Ukraine, assisted by ODIHR, to establish the facts and circumstances surrounding possible contraventions of OSCE commitments as well as violations and abuses of international human rights law and international humanitarian law. The mission worked to establish the facts and circumstances of possible cases of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including due to deliberate and indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure. The mission collected, consolidated and analysed this information with a view to presenting it to relevant accountability mechanisms, as well as national, regional or international courts or tribunals that have, or may in future have, jurisdiction. The report was presented to the Permanent Council on 13 April 2022. A second report was requested by the Permanent Council to cover the period from 1 April to 25 June, and was submitted on 14 July 2022.

The Moscow Mechanism reports on Ukraine can be found at https://www.osce.org/odihr/515868 (April 13) and https://www.osce.org/odihr/522616 (July 14).

Supplementary Human Dimension Meetings (SHDM): In the first half of 2022, the OSCE Polish Chair convened three SHDMs, organized by ODIHR, which addressed, respectively, international co-operation to address violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, to the functioning of democratic institutions in times of crisis, and protecting the rights of trafficked people. The agenda of all three SHDMs had a strong focus on Ukraine.

ODIHR Human Rights Monitoring: following the military attack by the Russian Federation in Ukraine, ODIHR launched an initiative to monitor and document the most serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law standards, providing accurate, timely and up-to-date information to the OSCE troika, participating States and to public audiences. These activities include an interim report presented to the Permanent Council of the OSCE on 20 July 2022, which can be found at https://www.osce.org/odihr/52308, and a second report furthering efforts to ensure accountability for violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, available at https://www.osce.org/odihr/534933. The initiative includes information obtained through monitoring the military attack on Ukraine since 24 February 2022 and ODIHR's previous experience of monitoring conflict and post-conflict situations. The initiative adopts a flexible approach, remaining adaptable to the challenges of the situation on the ground during implementation.

ODIHR is monitoring, recording and mapping incidents of anti-migrant/refugee and other racist, xenophobic and religion-related discrimination, hate speech or hate crime, with a particular focus on Ukraine and on the countries receiving most refugees. The Office uses the data to provide analysis of trends and risks, including from a gender perspective, as well as to make recommendations on possible responses. ODIHR is also working with human rights monitors to document the challenges that Roma fleeing from Ukraine are facing in the current context. ODIHR monitors the State responses towards Roma refugees fleeing Ukraine, and engages in consultation

with participating States to address the particular difficulties faced by Roma refugees and the need to undertake effective measures in order to eradicate discrimination against them.

Discussion

In which countries are election observation missions conducted?

All participating States have committed to inviting ODIHR to observe national-level elections. In cases when an ODIHR needs assessment mission (NAM) determines that there is limited confidence among election stakeholders in the election administration, the long-term process and election-day proceedings, and that the presence of observers could enhance public trust in the process, the deployment of a full-scale election observation mission (including LTOs and STOs) might be recommended. An ODIHR election observation mission is the most comprehensive form of ODIHR observation activity. A limited election observation mission (LEOM), without STOs on election day, may be deployed where the NAM determines that serious and widespread problems on election day at the polling-station level are unlikely, but that observation of the entire long-term process throughout the country might still produce useful recommendations. Election assessment missions (EAMs) do not comprehensively observe the whole election process but, instead, follow specific issues identified by NAMs. An EAM will not draw an overall conclusion about an election's compliance with OSCE commitments, other international standards and national legislation, but will assess these specific issues based on these standards.

In circumstances in which the formats outlined above do not respond adequately to the needs identified. In such instances, ODIHR may decide to deploy an expert team. Expert teams are deployed for shorter periods of time than other observation-related activities, usually arriving several days prior to an election and leaving soon after election day.

How does the OSCE cooperate with other actors like the EU and Amnesty International?

ODIHR cooperates with many regional and international organizations, including the EU, in particular the European Parliament and the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, as well as with the Council of Europe and others. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly deploys parliamentarians as short-term election observers. ODIHR also cooperates with different national and international NGOs at different levels: Amnesty International, Human rights watch etc.

Are there tools that are good enough to prevent bad behaviour by the violating States? Is it possible for ODIHR to affect the behaviour of members that are violating certain norms?

We should begin by stating that the Office functions effectively when there is agreement. However, not everything needs consensus. For example, we do not need consensus to work on core issues covered by our mandate. But when it comes to work within a country, we need the agreement of the country involved, not necessarily on all programmatic activity, especially if it concerns only civil society-related activities, but certainly if it involves assistance in monitoring a State's institutions. In 2021, we repeatedly offered the Belarus authorities the opportunity to invite us to monitor the situation after the clampdown that followed the 2020 elections, from exiled groups to the many imprisonments. We offered to provide monitoring activities to assess compliance with the rule of law and respect for the principles of fair trial, but did not receive an invitation to do so. We can only operate if there is political will in the country concerned. If there is no agreement (consensus means the agreement of all 57 States), we can still work with civil society organizations and other groups or try to make human rights assessments from abroad, as we have done in the past. Nonetheless, ODIHR is not as effective as it could be. We do not have an enforcement mechanism, although there is nonetheless value in having the ability to report and publicize information to raise awareness and to put pressure on those who are committing these violations.

How does the OSCE conduct fact-finding missions on the ground to produce the report on Ukraine?

We have already sent missions to the border areas of Ukraine and Poland. Our team has been in Moldova, Hungary, Estonia and Romania to carry out human rights assessment by interviewing refugees.

How do you manage to make contact with the Roma and Sinti community, being a community so spread around the world?

We have established contacts in the Western Balkans, Hungary, Romania and other places. We also try to build the capacities of Roma and Sinti communities to advocate for their rights, which is part of our human

rights work. This involves training, both for civil society and police. It is important to try to combat the bias against Roma and Sinti.

How has OSCE engaged in the past in the protection of Christian minorities?

ODIHR has been working on combating intolerance and discrimination against Christian communities for many years (https://www.osce.org/odihr/445141).

For example, we have published a series of detailed factsheets on addressing religious hate crime, including against Christians (https://www.osce.org/odihr/389468) and a guide we are currently developing for Christian communities.

THE FIGHT AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL THREATS

Denise Mazzolani

In the OSCE Transnational Threats Department, in addition to working with OSCE participating states to address transnational organized crime and cybercrime, we also deal with other serious threats such as terrorism, corruption, and trafficking in small arms and light weapons. The activities are extensive and the department solves issues effectively through a holistic and cooperative approach to security.

Today, I would like to tell you a bit more than the information you can easily find on our website or the internet. I will tell you more about the link between two emerging and sophisticated complex threats such as organized crime and cybercrime.

Despite what you hear on the media regarding these groups using the dark web to commit cybercrimes, the evidence and information we have need to be thoroughly investigated.

First of all, at the OSCE, organized crime is really embedded in a comprehensive security concept that includes the 3 dimensions I mentioned: politico-military; economic and environmental; human dimension of security.

As I said, in this perspective, organized crime is linked to security in several ways, for instance it is often linked to other security threats such as financing terrorism, illegal migration, and all sort of traffics. Organized crime also contributes to economic and environmental instability, it infringes fundamental and human rights and undermines trust in rule of law and in democratic institutions. Its transnational effects are not only impacting the criminal justices systems of our nations and countries but can really undermine confidence building among states. Transnational organized crime is accepted as a significant and growing threat to modern societies. Organized cybercrime is quite young and fast developing, so much so that it is not easy to be constantly updated and to know what is going on in this area.

So what is the connection between these two types of organized crimes? The differences are evident in two distinct phenomena:

- the extent to which traditional organized crime groups are engaged in drug trafficking such as big drug cartels;
- the extent to which cybercrime is increasingly committed by organized

groups and not single individuals which may resemble the structure of traditional organized crime or constitute a completely different organisational form.

With the reference to the Palermo Convention, the minimal definition for organized crime includes "A group of three or more persons existing for a period of time acting in consort with the aim of committing at least one crime punishable by at least 4 years of incarceration in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, financial or other material benefits".

Almost any form of criminal activities that goes beyond the individual represents the minimal definition of organized crime. Some jurisdictions include a minimum level of seriousness in the definition and as a result only criminal offenses above a certain level of severity are included.

The level of the securitization of the crime has been increased and in the literature it has been referred to as a securitization of organized crime.

Cybercrime is recognized as a serious and growing threat to the economic and social security of modern society. The increasing volume and technical complexity of cybercrime, involving any form of complex criminal operations that easily cross the threshold of a minimal definition of organized crime, has led to a situation where the media and political discourse increasingly associate cybercrime with attributes of seriousness and organization, elevating organized cybercrime to the status of a security threat as much as traditional organized crime.

This indicates that similar to organized crime, the conceptualization of cybercrime has also suffered from the combination of a vague and all inclusive definition of cybercrime and an evaluation of seriousness and organization based on a much more limited understanding of the term.

In some cases, the term cybercrime is referred to "All crimes occurring in or related to cyber space". This broad terminology can lead to an increase of organized cybercrime.

Researchers have noted that the association of cybercrime with organized crime has largely been based on assumptions rather than concrete and detailed empirical evidence. In their view, there is also a lack of solid evidence to make analogies between online criminal networks and organized crime groups. As an example: if 3-4 or more people on the Internet cooperate in phishing or credit card fraud, they may be considered an organized crime group, but the level and seriousness of the crime is lower than the classic crimes committed by the organized crime group.

Another point that I would like to stress is that the current period is relevant to the securitization of organized crime. Cybercrime has been facilitated by an extension of the understanding of security after the end of the Cold War. From different perspectives any form of serious organized crime has become potentially relevant to security because it can contribute to economic and environmental instability, infringing of human rights and the other reasons I previously mentioned.

Within the broader security framework, there are direct or indirect connections between organized crime and cybercrime on the one hand, and organized crime and security on the other. With regard to traditional organized crime, the criminal activities of the Mafia and drug cartels have transnational effects that necessitate cooperation and potentially undermine trust-building. The non-territorial aspects of most cybercrimes, which have allowed for a particular separation between perpetrators and their targets, increase the potential scope of transnational effects; in addition, non-state cybercrime actors, driven by ideology and profit, have increasingly acquired technological know-how. This situation has led to a blurring of the line between state-organized or state-sponsored cyberattacks against foreign countries, on the one hand, and for-profit non-state cybercrime, on the other. States can not only recruit hackers to instigate direct state-sponsored attacks with the aim of influencing or destabilizing foreign countries, but also benefit from tolerating cyber activities from their own territory, as long as they target victims abroad.

At the OSCE, we separate cyber security from cybercrime intending for cyber security cyber diplomacy, and attacks to critical infrastructure, which is the fundamental for the functioning of states. Any possible attack on these by other states could generate a huge escalation and possibly conflict. Cybercrime is always defined and presented as a criminal justice issue and States are called to cooperate on this topic. Cyberattacks are committed and are possible because of cybercrime. Usually cyberattacks that involve states and infrastructure imply a criminal investigation. From a conceptual point of view, it is difficult to maintain this separation clearly distinct. The US think that "Third way is for example advocating for more co-operation between security institutions and civil sector".

We need more evidence to understand whether and how much large, organized groups can destabilize security through their activities. Sometimes for several reasons when it comes to address certain threats some in-

stitutions are keen on giving statements of threats that are becoming really serious.

All this presentation is just to say that we need to be careful, we need more information and we need to analyze final conditions and decisions of different criminal justice institutions in the OSCE region before providing participating states with the right information.

Let me now illustrate how the OSCE is able to address these two criminal threats by developing capacity-building initiatives, providing advice or working closely with other international organizations such as the United Nations to better assist participating states.

When it comes to transnational organized crime, the OSCE has a stronger mandate on this threat than on cybercrime. In its official documents, the OSCE has been considering ordinary and transnational organized crime as a threat since 2000. In 2005 and 2006, it reached two major Ministerial Council decisions after the adoption of the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), the so-called Palermo Convention. As an organization, under the provisions of Chapter 8 of the United Nations Charter, we should do our best to support the United Nations in implementing the Palermo Convention. These two decisions of the OSCE Ministerial Council explain very well what our multilateral and regional organization should do to facilitate the implementation of all the provisions of the Convention.

I believe that, because of our history and our experience, Italy has one of the best national system for combating international organized crime. It is fully recognised within the OSCE and Italy is assisting many participating states with the sharing of best practices and knowledge. A very comprehensive example in the area of threat prevention are important projects of asset recovery prevention that the OSCE, thanks also to Italy, the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom, is carrying out in the Balkan region.

When it comes to addressing transnational organized crime, the OSCE and other IOs focus their activities and resources mainly on the repressive side. However, what does it mean? In the past, they have been working mainly with law enforcement agencies, prosecution office to increase the capacity of the police to investigate and being able to bring solid evidence that can be used in criminal procedures.

We need to invest more on prevention but how can we do it successfully? By involving all the stakeholders including civil society organizations, academ-

ia, universities and the private sector, since the best way to prevent transnational organized crime is through a comprehensive response that involves the entire society and not just two or three institutions.

In Italy, in 1995, we had great success in confiscating and depriving organized crime groups of the profits they made through their illegal activities. This concept is powerful, and the best tool and the strongest deterrent is the action of permanent confiscation of assets from organized crime groups and their social reuse to return them to society and the community.

Just as Italy is pursuing this confiscation policy, so are France and Spain. Yet, not so many European countries are doing the same and the project at the OSCE is to assist institutions and civil society organizations in promoting and developing this concept despite it being a great commitment for different state's institutions and civil society communities.

Through this project, which as I said it is also supported by Italy, the OSCE has invested many efforts, including in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As a result, the agencies of the federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina have just informed us that they will finally have the first case of social reuse of assets confiscated from organized crime group, namely: a hotel permanently confiscated in 2017. They will use the hotel to provide support for refugees from Ukraine. This is an example of a successfully implemented capacity-building project promoted by the OSCE.

Another concrete example in the field of transnational organized crime that I would like to stress is the cooperation with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Our participating states are constantly advocating for the OSCE to cooperate more with other International Organizations and in this sense UNODC has just developed a guidebook to support all the UN member states (including the 57 Participating States of the OSCE) to introduce strategies to fight transnational organized crime. We joined efforts and we are using this toolkit to push and promote the adoption of strategies to fight transnational organized crime, particularly in Central Asia where the countries have less experiences and capacity.

I would conclude by stating that when it comes to cybercrime, the philosophy, methodology and the modus operandi that the OSCE and the transnational threat department implement is the same. It means that we try to increase the capacity to investigate but also to prevent cybercrime working together with ministry of education, schools, youths, and the society to enlarge the awareness and to reduce the crimes.

OSCE ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSION

Lorenzo Rilasciati

What is the economic and environmental dimension and why is it so important for the OSCE

The second dimension is the so-called "second basket" and is part of the OSCE comprehensive concept of security. Indeed, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act includes cooperation in the economic, environmental and scientific field. The second dimension represents the bridge between the political-military dimension and the human dimension, being a tool to promote confidence, trust and good-neighbour relations among participating States. Up until the 90s, there had not been much progress apart from the political dialogue that our organization was offering to all participating States.

The OSCE is a political organization, so our documents are politically and not legally binding; this means that we do not have a kind of review system that allows, like in the EU, to impose sanctions. Our documents guide the activities of the organization carried out by the executive structures: field operations, institutions, the Secretariat, and the political commitment of the participating States. The main documents are:

- 1975: Helsinki Final Act: Basket II. "Cooperation in the Field of Economics, of Science and Technology and of the Environment";
- 1990: Bonn Document: It was adopted in the former capital of Germany. This document is particularly important, because all the participating States, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, committed themselves to the principles of free market economy. Our activities started in the 1990s with the promotion of dialogue in the economic and environmental dimension through different meetings.

The Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities was established through:

- the mandate of the coordinator for economic and environmental activities (CoEEA), in 1997;

- the 2003 Maastricht Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension. This is the core document on the basis of which activities, discussions, and decisions are adopted by the Participating States. In this document, you can see all the areas, ranging from the economic to the environmental, energy, sustainable development and scientific, on which the Participating States decided to cooperate. It is important because it identifies the challenges the Participating States had to face at that time in the economic and environmental field. Therefore, the OSCE was one of the main actors providing support and underlying the importance of cooperation between the OSCE and other international organizations. Because of these documents, the Participating States, annually, try to achieve consensus on specific areas through the adoption of Ministerial Council and Permanent Council decisions. The decisions, once taken, represent clear mandates not only to the executive structures, but also to the Secretariat. They identify areas where participating States commit themselves further in complying and facing the challenges in all kind of economic and environmental areas.

The structure of the second dimension

At the base there are the 57 participating States, which are annually guided by a country, chosen by consensus by the participating States, and based on the priority of the Chairmanship, there are three main areas of political dialogue:

- the main event is the Economic and Environmental Forum;
- the Economic and Environmental Dimension Implementation Meeting;
- the Economic and Environmental Committee.

Each of these three pillars actually contributes to the adoption of Ministerial Council decisions, which offer the opportunity to identify commitments and mandates for the field operations, the Secretariat and other executive structures. Examples of priority areas for the Chairmanship are: Climate Change, Corruption, Digitalization, Human Capital, Digital Economy, Economic Participation, and Good

Governance. These themes are proposed by the Chairmanship and agreed by the 57 participating States.

The Economic and Environmental forum (EEF)

The main instrument of second dimension is the Economic and Environmental Forum (EEF). It is the main annual meeting in the Economic and Environmental Dimension and gives political stimulus to the second dimension in order to address issues in areas that participating States believe are important, and out of which recommendations are put to the attention of the participating States for the adoption of Ministerial Council Decisions. This year (2022), the topic chosen by the Polish Chairmanship is strictly related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Its title is "Promoting security and stability in the OSCE area through sustainable economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic." In 2018, the Italian Chairmanship identified digitalization and human capital development as areas of engagement and discussion. This led to the adoption of two decisions:

- MC Decision 5/18: Human Capital Development in the Digital Era.
- Declaration on the Digital Economy as a Driver for promoting Cooperation, Security and Growth (2018). It is important to note how this is still, four years later, a path that chairmanships want to follow.

Economic and Environmental Dimension Implementation Meeting (EEDIM)

The Economic and Environmental Dimension Implementation Meeting (EEDIM) is a kind of peer review system. It is a mechanism that allows participating States to:

- review the implementation of decisions and commitments in the EED. This year the focus will be on women's economic empowerment;
- strengthen dialogue and cooperation among the participating States;
- set direction for future work.

The Economic and Environmental Committee (EEC)

The EEC is the regular forum for dialogue among delegations on economic and environmental issues. The commitments agreed by the participating States are translated into concrete project activities implemented by the Secretariat and the OSCE executive Structures. Within the Secretariat, the OCEEA supports participating States by actions oriented in three main areas:

1) Economic Activities

a) *Good governance*

Good governance at all levels is fundamental to economic growth, political stability, and security. The OSCE works to tackle many aspects of weak governance, including corruption and money-laundering, and to promote full respect of the rule of law, increase transparency and develop effective legislation as the foundation of a functioning State.

Promoting good governance and combating corruption, money laundering, and the financing of terrorism are among the key activities of the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA). These activities are based on a number of OSCE Ministerial and Permanent Council Decisions, including the 2014 Basel Ministerial Council Decision on the Prevention of Corruption and the 2012 Dublin Ministerial Council Declaration on Strengthening Good Governance and Combating Corruption, Money-Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism. The OCEEA actively supports national reforms and transparency initiatives, as well the development and implementation of more effective anti-corruption policies and mechanisms to help participating States in achieving good economic governance, creating robust anti-money laundering regimes, a solid ethics infrastructure, and sound financial and resource management.

The OCEEA, as well as a number of OSCE field operations, strive to make good governance a priority of their work by engaging in:

- Support in the development and implementation of effective anti-

corruption policies and mechanism to implement international obligation;
- Improving national anti-corruption frameworks;
- Designing code of conducts and ethics;
- Introducing transparent public procurement procedures.

Concrete examples of these activities include projects on supporting Armenia in establishing its anti-corruption institutions: assisting Ukraine in promoting transparency at Municipal level; strengthening the fight against transnational organized crime in South-Eastern Europe through improved regional co-operation in asset seizure, confiscation, management and re-use.

b) *Migration*

The OSCE supports participating States in the implementation of the migration-related commitments, the OCEEA focuses on the following key areas of action:
- Deepening inclusive dialogue and co-operation at all levels within and between States: the ever-changing migration dynamics require continuous search for common grounds among a variety of stakeholders to address challenges and leverage opportunities;
- Bridging the knowledge gap: to display their positive impact, legal migration policies need to be grounded on socioeconomic analysis and evidence. The OCEEA produces knowledge tools such as policy guides and handbooks and supports the establishment of comparable data collection systems in countries of origin, transit and destination;
- Assisting participating States to improve migration legislation and implement effective national policy frameworks: by involving governments, social partners, civil society, the private sector, migrants' communities and diaspora, as well as academia, the OCEEA fosters co-operation and partnerships to facilitate effective legal migration schemes, such as circular migration and other forms of voluntary labour mobility programs.

One of the major project implemented is E-MINDFUL which aim at promoting a balanced and effective communication about migration with the view to contribute to expand the social and political space for

effective migration policy-making, supporting inclusive, innovative and prosperous hosting communities.

c) *Human Capital Development*

Widening socioeconomic inequalities are among key drivers of unemployment and migratory pressure that can undermine ongoing efforts towards greater economic convergence, posing an increasing threat to social cohesion and stability in the OSCE region.

Promoting human capital development through quality education and lifelong learning; ensure equitable working conditions and economic empowerment; and support effective legal migration policies and labour mobility are some of the areas of engagement by the OCEEA.

One of the main projects that we are running, in particular in the western Balkans, is the creation of the conditions for young start uppers to be connected in the region through the skills that are provided, offered and learnt by assistance activities that the Government of Italy or Universities of Italy are offering to those young start uppers. The basic idea of this project is to create the conditions for a community of young start uppers that go a little bit beyond the challenges that are facing the citizens in the Western Balkans and to promote regional reconciliation and cooperation.

d) *Connectivity*

With the rapidly changing landscape of global trade, ensuring connectivity among economies has become crucial to participate in global economic growth.

Strengthening stability and security

In order to enhance regional security and stability, the OSCE works on creating the basis of economic connectivity between the 57 participating States, through dialogue on trade and transport.

Here there are other two examples about why we are promoting

connectivity in the OSCE region with a number of external partners. The aim is to promote trade facilitation reforms, by promoting legislative reforms, but also capacity building of various actors.

2) Environmental Activities

Environmental activities represent one of the area of major involvement in our office. There is a long list of activities that are being implemented: Water Management, Climate Change and Security, Disaster Risk Reduction, Hazardous Waste Management, Good Environmental Governance. We have a specific cluster on Energy Security in terms also of energy sustainability, green energy and circular economy. On this last cluster, we also established cooperation with a number of international organizations that allow the organizations involved to avoid any kind of overlapping activities, also considering that all international organizations are suffering in a way from the same funding problem due to budget recuts.

a) *Water Management*

OSCE is a security organization so we see all the activities we are implementing through the prism of conflict prevention and eventually conflict rehabilitation. Here you see areas of involvement, which include the strong participation of women in the water sector. The main objective is to support gender mainstreaming in water management bodies and policies to improve women's professional capacities in water management, career development and conflict resolution. However, the third cluster of activities includes also the promotion cooperation among Participating States. For instance, the cooperation and the support we were providing in Eastern Europe between Moldova and Ukraine in the Dniester River Basin. In this case, the main objective is to support Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) in the Dniester River Basin to strengthen sustainable development.

b) *Climate change and security*

Among the activities that have been conducted in this field, there is the identification of a number of hotspots that could represent a challenge for the participating States concerned to the security and regional cooperation.

- "Climate change and security in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and Southern Caucasus." The objective is to support transboundary cooperation on adaptation to consequences of climate change.
- "Strengthening response to security risks form Climate change in Central Asia, Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and South Eastern Europe." The objective here is to reduce climate change-related security threats in the project regions.

c) *Disaster Risk Reduction*

All activities are aimed at creating the conditions and the capacities for local authorities to address the challenges in these specific areas.

- "Enhancing capacities of wildfire risk management in the South Caucasus." The objective is to support the three countries of the South Caucasus in strengthening their national capacities of wildfire risk management.
- "Improving radiological and environmental awareness in territories affected by the Chernobyl Accident in Belarus and Ukraine with a focus on Wildfire management." The objective is to reduce environmental and security risks posed by wildfires in the territories affected by the Chernobyl accident through improving awareness about effective wildfire management in contaminated areas.

d) *Hazardous Waste Management*

"Stakeholder Engagement for Uranium legacy remediation in Central Asia." The objective here is to organize dialogue, disseminate information and increase the level of knowledge of local stakeholders and authorities about the risks of Uranium Legacy Sites (ULS) and benefits of remediation and risk management activities. The plans also include capacity building reinforcement of existing Aarhus Centres and opening

of new public environmental information centres near the uranium legacy sites. The challenges in these territories are related to the fact these territories during the Soviet Union were the site for nuclear weapons testing. What we do together with International Atomic Energy Agencies is to address and disseminate information to local authorities on how to address the economic, social, and environmental challenges that population is still facing. On the Environmental side, we are working strongly with the civil society organizations, which are engaged through the so called "Aarhus Centres". The Aarhus Centres are centres that have been established based on a Convention that was adopted by the members of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), based in Geneva. The OSCE helped the UNECE and the participating States in establishing those Aarhus Centres and in providing assistance to the participating States, not only by complying with the provisions of the Convention, but also by ensuring their participation in the decision making process, as far as environmental issues are concerned.

3) Energy

The OSCE supports an energy security dialogue among participating States and other international bodies and assists in capacity building

The OSCE has a unique role in the field of Energy Security, and participating States include many of the world's largest energy producers, consumers and transit countries. Because of a dramatically changing energy landscape, new energy security challenges have emerged, so that the link between energy security and climate change is becoming increasingly visible. OSCE response to this phenomenon is:

- Strengthening energy security dialogue among consumers, producers and transit countries;
- Promoting good governance and transparency in the energy sector;
- Addressing threats to critical infrastructure, such as electricity networks;
- Promoting sustainable energy solutions;

- Promoting best practices and capacity building, including in the private and private sector.

All these activities can be implemented because of the strong support that the OSCE receives from most of the participating States.

Italy is one of the main contributors to second dimension activities. Sometimes the budget we have at our disposal is not very high, and it is only thanks to extra-budgetary contributions that all these activities can be implemented. The OSCE's second dimension cooperates with a number of international organizations, and it is quite rare that it implements activities by itself. That is because we want to avoid any kind of overlapping and repetition of activities. We are guided by the decisions of the UN including the agenda on sustainable development.

THE OSCE MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP

Emiliano Alessandri

This short presentation of the OSCE Mediterranean Partnership will address four different aspects:

- the basic features of the Partnership;
- the history of the Partnership;
- a discussion of the OSCE specific niche;
- an overview of some of the challenges and opportunities facing the OSCE engagement with the Mediterranean Partners.

The OSCE Mediterranean Partnership covers six countries: all the North African states with the exception of Libya, namely: Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, and Tunisia as well as Jordan and Israel in the Middle East. Since the Helsinki Final Act, the OSCE covers all aspects related to Mediterranean security, but the OSCE entertains formal relations with only six countries of the Mediterranean. What does this partnership entail? The Mediterranean Partners have access to all of the OSCE internal mechanisms, meetings, committees and activities. As such, Mediterranean Partners actively contribute to fostering a cooperative and comprehensive security agenda – which is the OSCE's core mission. They, however, cannot participate in any of the OSCE decision-making processes. This means they do not have any veto power either.

Originally, the OSCE Mediterranean Partners were more simply called the "non-participating states" and for a long time the dedicated dialogue format was the "Contact Group". Over the years, Mediterranean issues have been progressively mainstreamed within the OSCE and the Contact Group has been renamed into "Partners Group", to mark the new quality of the relationship. There is both a political and a practical cooperation track to the relationship and the two tracks are self-reinforcing:

- On the one hand, the political dialogue is being developed around a growing set of shared security issues, from anti-terrorism to the fight against climate change. The dialogue takes place at the ministerial level once a year

in the context of the Mediterranean Conference. Otherwise, it is carried forward at the ambassadorial level by the Permanent Representatives of the participating states and the partner countries;

- On the other hand, the OSCE offers the Mediterranean Partners an open-ended and growing menu of practical cooperation projects in the field of capacity building. The OSCE defines security in a comprehensive manner, so projects with the Partners cover all the three so-called "dimensions" of security. In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in the second dimension (environmental and economic) with the attempt to launch new projects on the climate change-security nexus in the Mediterranean region.

A key feature of the OSCE Mediterranean Partnership is its multilateral nature. Both the political dialogue and the implementation of projects generally take place on a 57+6 format. This makes the OSCE Partnership quite unique and different from the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue or Neighbourhood Policy of the EU, both of which heavily rely on bilateralism.

When it comes to the history of the OSCE Mediterranean Partnership, it is worth remembering how the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 – the OSCE founding document – already included a dedicated Mediterranean Chapter. At the time, the document was quite unique because NATO did not have a Mediterranean Dialogue and the European Communities had not developed a full-fledged policy toward the Mediterranean region either. A key aspect of the Helsinki Final Act is that it presciently established a link between security in Europe and in the Mediterranean region, by explicitly recognising the security interdependence of the two regions. Among the early advocates of a Euro-Mediterranean security approach were Italy and Malta. On the other hand, focused as they were on "détente" in Europe, the United States of America and the USSR were not excited about having a Mediterranean Chapter fully integrated into the Helsinki Final Act. The MENA region was cut across geopolitical competition at the time. The Helsinki Final Act was adopted just a couple of years after the Yom Kippur war of 1973. Conceived nearly fifty years ago, the Mediterranean Chapter is still very relevant. For instance, it deals with issues such as environmental challenges and the need for scientific cooperation in preventing scarce resources from becoming a source of international conflict.

In 1994-1995 the CSCE turned into the OSCE and the non-participating states became formal partners of the newly established organization.

Fast forward to more recent years, a landmark document for the OSCE Mediterranean Partnership is the 2018 Milan Ministerial Council Declaration on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean, promoted by Italy during its OSCE Chairmanship. The Declaration is at the same time an update and a revision of Mediterranean Chapter contained in the Helsinki Final Act. In addition to a reiteration of some of the ideas and principles contained in that document, the Declaration articulates a program of dialogue and cooperation with the Mediterranean Partners in key areas, from combatting transnational threats to cooperating in the economic and environmental dimension. A key outcome of the Italian diplomatic effort behind the adoption of the Declaration is the recognition by the 57 participating States that the link between European and Mediterranean security has become "all the more relevant".

The next point is the OSCE specific niche. The OSCE defines security in a comprehensive manner, which means that the organization addresses the security implications of almost every aspects of international affairs. As a result, cooperation between the OSCE and the Mediterranean Partners covers a wide variety of areas, such as countering violent extremism, combatting the trafficking of weapons, cultural properties, as well as the trafficking of human beings. Second dimension issues have become very important in recent years, in particular the nexus between climate change, resource competition and conflict. Cooperation also takes place in the human dimension, on themes regarding human rights and democratic institutions. Our Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights just implemented a project with young policy advisors from the Mediterranean Partners with a focus on incorporating human rights concerns into policy making.

While cooperation takes place in many areas, the OSCE does not have the same field presence in the MENA region that other international organizations can leverage. At the same time, the OSCE does not have a reputation problem in the region. The OSCE is less known but widely respected and welcomed. In its relations with the Partners, the OSCE has always treated them equally. Moreover, the OSCE capacity building process is not a top down one and the OSCE has no predetermined agenda to "impose" on its Mediterranean Partners. The dynamic of cooperation is participatory and driven by the principle of co-ownership.

The Mediterranean Partners know that we cannot offer projects on the scale of those implemented by the EU or the UN. They also know that we do not offer development assistance. At the same time, they are familiar with our history as an organization that has supported transition countries and built bridges between former or current rivals. Our experience with cooperative security in Europe is still acting as an inspiration for leaders in the MENA region. In the background of our Partnership, there has always been the belief that the Helsinki process may one day be replicated in other international contexts. To this end, the Mediterranean Partners have been very interested in the OSCE's unparalleled knowledge and experience around the "conflict cycle", and the development of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) in particular.

When it comes to the challenges facing the Mediterranean Partnership, one has to do with the ongoing war in Ukraine. Precisely because the CSCE/OSCE process has always embodied an aspiration, the Mediterranean Partners are following the conflict in Ukraine with apprehension. They have concerns about the OSCE no longer offering a multilateral platform for constructive security dialogue on sensitive issues.

There is also a challenge related to the prioritization of resources. The Organization has been under budgetary pressure for some time. Because of the internal tensions cutting across the Organization, many activities are no longer covered by the so-called "unified budget" as there is no consensus on it. Competition for scarce financial resources may reverberate negatively on the OSCE Mediterranean Partnership, which has traditionally relied on voluntary contributions from a sizeable but limited number of states.

When it comes to opportunities, the OSCE Mediterranean Partnership has many, even in the current context marked by international tension. What continues to make the OSCE platform unique is its inclusiveness. When the OSCE addresses Mediterranean security issues, next to the Mediterranean Partners themselves are all of the EU and NATO countries but also non-EU regional players such as Turkey, as well as the Russian Federation and the United States of America. Our diverse membership includes some of the key actors of a Euro-Mediterranean space that has become increasingly multipolar and contested. The war in Ukraine has created a number of negative spill overs in the MENA region, for instance by driving up the price of food and energy. Turning the Mediterranean's multiple 'crises' into opportunities for cooperation remains the OSCE's challenging but possible mission for the years ahead.

THE OSCE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY

Roberto Montella

Thank you very much Ambassador Baldi for this initiative. This is very good for the students, for Italy and for the OSCE too. You're doing a great service to our country also promoting the organization, which is very much unknown in some circles.

Two of the authors of this volume, Ambassador Zannier and Director Mecacci, are also linked to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. Mecacci was an Italian member of the Parliament and a representative of the Italian Delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. He served a total of 5 years in our Assembly heading the 3rd committee that deals with human rights and humanitarian issues and also leading numerous OSCE election observation missions. He is now the Director of the ODIHR.

Our other colleague is Lamberto Zannier who, in the Italian context, is probably the highest authority as far as the OSCE is concerned, having served as Secretary General of the organization and as its High Commissioner on National Minorities. He also served as Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre. Zannier now works for the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly as a consultant, advising on ways to improve the effectiveness of the organization in dealing with the numerous challenges affecting the region we serve.

And this is one of the things that I would like to outline: the untapped and unique potential of the OSCE, with its very comprehensive toolbox, addressing all elements of the conflict cycle.

I worked for many years in the OSCE field operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Kosovo and in Serbia.

I've seen with my own eyes the great work that this organization is able to perform, the impact that this organization has in the day-to-day life of many people. I think this is not sufficiently known, not only in the greater public but also at the level of foreign ministers, and of capitals. Unfortunately, when foreign ministers attend the OSCE ministerial meetings which are held every year in December, they are often too busy to devote the attention and the time the OSCE deserves. Whenever I have the opportunity to discuss with foreign ministries issues related to the OSCE, I

actually see that there is great appreciation for the work we do signalling a need to further raise awareness.

Clearly, in the context of existing multilateral frameworks, I see that it is rather difficult for the OSCE to generate similar degrees of attention as, for instance, is the case with the European Union or NATO. Especially for a minister from an EU country that focuses more maybe on the EU Foreign Affairs Council or sometimes, when they come to the Ministerial Meetings the OSCE, they have just been at the NATO Summit.

So, their focus is more on NATO and on the EU. In the OSCE they come to deliver speech, but they don't really grasp all the amount of activities that this organization does.

You mentioned that I am the number one in this organization. I think my organization and my colleagues will tell you that this is very much a teamwork. I feel like I am the coach of a team of professionals in the international Secretariat, but the international Secretariat is the backbone of the organization, supporting members of parliament in engaging in much needed inter-parliamentary diplomacy. This is a unique organization within the OSCE because we, the staff, are 25 between permanent staff, Junior Professional Officers (JPOs) and research fellows.

My colleagues and I are mainly doing a service but the main driving force of the OSCE Parliamentary Assemblies are the parliamentarians themselves.

We have 323 members of parliament nominated by national delegations, so this is not a parliament as the EU one where you are elected directly as member to the parliament. Here parliamentarians are elected in their national constituencies and, in accordance with our Rules of Procedure, each member state has a set number of members of parliament that compose its Delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE.

I will make a very short presentation of what we are as I'd rather interact with the students and answer questions, normally I operate much better if I interact, so please feel free to ask all questions about my experience, about the organization, about the OSCE PA, but also if you're interested about what the OSCE does in general, because my experience is with the Parliamentary Assembly and also with the OSCE Field Missions and in general with the international political arena we operate in.

So, there are 323 parliamentarians who are deployed 3 times a year for our main gatherings. We have an Annual Session, which happens every year in July and as we are not like the Council of Europe that has an Hem-

icycle in Strasbourg and has an headquarter in Strasbourg. Our headquarters is Copenhagen. In Vienna, we have a satellite Office which, besides other functions, liaises with the Organisation's Permanent Council and OSCE Secretariat.

Returning to our Statutory Meetings, our Annual Sessions are held every July and are hosted by different national parliaments. This July, for instance, we will be in Birmingham from the 2nd to the 6th as guests of the UK parliament which has generously offered to host us. Next year we will be in Vancouver. Last time before COVID when we had an annual session, it was in Luxembourg.

So, normally part of my job is to identify parliaments who are ready to host our main meeting, which, as I said earlier, is the Annual Session, every July. During our Annual Sessions parliamentarians meet for a full week in different formats, including in Plenaries, Standing Committees permanent and ad hoc Committees. These deal with a vast array of topics including conflicts, military, arms control, political developments, as well as the economic and environmental, social and humanitarian questions. The various debates among parliamentarians also serve to craft our Annual Declarations which are voted by MPs and which are composed of the 3 main resolutions and up to 15 supplementary items, which supplement the 3 main resolutions.

The Annual Sessions are the only yearly occasions where documents are voted by the Assembly. The peculiarity of the Parliamentary Assembly, which makes us totally different from the governmental side of the organization, is that the Assembly votes documents by simple majority.

So, just to make an example, if within the organization, and I'm sure you've been briefed on the consensus principle, the OSCE as such, the ambassadors in Vienna and the ministers, whenever they meet for the ministerial meetings, to assume a stance let's say on the war on Ukraine or adopt a decision, they need to have consensus and they all have to agree on the same text or decision. This differs from the Parliamentary Assembly which can adopt resolutions and decisions by simple majority, so any country or any member of parliament can present resolutions and can also present amendments to relevant resolutions. However, at some point there is a moment when these resolutions are voted, and they become a part of the acquis of the Parliamentary Assembly. Are these resolutions binding? Obviously they are not, as nothing in the OSCE, binding.

We are an organization which makes political commitments, so what we come up with are sets of recommendations for governments in addition to policy making on specific developments and public messaging. Of course, these don't carry a juridical or a legal obligation for the countries.

The other meeting we normally have is in the autumn, we call it the fall session and it is hosted normally by another parliament. So next October, we will be in Bulgaria, the following October we will be in Tashkent in Uzbekistan. So, as I said before, my job is to make sure that countries and parliaments are ready to host us because there are considerable costs involved for our hosts.

But it is also a great experience for parliamentarians to visit some of those countries to have the meeting, also to get to know the different characteristics of the country or the way that country operates.

So, it is a kind of showcase also for many countries. Since I've become Secretary General, I brought the assembly to Belarus. This was my first session, after I was elected Secretary General. You can imagine some kind of perplexity in some countries saying "Why the Parliamentary Assembly has to meet in Minsk?", this was in 2017 so there were different conditions at that time. But it was also a very good opportunity for members of the parliament, we had 17 members of the US Congress going to Minsk, hearing an hour speech from Lukashenko and hearing for themselves how things work in Minsk. They had also the possibility to interact with the civil society and NGOs, this was one of the requests that I had with the Belarusian authorities.

But my point here is that it is a great experience for members of parliament, because they not only go to have a session in the summer where they vote on documents or in the fall where they meet in a different country and they also see a bit the partners for cooperation.

For example, one of the sessions we did was in Marrakech in Morocco so they can see also our partners for cooperation. They get an experience also of the country we are visiting.

Then every year in February, we hold what is called the Winter Meeting, which is the main opportunity for our members of parliament to interact with the governmental side and institutions of the OSCE.

So, these are the 3 main activities: the winter meeting, the annual session and the autumn meeting.

I'm sure after this cycle of lectures, you've seen that there is a parliamentary dimension and a governmental dimension and this is an intra-governmental dimension. It is different from other parliamentary organizations because in the Council of Europe, the Council of Ministers and also the Secretariat are kind of an accountability system. The Parliamentary Assembly, in the Council of Europe, votes for the Secretary General of the organization.

Here it is different, the Parliamentary Assembly makes recommendations and interacts with the governmental side and, since I took this position, works in synergy with the governmental side and very much in a co-operative fashion.

I think all the colleagues you've heard speaking before, can attest this idea of having the OSCE delivering as a whole, trying to work in all its articulations, the institutions, the governmental dimension, parliamentary dimension. However, as I have always insisted, the main focus of our attention should be working with the users of OSCE products.

It is the citizens who are the customers of this product, the citizens who live in the OSCE countries, especially in some countries that desperately need the OSCE for institution building reasons, for improving the rule of law systems, the law enforcement system, their democratic system or the electoral systems. So, we work for the citizens at the end of the day and who is best to represent the citizens than the parliamentarian who are representative of 1 billion citizens in the OSCE region?

So, these are the 3 meetings: autumn meeting, annual session and the winter meeting in Vienna. These are the 3 institutional moments. But then, of course, we have an elected President, we have a Bureau of 20 members, we have Special Representatives in different areas, and we can go through them with your questions, but these are other activities that these individuals do in a very flexible fashion.

We have members of parliament who have been to Guantanamo three times to see how inmates were treated; yesterday it was the 2nd of May: do you remember what happened in Odessa in 2014? One of our former President went to Odessa 3 days later to see what had happened there in 2014.

We have members of parliament who are very flexible, easily deployable and they go to spots when things happen. I've been myself at the borders between Turkey and Syria, seeing how the Turkish authorities deal with the inflow of Syrian refugees when there was the crisis in Syria. These

are the kinds of activities we do also on the ground and, as I have experience coming from the OSCE field operations, I really believe that a lot of our activities, besides the ones that we do when we meet and make debates or issue documents, are done on the ground, face to face with the problems, touching with our own hands the challenges that the citizens go through.

And I think this is very formative for the members of parliament because after they go back to their national constituencies and they can push their own parliaments or governments to promote policies or decisions.

Since I became Secretary General, I pushed for giving ourselves some structures on main topics. Thinking of today's challenges, one was on establishing an ad hoc committee to deal with migration. Now it is becoming again a big issue, however in 2015/16 this was a top issue so the Parliament Assembly decided to establish an ad hoc committee on migration. This ad hoc committee is made up by members of parliament, not the entire membership and it deals with issues, goes to places, and talks to institutions to see how the migration is dealt with.

The same was done at the suggestion of the Russian Federation on the fight against terrorism. As a consequence, in 2017 we established an ad hoc committee on the fight against terrorism and also there, some members of parliament met, talked or visited places. The head of our committee on terrorism went to New York, Tel Aviv and Moscow. They've gone also to see different countries' work on the fight against terrorism. In a different period, these ad hoc commissions on migration and terrorism were a good tool to have members of parliament from Russia or from the United States to sit together and engage on issues of common interest.

They had some issues on which they diverged, for instance on Ukraine (and again I'm talking about pre-24th February). In those challenging years there were strong differences also on the Belarusian issue, however on some other issues they would work together and converge on how to make life easier for those who are affected by migration-related challenges or for the victims of terrorism.

So, these are some of the activities, we also speak up and we make public statements, but I think I've given you some highlights there.

OPPORTUNITIES IN THE OSCE FOR YOUNG PEOPLE

Mario Alberto Bartoli

I will start, in an unconventional way: quoting an extract from the song "Career Opportunities".

"Career opportunities, the ones that never knock. Every job they offer you is to keep you out the dock Career opportunity. The ones that never knock."

I am sure you are wondering what connects the OSCE to this pop song. Actually not much, except for the simple fact that the OSCE is not a career-oriented organization.

Due to the limits of 10 years for employment within the OSCE, working in the organization is not a whole life span investment. So why should you consider devoting some of your future time to compete for one of the vacancies which are already advertised in the platform of the OSCE? Simply because of its comprehensive approach to security. In my opinion, the OSCE is the only platform in which a new security architecture can be built in Europe, once the dramatic conflicts come to an end.

On the occasion of the speech at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, our president Mattarella openly evoked Helsinki, not Yalta, as the framework of principles and values within which, and upon which, we can build a road to peace that can be sustainable.

So going back to my initial question, I would suggest the following answer: because the OSCE is the largest organization of peace and security in Europe, a forum where the aspiration to peace and stability and the relevant decisions can really be sustainable due to its convenience power. We are talking about a territory that spans from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

In a nutshell, joining the OSCE is an act of faith on the purpose of building peace and security in Europe, not the career opportunity that never knocks. However it also might serve as a launching pad to careers in other international organizations, as it requires and provides enough skills to compete elsewhere. Let us try to explain better how to approach these opportunities.

The OSCE is the world's largest regional security intergovernmental organization. It has 57 members from Vancouver to Vladivostok. What is the mission of the organization?

- A holistic approach to security: Politico-military dimension; economic-environmental dimension; human dimension;
- A cooperative approach to security;
- Being a political organization.

The values of OSCE are:

- commitment;
- integrity;
- diversity;
- accountability.

About the opportunities, I will sum them up into three large groups:

1. The seconded: individuals nominated by their National Authority;
2. The contracted: the OSCE offers fixed term contracts for position at the Secretariat, autonomous institutions and to a limited extent, in the area of administration within its field missions;
3. Other opportunities are the JPO (the Junior Professional Officer) and the internships.

What I want to stress now, is that the vacancies are open for competition only among national participating States.

The OSCE has developed partnerships with the Mediterranean and Asian countries, but they cannot apply for seconded positions, unless in exceptional circumstances and for short periods.

How to apply?

1. Click the link of the platform: https://vacancies.osce.org/
2. Register and create an account
3. Check the vacancies on the platform and receive alerts
4. Submit the application.

Seconded positions

Seconded staff members are not directly employed by the OSCE but are pre-selected and nominated by their respective participating States. Generally they last one year and can be extended with the consent of the interested parties (OSCE - meaning the institutions they've been serving into - participating States, seconded authority and the seconded themselves). If all the original requirements, such as budget, presence of national interest and the evaluation of the seconded experts' are met, then the outcome is positive. The maximum period of service in the same Mission institution is 7 years. The

maximum period of service in OSCE as a secondee is 10 years. The Italian seconding authority is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation (MAECI).

Financial aspect

The financial aspect is important in order to have a clear idea of the revenue and return of such an investment in terms of training and of personal commitment. The elements of remuneration for seconded position in the OSCE are:

- the Boarding and Lodging Allowance (BLA) that is paid by the Organization in the field;
- financial integration to be paid using the National authority's Budget.

In Italy both the BLA and the national financial integration have the legal nature of indemnity and are therefore not subject to taxation.

For the Secretariat and the Autonomous Institutions (that are the ODIHR, the Representative for the Freedom of Media and the High Authority for National Minorities), there is no BLA, consequently, all the costs are covered by the secondment authority and then it is about 5,000 euros plus death and accident insurance that is covered by us.

The amount of the BLA is updated every 6 months and it is related to the purchasing power of the euro in the country that is hosting the field mission. However, we can consider something around 115 EUR per day.

Concerning the integration, the OSCE provides for it in its missions. There are four positions for secondment; the first one is the so-called S1, which is the Professional, then the S2 Senior Professional, the S3, which is already a Managerial Position, and the S4, which is the Senior Management. For the first one, we do not provide any integration but we do cover the accident insurance.

For the S2 Senior Professional, which is already a position that implies responsibilities on behalf of the employee, we do provide an integration of 1400 EUR plus an accident insurance, which becomes 2000 EUR for middle management positions and 3000 EUR for senior manager positions. So, if you make a simple calculation you can have, for example, 3500 EUR per month as BLA plus our integration, which is possibly less than what other organizations pay but, as I said at the beginning, this is not

about career or money. It is really about commitment towards the aims and objectives of the organization.

Most of the personnel for the field missions is covered through secondees, so by seconded authorities.

Remuneration packages in terms of employment, in this case, are similar to those of the United Nations Common System.

Then there is the general service, the so-called GS, the Junior Professionals, which are grades P1 and P2. After that, there are P3 and P4, which are middle-ranking professionals and the Management Professionals that grade P5 up to D.

As to the Junior Professional Officers, which is a very interesting position, we do try to allocate some money every year because we think that it is the best entry point, especially for young women and men, to try their luck in competing for positions within the organization.

The purpose of the JPO is enabling young graduates to gain the firsthand professional experience in OSCE and the duration is 1 year and it is organized so that the experience is developed through direct employment into duty stations. This involves 9 months at the Secretariat and three months at one of the OSCE field operations. There is some flexibility in establishing the modalities of implementation of the program.

Candidates must be: under 30, have at least a 1st level university degree in a field of study relevant to the OSCE's mandate, such as political science, international relations, human rights, peace and conflict studies, law, public policy, business administration, human resources, economics, or environmental studies.

These cover all the three dimensions of the organizations, so it is a comprehensive approach even in the recruitment process. Candidates are preselected and nominated by the respective participating States. We try to allocate enough money to go over at least three positions per year of JPO.

Regarding internships, we are not involved in this process but we know that around 40 interns per year are recruited for placement within different departments of the OSCE Secretariat, though sometimes and exceptionally, other OSCE institutions and field operations might select them. Even in this case, candidates must be under 30 and they should be in the final year of higher education at the graduate or post-graduate level, or within a maximum of one year after graduation, as of the application deadline, in a field relevant to OSCE's mandate. The traineeship usually lasts between 2

and 6 months and internships are full time and unpaid. But there must be some arrangements so that, especially when they are serving and there are no residents in the duty station, they can be entitled to a partial compensation for the expenses.

Now I will dedicate some words on the process. In the recruitment process there are differences between the seconded and the contracted positions. Let us start from the seconded positions or JPO vacancy. This starts with the candidate's applications through the platform. Then we receive the application and we do an evaluation. After that, at the end of the evaluation, there may be a nomination of the candidates. After our nomination, there is the evaluation by the OSCE and the selection process. If you are lucky enough to pass the selection process, there is the recruitment. If you are unlucky, there is the rejection.

With regard to the contracting positions, it all begins with the candidate's application for the internship, after which the OSCE starts its evaluation and selection process. There is no role in the process by the seconded authorities and at the end of it there is either recruitment or rejection.

I think it is important to stress that the OSCE Human Resources Department reviews all applications received and draws up a shortlist of qualified candidates according to the job description.

There is a long list for competency-based interview that can be either in person or by video conference and telephone with a panel of members who are usually selected on the basis of the profile of the position, or from various departments of the OSCE. Sometimes the candidates may be asked to take a written test with questions specific to the position they are applying for.

Let us move onto the role of the National Authority in the selection process. The National focal point is our office. This is made up of 3 diplomats and 1 administrative officer. As we said at the beginning, it is not much but we try our best to deal with the 3 big issues the organization is called to deal with.

Concerning the process for the nominations of secondees, firstly, we must be diligent and evaluate the budget requirements in order to assess the availability of the budget for the position. That is very important because otherwise we would find ourselves without financial coverage whenever it is time for the employee to receive her/his salary.

The next step is the National Interest Evaluation. Once we make sure that we have enough money, we have to ensure that the position is relevant for Italy, and that can be for many reasons (for example, if the position is open in a region where Italy has specific interest). Once we have cleared the position, in the sense that we have found it interesting for our country, then we start to check the applications.

First, we check if there are Italian candidates, because that is not necessarily always the case. After that, we perform the so-called "eligibility check", i.e. we check if the Italian candidates meet the vacancy requirements. Usually we try to focus on 1 or 2 candidates in order to not create a crowding-out effect in the process of selection. Once we have ended the eligibility check and we have picked these 2 relevant and eligible candidates, we proceed with the nomination of 1, 2 or more Italian candidates.

From this point onwards, the ball is in the court of the OSCE, so they start the evaluation process, which is sealed off against any external interference. This means that obviously we are ready to support our candidatures, but a role in this respect can be played only at the latest stage, when there is a shortlisting, meaning that there are 2, 3 or 4 representatives of participating countries of the OSCE. At this stage, we can perform a certain pressure in support of our candidates. But, in the phase in between the long listing and the short listing, there is not much that we can do.

The next topic I would like to talk about is the participation in the ODIHR's election observation missions. The ODIHR, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institution and Human Rights, performs electoral observation missions in its Participating States depending on the kind of mandate that the ODIHR has on this exercise. It observes elections to assess the extent to which the electoral process respects fundamental freedoms and fairness criteria. Hence, the focus is equality, universality, political pluralism, confidence, transparency and accountability. There is a core team of experts, long-term observers and short-term observers upon which the electoral observation mission is built on.

Candidates must be citizens of OSCE Participating States, excluding obviously the country where the election is taking place for the sake of fairness.

Electoral observers are provided with flight expenses, insurance against death and accidents, internal transport expenses, daily allowance (even in this case it varies according to the country), and the expenses are covered by us.

There is no medical insurance, so the OSCE has to take care of it by itself. Even in this case, the person interested in participating in this selection has to register, create an account on the website, check the available vacancies, and submit applications. Vacancies for Italian candidates are also advertised on the website of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.

What is important to stress is that for Italy, the entire recruitment process of selection of LTOs and STOs is directly operated by ODIHR and does not apply for all OSCE Participating States.

What the OSCE needs are multi-skilled professionals. A candidate needs to have the vacancy-related technical skills. Also, possibly, and particularly for positions of managerial level, management skills. Therefore, previous experience in resource management, communication, problem-solving and organizational awareness are welcome.

Soft skills are also very important in an organization that promotes a comprehensive approach to security. This is because we need to have hard security and soft security.

You need to be able to communicate with everyone at different levels and sometimes you need to put on the table your management skills, some other times very specific technical skills, but you have to be able even to rethink with your soft skills whether it is needed. These skills are: teamwork, leadership, flexibility (which is very important), reactiveness and forward thinking.

Forward thinking is very important as the agenda of the organization is characterized by a variety of tasks, from monitoring to management of resources, to analysis and reporting, so you need to be able to detect the dynamics, anticipate events and set up procedures that will allow you to manage situations at best before they even occur.

Therefore, these skills are very important and related to the activities that you have been undertaking over the last few months, thanks to the commitment of Ambassador Baldi.

You need to announce your interests and start immediately, even before you are actually eligible. If you are interested in finding opportunities at OSCE, it is better to start now. That is why it is so important to provide you with certain knowledge and understanding of what the OSCE is, which is not intuitive.

Speaking for myself, when I entered this office, it took me some

time to get familiar with the dynamics and not just with the legalities and practicalities of the organization but also with the paradigm of the organization, which sometimes is not easily understood by everyone. I have been given proof of this even during the first phase of the Ukrainian crisis when people were pushing the organization to perform activities that were not in the mandate of the organization and were not in the core business of the organization.

Understanding your organization is paramount. It is important, even as you try to pave your way, to try to compete for positions within the organization. So, enhance your assets. For instance:

- General assets, previous international experience; if possible language skills, as these are very important; previous experience in a multicultural professional environment is essential; gender awareness; knowledge of OSCE Mission country/region.
- Specific assets are something that you can develop at the later stage, but you need: management experience; technical knowledge, if required software, special devices, drones, for example for the Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine; experiences in organization/management of training activities; previous experiences in operational theatres; multi-stakeholder working approach, because you deal with institutions as NGOs. Sometimes you have in your team personnel that is hailing from different professional experiences. So civil society, academia, etc.

CONCLUDING REMARKS BY THE OSCE SECRETARY GENERAL

Helga Maria Schmid

Dear students,

I am delighted to address this closing event of the seminar cycle on the OSCE.

From the outset, I wish to thank Italy, and Ambassador Stefano Baldi in particular, for his excellent initiative and for the firm support to the Organization.

This workshop is a brilliant practice to bring the OSCE closer to students like you – and to bring you closer to the OSCE. Through programs like this, leaders of tomorrow gain a better sense of the tools at their disposal to promote stability within and between states. The discussions you have also help up to learn from your ideas and perspectives. I sincerely hope that this cycle of seminars will be only the first of a series – and that we can replicate this good practice in other formats and in other countries.

Today you will discuss the "OSCE of tomorrow" and I want to offer a few thoughts from my perspective as OSCE Secretary General. There is no doubt that we are living unprecedented times for Europe – with war in Ukraine and all the suffering and upheaval that entails. This is terrible. And the aggression in Ukraine – and OSCE participating State – is waged by Russia – another OSCE participating State.

Some might say this means that this project – that began nearly 50 years ago with the Helsinki Final Act – is at its end. They point to closure of our Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine as symbol of what's to come.

Let me say that, for the past eight years, the Mission played a vital role by providing invaluable and objective facts on the ground, facilitating dialogue where there was none and enabling the repairs of civilian infrastructure on which millions of people depend, by facilitating localized ceasefires. Yet, the Mission is now closing down following the lack of consensus to extent the Mission's mandate due to the position of the Russian Federation.

Russia has unilaterally chosen war over dialogue. But, with our broad mandate, the OSCE's work remains relevant, in Ukraine and in the region.

We have three specialized institutions – promoting democracy and human rights, freedom of media, and national minorities across our region.

We have over a dozen Field Operations – our frontline staff, delivering hundreds of projects across Eastern Europe, South Eastern Europe and Central Asia to support those countries in implementing their reform agendas – including on anti-corruption, counter-terrorism, and environmental sustainability.

We promote gender equality: last December, I personally launched the OSCE Networking Platform for Women Leaders including Peacebuilders and Mediators, with the aim to strengthen women's ability to meaningfully engage in and influence peace processes at all levels.

We help youth to make their voices heard with the Perspectives 20-30 Online Academy. In September, I will meet this group of students and hear their targeted policy recommendations and vision for a safer future.

In line with our core mandate, we continue to prevent and resolve conflicts in the region, including in Moldova, where our Mission has enhanced its daily monitoring activities in the security zone and along the Moldovan-Ukrainian border to note and report any changes in the security situation or perception on the ground.

And in Georgia, where together with the UN and the EU, the OSCE co-chairs the Geneva International Discussions that deal with the consequences of the 2008 conflict.

And we are still working in and with Ukraine, our partner for more than 25 years, where our support today ranges from providing support to the constitutional court on how to operate during war, to demining, counter human trafficking, reducing environmental risks, and so much more.

All of this is key for peace and stability.

The OSCE is not a military alliance and does not provide defense guarantees; nor can we always prevent the emergence of conflicts. But, we can facilitate dialogue, promote political talks on peaceful resolution of crises, and offer concrete help to the people of our region in all aspects of their lives.

As for the OSCE of tomorrow, the challenge ahead is to reinvigorate trust in multilateralism and diplomacy. We need to make good use of the tools at our disposal. Therefore, now more than even, the OSCE has a critical role in Europe, because promoting dialogue is the raison d'être of the OSCE.

Our documents remain the fundamental principles for security and co-operation in Europe. That is the challenge ahead, and an entry point for your important contributions. I hope that this cycle of seminars has brought you closer to the OSCE.

PART II

Case Studies and Simulations

CASE STUDY

ITALIAN OFFICIALS IN THE OSCE

Guido Almerigogna – Arianna Briganti
Maddalena Dalla Mora – Giulia Manconi

CONTENTS: 1. Guido Almerigogna. – 2. Arianna Briganti. – 3. Maddalena Dalla Mora. – 4. Giulia Manconi.

Italy's strong support for the OSCE is reflected not only in the considerable annual contribution provided to the budget of the Organisation (Italy being one of the top five contributing States), but also in terms of personnel working for the OSCE, most of whom are seconded by the Italian Government.

Italian officials are present in all the different departments and structures of the Organisation: at the Headquarters of the Secretariat in Vienna and of Autonomous Institutions, in the field missions, as well as at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.

The following short interventions by selected Italian officials were designed to present the students with examples and concrete cases of the work of the OSCE, as well as to highlight the different personal, academic and professional paths that led them to work for the Organisation. In no way they are intended to be exhaustive, neither to cover the wide array of areas in which Italian staff are engaged in, nor to describe in a comprehensive way the work and dynamics of the relevant departments or mandates.

1. *Guido Almerigogna, former Advisor to the Secretary General of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (at the time of the intervention), currently Advisor to the OSCE 2023 Chairmanship-in-Office*

I am about to conclude my almost 4-year term as Advisor to the Secretary General of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA), a journey

which allowed me to dive deeper in the complex OSCE dynamics after my previous experiences in Permanent Missions in Vienna. As you will find out from the more detailed intervention on the Parliamentary Assembly, the PA has legal independence with respect to the rest of the organization and brings together 323 Members of Parliament from all OSCE participating States. Besides giving democratic accountability to the organization by representing the whole political spectrum and over 1 billion citizens, the PA's aim is to provide an added value based on distinct parliamentary assets such as legislative driving force, oversight on the executives, and parliamentary diplomacy. The PA international Secretariat's role is to give consistency and coherence to these efforts, coordinate them, and, in other words, allow the OSCE to reach national parliaments and national parliaments to reach the OSCE, possibly with mutual benefits.

Being Advisor to the Secretary General entails a "cabinet role". Together with my colleagues in his office, we assist and advise him in managing the complex machine that is the PA. Tasks include parliamentary activities' conceptualization and preparation, drafting of reports and speeches, filtering incoming and outgoing information/requests/instructions, both within the office and with external stakeholders, drafting official correspondence, planning and maintaining the calendar and SG's agendas as well as accompanying him in meetings and visits. There is no routine. Examples of everyday work can be very different: one day you are preparing the SG's speech to a conference and talking points for bilateral meetings (usually always aimed at promoting the role parliamentarians can play within the OSCE and on OSCE-related portfolios), the following day you are stuck with annoying intra-office tittle tattle trying to make everybody happy – most likely in vain. One day you accompany him in an official visit, striving to take care of protocol and tight schedules – which includes forbidding him to grab a coffee if we are late – and another day you stay in the office, guarding the fortress, fixing archives, cleaning emails and so on, but also serving as a sort of control tower with remote support for the visit taking place and the colleagues on the ground. One day you are representing the SG in an official meeting thousands of kilometers away from home - as I did for instance in Saint Petersburg just before the war started on health security legisla-

tive coordination among Parliaments - and the following day you are preparing his Christmas cards.

This job has four main features. The first one is flexibility – be ready for everything. The second one is having a clear vision and understanding of the dynamics at work – both within the office but also in the organization at large as well as between different states and other actors. In fact, as much as your tasks can be different and multifaceted, they are not separated and can't be taken one on one: giving consistency and coherence to all efforts requires managing expectations, perceptions, and directing all actions in the same direction. You also need to be aware that, as much as you strive to keep an OSCE-whole approach, whatever you do will always be interpreted by, say, Americans in one way and Russians in the opposite. The third feature is dedication, which requires you to go the extra mile, perhaps making easy tasks longer and more difficult. For example, play the role of the devil's advocate. How many times I have opposed ideas of the SG just to present the other side of the coin. Sometimes opposition prevailed, some other times the role is just to put on the table pros and cons, then he decides and you implement. But the more intense these exchanges are, the more intense of a discussion there is, then the most effective the cabinet role is. This includes being hated by the boss sometimes, but I assure in the end he will love you, despite being classified as a "guardian of orthodoxy". Another example is thinking ahead of time: most often, a boss has too many things under his belt to think about everything that is going on. You should not wait for instructions, rather create them yourself. The fourth feature is knowledge. Study, study and study more. Not only the theory but the practice, as well as expectations and perceptions, I can't get tired of repeating this. This is what will make a difference. While a cabinet role implies that you cannot focus on any dossier or dive deep into it – you are a generalist - it also implies you need to have an eye on everything that is going on, and how things are intertwined one with the other.

This of course gives you a very privileged viewpoint on the whole organization, from the highest level. By living close to a Secretary General, you are automatically at the center of all main OSCE PA activities, such as statutory meetings (the plenaries), election observation missions (I went to 9, advising the leadership in 3), official visits, and

many others, as well as of OSCE events, including Ministerial Councils, Heads of Institution meetings, etc. With this, I learned what our organization is really about. And this brings me to my last point. A personal thought on the OSCE. During my first job interview I was asked what its added value is. I replied I had no clue. And it is true, sometimes we keep it well hidden, but I assure you there is. The OSCE is a unique platform for dialogue with an also unique toolbox on the conflict cycle, among the rest. However, it needs to be used, and this comes up to political will only. It is a very critical moment now for the OSCE, we could be the most relevant organization or just die out. We might be personally convinced or not convinced that this is the moment or not for dialogue, but as an international civil servant (I am seconded by the Italian MFA but I shall not seek nor receive instructions from any government) we also need to act on the basis of what our organization promotes and on the basis of its mandate. The OSCE's mandate is about dialogue and diplomacy, and this is what we should invest on today, whatever it takes, while of course standing behind our common values and commitments. Standing behind them and promoting dialogue is not an equation, and it is our challenge today.

2. *Arianna Briganti, Head of Governance, Economy and Environmental Issues Department at the OSCE Presence in Albania*

I'm working at the OSCE Presence in Albania, Head of the Governance of Economic and Environmental Issues Department, also known as "Good Governance Department". I will start by walking you thorough my professional background and how eventually it led me to the OSCE. I'm a development economist and human rights expert by profession. I started almost 20 years ago with the Italian Development Cooperation Agency (currently called AICS), then moved to the German Development Cooperation (GIZ). So, I gathered most of my experience in the international development sector (nowadays it is also known as global development). For the majority of my career, I have been operating in countries at war or post-conflict-countries (I've been working and living in Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Horn of Africa

region, Somaliland, Ethiopia, South Sudan). Then I moved to Eastern Europe, some six years ago. I was still with GIZ at that time. Throughout these travels and experiences, I understood that international/global development without engaged politics, policymaking and diplomacy is not whole. So, I strived to appreciate how to gain a deeper understanding of my job, how to get better at doing what I was doing. I remember the first time I got in touch with OSCE's colleagues in Georgia: I was there with an international bilateral organization and after meeting the OSCE I understood for the first time the meaning of multilateralism. While I was working in a bilateral manner OSCE colleagues where preoccupied with a broader political picture that was missing in my portfolio and even in my understanding. I didn't have the analytical skills or the experience to understand, for instance, the influence that Russia's politics -at the time- had on Georgia's national and international politics and socio-economic development. In 2015 I moved to the Balkan region, first to Albania and then to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Again, I could observe how OSCE was operating in this challenging region and carrying out transboundary projects. I was recruited by the OSCE Presence in Albania in 2018 where I am contributing with my multicultural and diverse experiences. Having a background in Economics is often very convenient because I am equipped to appreciate and analyze global market and societal trends, but having a background in Economics and Human rights (in particular Gender Justice) really expanded my own meanings of sustainable and socially-oriented economics. Therefore, I like the department I'm leading so much. It is heterogenous and multidisciplinary. Together with my colleagues I tackle anti-corruption, by supporting the government of Albania to improve the investment climate through transparency, ethics, and accountability. You may have noticed that Albania ranks quite low in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index and not only there. There is still room for improvement, and this is the work we're trying to accomplish at OSCE. Supporting the government, in particular the Ministry of Justice, in being more accountable to its citizens translates in a more prosperous Albania with better living condition for all. This will eventually have positive repercussions on the region ameliorating the peace and security climate.

In my department we are also concerned about environmental

governance and security which we engage in together with the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, civil society organizations, academia, and groups of young "green" activists. It is interesting to also notice the language we're using and adapt to the multilateral context: I certainly concur with Amb. Fratini that some issues are very sensitive because they are political in nature. Working for an organization which is based on the consensus of 57 pS is very intriguing but poses challenges. For instance, the term "environmental crimes", have generated some discomfort with a number of pS. In a multilateral realm we have to learn how to use and frame the language according to the political circumstances. This is not my job, but that of diplomats such as Vito, Amb. Baldi, Amb. Fratini and Amb. Del Monaco. It is them who lead the discussions with the pS and then feed us (the technical team) back and enable people like me to carry out their technical work. Working with diplomats and in a diplomatic context is very rewarding, I learnt a lot and established sound collaborations with OSCE diplomatic corps. We reinforce each other and by doing so we meet our mutual targets sooner and more sustainably. Working in silos is not an option.

Going back to the language example, after diplomatic talks on the environmental issues, the Presence decided to adopt the term "environmental governance". Recently, pS accepted to add to this discussion also the topic of climate change, which has been highly debated and controversial for many years. Again, this is the result of diplomacy and open dialogue paired with sound technical and scientific work. If you approach an organization like the OSCE you should know how to navigate it and the proper usage of communication and language in key to your/our success. The Good Governance Department is also very active on local governance issues, currently engaged with the new Administrative Territorial Reform (ATR): we try to bridge the gap between the periphery and the center. To this end, we provide the Government of Albania support in tackling matters such as fiscal capacities and administrative resources, marginalization of rural communities and vulnerable groups, improving performance monitoring to strengthen accountability of municipalities.

Last but not least, my background in Human Rights is quite useful in providing leadership to the department since we also work on combatting

trafficking in human beings. It is a very wide-spread phenomenon and the needs are multiple. Hence, by applying a victim-centered approach we focus on many aspects at the same time i.e., strengthening Albania's law-enforcement and prosecution capacities; multi-agency cooperation among Albanian institutions; Cyber-trafficking. Cyber-trafficking is something that is skyrocketing, especially after the pandemic. We're exploring the problem and providing support to the Ministry of Interior and other partner institutions to investigate all technology-facilitated cases of trafficking in human beings. Bear in mind that 90 % of the people trafficked around the world are women and girls. There's a very important gender component underneath the crime of trafficking people in particular for sexual exploitation. The situation faced by Ukrainian women is only the latest of many grim examples around the world.

All the above represents in a nutshell the operational framework of the Economic and Environmental Issues Department at the Presence on Albania.

3. *Maddalena Dalla Mora, Operations Co-ordination Officer at the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine*

I work at the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, unfortunately at the moment not in Ukraine, given that we were temporarily evacuated from the country. The OSCE SMM to Ukraine is an unarmed civilian monitoring mission, deployed allover Ukraine, through ten monitoring teams, two of them in the non-government controlled area of Donbas region. I worked first in Luhansk (non-government-controlled area) for more than one year as Monitoring Officer, monitoring the Minsk agreement, the cease-fire violations along the line of contact, the withdrawal of weapons and the situation of civilians during the conflict. Then I moved to Kyiv, taking up a position as Operation Coordination Officer in the Head Office, coordinating monitoring operations at the entire Mission level, including the deployment of new staff, visits of different external and internal interlocutors of the SMM, ad hoc operations – a really varied and interesting portfolio. Last week I supported and was part of the evacuation operation of the entire Mission. I do not know what the future of our Mission will be.

The only hope I have is peace for Ukraine and that we can come back to support our host country to recover from this tragic war.

On my background before joining the SMM: I started my career at the OSCE through the Junior Professional Officer Programme, as an Italian secondee. The programme has been a great experience, giving me an opportunity to experience both the Secretariat (I was placed in the Conflict Prevention Centre, Central Asia Desk) and the OSCE Mission to Serbia, within the Office of the Head of Mission, focusing on political affairs and reporting, which provided overview of the activities of the OSCE in the Western Balkans. Beforehand I completed an internship with the EU delegation to the OSCE, where I contributed first-hand to the preparations of the Permanent Council's meetings, the negotiations within the EU Member States of the statements and much more. I studied with Guido at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, and I can only share his advice on the importance of making contacts and trying different career options.

4. *Giulia Manconi, Associate Energy Security Officer at the OSCE Secretariat*

I work at the Office of the Coordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities. I work on the Economic and Environmental Dimension. I recall when I studied about the OSCE back at university I learned a lot about the Security Dimension and the Human Dimension, but I didn't know much about the 2nd dimension. Yet the OSCE is based on a comprehensive concept of security that also includes the economic and environmental dimension. The dimension is especially important for keeping at the table countries that are not that much engaged in other activities and dimensions. Over the last years the EED has been increasingly important and has played a de-escalating effect. It is been really important to build trust and cooperation between pS and to engage them in activities of the OSCE, since progress in the other dimensions unfortunately hasn't advanced much. So let's say that it played a balancing and stabilizing role. Of course among all the activities and topics that we work on energy security is one of the more politically contentious ones, especially right now, but it has always been very

complex. It was the priority of the Ukrainian chairmanship in 2013. To support energy security the Office implements a number of activities and projects to strengthen energy security and the capacity of pS to ensure it. We do that in three main ways: training energy operators and decision makers to make them able to defend and boost the resilience of the infrastructure from two main threats: man made threats (cyber, human failure), natural disasters. Of course with climate change the security of our infrastructure is not guaranteed, we experience more and more black-outs caused by extreme weather. For that we make sure that the less developed pS are given the know-how to build this resilience. Also we help them diversify their energy mixes, which is clearly more and more relevant. We help them integrate renewables in their energy mixes, invest into alternative and greener fuels. Also we help them make their energy grid more flexible. To integrate renewables you also need flexibility of the grid. These are complex topics, and we work with a lot of consultants.

We are a platform for dialogue. One of our main mandates in managing the security field is that of promoting dialogue and cooperation on energy topics. This is really important, also exchange of best practices and technologies. The membership of the OSCE is very diverse so you have states that are way more developed then others and we work very closely with, for instance, states in central Asia, that are cut out from many other energy agencies, so they really need the support of the OSCE for this.

The issue of energy security is complex, but you don't need to be an engineer to work in this sector. You need to be a good analyst of political developments and you need to have great environmental awareness. The concept of energy security has changed a lot and climate considerations are at the forefront of the energy transition that we have to face. Also an understanding of the conflict dynamics and geopolitics of energy.

So how did I get here? I also started to learn about the OSCE in the western Balkans. I started my career in Bosnia. I was an intern at the Italian embassy in Sarajevo back in 2013. I supported the embassy implementing a number of project development activities supporting communities that were hit by heavy floods. While I was there I also wrote my thesis about the role of the EU as a peace-builder in the west-

ern Balkans. While I was writing the thesis I got to interview a lot of stakeholders and the OSCE always came up in the conversations I had. I started to realize that the OSCE was very relevant for the Region and beyond. So I started to look for an opportunity to get into the OSCE. I first applied directly for an internship, but I didn't get in. Yet, thanks to my EU background I got a position at the EU delegation to the OSCE, where I worked on Western Balkans and political and military issues. After that I really wanted to stay in Vienna but I didn't find anything. So I went back home and volunteered with an NGO in my hometown. My goal was still to go back to Vienna, and luckily there was an opening at the Italian delegation and I got the post. I ended up staying longer then I expected because I was selected to support the Italian Chairmanship as an advisor on economic and environmental activities. It was a fantastic experience, I had great exposure to all political negotiation tables and I had the opportunity to work closely with the Office of the Coordinator. From there I thought this was my next destination and started looking for ways to get into the office. There were different openings and the Energy Security one was the most interesting and relevant for me, since it summed up all my passions for politics, security, conflict prevention, environmental issues. So I applied and luckily enough I got the post.

If you do not manage to get a post immediately don't get discouraged and look for other ways to work with the organization. One possibility is applying for the internship with the Italian MFA, but also the EU delegation. And this is the case also for other IO like the UN. Think about joining a think-tank that publishes a lot about organizations you're interested in. Try to understand your passion and to find topics of interest before leaving an organization. At University we're bombarded with a lot of subjects and classes and it is difficult to figure out what we like the most. Take some extra courses, get certifications, because it is a very competitive world. When I select interns, I always try to select the ones with less experience since I think internships should be a learning process, but it is not bad if you can prove that you've spent extra time to take courses and build more skills. Get in touch, network, and reach out to as many people as possible.

SIMULATION

MANAGING A REQUEST SENT TO ODIHR TO OBSERVE THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS

Andrea de Guttry

The lecture format was interactive, being structured as a simulation: the students were requested to act as legal advisors of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). Their specific task was to analyze a request, coming from the Russian Federation, for the deployment of an electoral observer mission and to elaborate a reasoned recommendation to the ODIHR Director on the matter. The facts of the simulation were based mostly on a real, official and public documents.

As a preliminary exercise, the students were asked to critically analyze Article 25 of the ICCPR – upon which the OSCE commitments in the field of elections are based. It was underlined that the provision has elements of ambiguity, which can make it tricky for electoral observers to assess whether elections in a given OSCE participating State are in line with its commitments in the human dimension.

Prof. de Guttry stressed how any request for the deployment of an electoral observer mission is, *per se*, a positive signal since it constitutes a recognition of the value of ODIHR's work. On the other hand, students rightly pointed out that sending observers in authoritarian countries might put at risk the credibility of the entire election observation tool. Students then received the copy of a fictitious request to ODIHR by the Russian Federation asking the deployment of an election observation mission during the national elections in the Federation. De Guttry proceeded by explaining the practice of ODIHR and other relevant IO's preliminary need assessment missions to decide whether or not to meet the request. Students were then asked to reflect on relevant issues a need assessment mission might have to consider once deployed in the country requesting the international election observation mission. Some of the issues that were mentioned were: freedom of the media, freedom of speech, electoral maps, non-discrimination, NGO

reports, secrecy of the vote, past reports on elections in the country, pre-election environment, national human rights standards, accessibility of the vote (i.e. for disabled individuals), electoral projections, links between politicians and executive power, corruption, cybersecurity (especially if there's e-voting in place), party-financing, available budget, availability of judicial review of the electoral process.

The (real) report by the ODIHR need assessment mission was then handed out to the students, in which the terms of reference for the observer mission were illustrated. De Guttry then confronted the students with the official position expressed by the Russian Federation after the ODIHR need assessment report was made public. The Russian Federation confirmed to be ready to allow for the observer mission to carry out its activities on the national territory, but with a significantly lower number of observers then the one determined by the need assessment mission. Students gathered in small groups to debate about whether to accept or reject the terms imposed by the Russian Federation.

The various groups of students came to different conclusions. Obviously, the decision is not an easy one since either way relevant interest need to be sacrificed for the sake of upholding equally important interests. Claims that were made to support the rejection of the request were the loss of credibility by ODIHR, but also the practical impossibility to carry out a serious and thorough observer mission, which in turn could confer credibility to a State that in reality is not at all fulfilling its democratic commitments.

On the other hand, "some report is better than no report" was mentioned as a point in favor of giving in to the Russian request. Rejecting the request could further trigger the narrative of the anti-Russian attitude of the West. Also, the mission could rely on the assistance of local volunteers and cooperate with Russian NGOs to compensate for the lack of human resources.

At the conclusion of the seminar, de Guttry shared the official press release issued by ODIHR and concerning this case, which shows that ODHIR ultimately decided not to deploy the observer mission. Ambassador Baldi shared some details about the discussions that were held at the time. And, as the students rightly pointed out, Russia accused the ODIHR of an anti-Russian attitude, of using double standards, especially since for the mission deployed to monitor the USA

elections the number of observers was exactly the one requested by Russia for the observation of its own elections.

CASE STUDY

NEGOTIATIONS ON THE 2018 MINISTERIAL DECISION ON PREVENTING AND COMBATING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

Cristiana Carletti – Maria Alcidi

This lecture will be totally assigned to Maria, who is really an expert on the issue that we will discuss in a while. I will focus on common efforts not only of the OSCE membership in this framework but also in other intergovernmental systems, to deal with the prevention and countering of violence against women. I will then pass the floor to Maria, who will talk about the work the OSCE has done under the Italian Presidency for the adoption of the concerned Ministerial Declaration.

We have to start from very precise legal definitions of this complex issue. We will look not only at the national definitions but also at the international legal framework. We have different approaches to deal with the issue – starting from formal language used at the international level. Hence we have to pay attention on the acronym "VAW", which stands for Violence Against Women. The definition is based on legal terms used mainly at the UN level:

"Any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, (here the mere risk of becoming a victim is taken into account) physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life."

It is important to stress this last point because we always believe that VAW is mainly public. Unfortunately, it is not often the case: this kind of acts and conducts fall under the definition of domestic violence. Starting from this general definition there are a few other ones linked to the context in which VAW occurs: the family. Not only women are concerned, but also female children, especially at the domestic level. VAW could entail marital rape or female genital mutilation; the diffused concept of intimate partner violence, used mainly at

the European Union level; and also violence related to several forms of exploitation. In the OSCE we have this concept translated into the idea of how women that are victims of violence could unfortunately be trafficked.

Apart from the domestic and family environment, we have of course a definition located in the public sphere. Here we have a slight expansion of the VAW concept, that of course has been introduced in specific sectors. I could just mention the ILO framework, where we have a very recent legal binding instrument – the ILO Convention concerning sexual harassment in the workplace. Sexual harassment in public spaces is a situation where VAW is publicly recorded jointly with, in general terms, sexual harassment and intimidation at work, in educational institutions (here you could have some references to violence among peers) and again trafficking in women and forced prostitution. Physical, sexual and psychological violence clearly emerges, but in the public sphere also omission to prevent VAW needs to be mentioned. States have a responsibility to promulgate laws and to adopt policies in order to prevent and counter Gender-Based Violence (GBV)/VAW. Any omission could unfortunately not be a deterrent but it contributes phenomena or trends of VAW, more and more recorded at the national level.

Further detail should be devoted to the concept of sexual violence: specific definitions are very technical from the legal point of view. Just to mention them quickly: Sexual Violence, Domestic Violence, Intimate Partner Violence (again, more used in the EU context). Another very relevant definition that is legally very different among EU member states, and that has been introduced by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE), is Femicide, e.g. the intentional murder of women because of their gender. It has its root causes in private life, in personal life, and it is strictly connected with VAW. It originates from reiterated abuses, especially between partners (and in particularly when the female partner is the victim) that amount to certain kind of categories of abusive acts under the general definition of femicide: intimate partner violence, torture or misogynist slaying of women, honor killings, targeted killings of women and girls in armed conflicts, killings of women and girls because of their sexual orientation or gender identity, female infanticide, gender based sex selection feticide, genital mutilation etc.

I will now move onto a concept that is exactly in between the pub-

lic and the private sphere: digital/cyber/online violence. We use different formulations concerning the act of violence that is committed, assisted or aggravated by the use of information and communication technology against, of course, a woman or a girl. Cyberbullying, non-consensual sexting, doxing are very offensive digital conducts amounting to crimes according to national legislations.

To complete the very broad list of crimes under the definition of VAW, I add human trafficking, female genital mutilation and child marriage, where spouses are below the age of 18, generally accepted as the age of maturity.

All above mentioned legal concepts have been translated into agreed language at the international level. I will start from the UN system, which I'm more familiar with. Obviously we had written sources already before 1995, but they were mostly non-legally binding instruments. Later on, the UN system has positioned on gender quality through a document translated into action by the UN member States: the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action. It is a political agenda identifying specific interventions that should be taken into account and endorsed by governmental authorities, also in order to respond to VAW. The Platform is articulated in 12 areas of priority actions in which several references are reported to actions to prevent and respond to VAW. We reached, in 2020, 25 years since the adoption of this document, a UN written report that refers to priority areas and considers highly negative results in the implementation of the Platform for Action, listing action against VAW among these critical areas. This issue was raised in 2020 during the session of the Commission on the status of women, when all UN member States through their delegations reiterated in several instances this focus as one of the most critical areas to be translated into action.

I will now turn to another, very recent, intergovernmental forum – the Generation Equality Forum, launched in 2021, taking into account the twofold endorsement by France and Mexico. There was a kick-off event in Mexico in March and then an international conference hosted in Paris in June. These events have launched the Generation Equality Forum, to be considered as a platform for translating into action some global commitments on gender equality under the management of UN Women. Among the Action Coalitions presented during the Mexico

kick-off one is devoted to VAW. In the Generation Equality Forum in Paris a joint leadership statement on gender-based violence and COVID-19 was released. If you think about the legal definitions we've talked about, COVID-19 has had a negative impact on gender-based violence (GBV), especially in the private sphere. Paragraph 5 of the joint leadership statement recognizes GBV as a global long-standing emergency, stating it needs to be urgently addressed through political will, resources and accountability mechanisms to prevent and counter it. There is another relevant paragraph (8) which reminds that GBV occurs predominantly in the private sector, in family life. GBV requires a call to action to protect women, so far the statement complements the commitments under the concerned Action Coalition.

Two weeks ago the Gender Equality Forum has adopted a dashboard within the official agenda of the 2022 Commission on the Status of Women. It illustrates the commitments by UN Member States, CSOs, business companies, intergovernmental organizations. There is a huge amount of commitments, 805 to be precise, that can be divided into: financial, programmatic, advocacy, policy. Obviously there are cross-cutting, mixed commitments and those ones concerning GBV are a large amount.

Lastly, at the EU level, the work for preventing and combating VAW/GBV started recently, in 2012. An important role is played by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE). There are key milestones in the EIGE's work on GBV that contributed to the debate, especially in terms of data collection and surveys released on several forms of violence I've referred to before. There are some very interesting studies on the role of the States in monitoring and assessing trends about GBV, but also about the correct use of terminology and indicators. Another interesting study, published in 2018, concerns the collection of data by police and judicial authorities, especially in relation to intimate partner violence. As you can imagine, it is difficult to counter the under-reporting for this phenomenon. A recent study has been published concerning intimate partner violence and gender-related killings of women. EIGE of course interacts with UN Women, the Council of Europe and the OSCE and this approach is key to operationalize not only data collection, but also the chance to compare them.

2. *Dott.ssa Maria Alcidi, Max Planck Foundation for International Peace and the Rule of Law*

During this presentation, I will illustrate selected features of the debate that took place during the negotiation of the Ministerial Council Decision on preventing and combating violence against women, which I had the honor to lead during the Italian Presidency of the OSCE in 2018. To render this presentation amenable to those of you who may be less familiar with the OSCE dynamics, I will resort to some unavoidable simplifications. Let me start with the first one: the debate around the Ministerial Council Decision was characterized by the polarization of OSCE participating States along two positions which I will refer to as the conservative vs. progressive. The two "camps" disagreed on fundamental questions including:

- the role that women and men shall play in society and within the family;
- the impact that traditionally assigned gender roles have on rendering women vulnerable to violence;
- and finally, the potential correlation between gender equality and security.

So the underlying security question, key for a security based organization such as the OSCE, was "can we assume that there is a correlation between the level of gender equality exhibited by participating States and their likelihood to embark on conflicts or to otherwise suffer from political violence"?

The conservative camp was supported by countries such as the Russian Federation, Armenia, the Holy See, Poland, Hungary, Turkey and, to a lesser extent, the Central Asian countries. Within the progressive camp the most vocal were the Scandinavian countries, alongside Canada, Switzerland, Slovenia, France and Germany. Italy, in its Chairpersonship's role, maintained a neutral role. My contribution to the debate, however, appeared, at times, as leaning toward the progressive camp, when I was intervening as an expert rather than as a member of a diplomatic team. This positioning afforded me with a degree of authoritative leeway that was not challenged by participating States on the opposite camp.

Let me start with a specific example which illustrates the conceptual divide. On the root causes of gender-based violence, our proposal was

to have a language that reads: "Violence Against Women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relation between men and women." Such language, by the way, features, almost verbatim, in the 10th paragraph of the Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence. The conservative camp was not particularly thrilled about this proposal. So we managed to reach consensus on a less straightforward sentence, featured at paragraph 7 of the preamble of the Decision, which reads: "inequality between men and women is a root cause of violence against women and girls". The use of the indefinite article "a" did make a difference in that "inequality" was accepted as being one among other root causes of Violence Against Women. What's more, the correlated idea that the lack of economic independence leads to increased vulnerability of women to male violence, was a very hard concession for the conservative camp. Accepting the idea that it can lead to violence, but it also may not in certain instances, allowed for the reaching of consensus. So, the adopted language was: "discrimination and economic inequalities, including lack of economic independence, can increase women's vulnerability to violence."

Let me now bring to your attention an example of a real success story. Professor Carletti has introduced you already to the definition of Violence Against Women. Well, in paragraph 9 of the preamble of the OSCE Ministerial Council Decision we managed to broaden the scope of such definition by adding – alongside physical, sexual, psychological and economical harm or suffering – also political and social harm or suffering. This is a clear added value that the language of the Decision brings to the evolution of the definition, and a real success story when compared for example to the more restrictive scope of Article 3 para (a) of the Istanbul Convention.

Another example worth mentioning which illustrates the complexity of the OSCE dynamics concerns the reference in the OSCE Ministerial Council Decision to the concept of intersectionality. This concept refers to an analytical framework that was introduced in 1989 by the legal scholar of color Kimberlé Crenshaw. Her idea was to examine how different systems of oppression intertwines. To give you a very simple example: the vulnerability to gender based violence of a middle-aged, white, Cristian women in Europe is different (and allegedly much less ubiquitous) when compared to the same vulnerability that a

Muslim, disabled, and transgender women faces in the same geographic context. So the idea that many different shades of identities intersects (therefore the term "intersectionality") and may further expose women to gender-based violence was something the progressive camp felt very strong about adding to the text of the Decision. However, the word "intersectionality"' represented a red-line for some. Why? Because for some the idea of intersectionality is associated with liberal views regarding sexual orientation, sexual differences, and non-heteronormative values. We needed two very committed diplomats, one from the Canadian delegation and the other from the Holy See, to join forces and to come up with a language that was acceptable to everybody. This language can be found in paragraph 11 of the Decision, which doesn't mention "intersectionality" as a word per se but encompasses nonetheless its idea: "women and girls may suffer many different kinds of discrimination, sometimes in combination, which exposes them to increased risk of violence, and [...] such combinations can lead to further discrimination."

In the digital sphere, two years after the US presidential election and Brexit, the Russian Federation expressed concern that the progressive camp would misuse the Decision to criticize the Russian alleged manipulation of the cyber space for political goals. Hence, the whole reference to violence stemming from the online-offline space represented a diplomatic minefield. How did we overcome this stalemate? Again, by paraphrasing the language. Instead of "online" we referred to "digital technologies". As a result, in the Decision the reference to ICT and digital technology trumps the more common reference to the "online space".

Now, I'd like to briefly touch upon the philosophical ideas underpinnings the progressive and the conservative camps. Accepting the risk of broad generalization, I contend that the conservative camp sides with the theory of gender essentialism. By that I am referring to the idea that men and women are assumed to have different characteristics, predispositions and behaviors that stem directly from their biological differences. So, for lack of a more sophisticated example, if I'm a woman and I'm biologically designed to deliver babies, it is inherent in me the attitude of caring for others. As such, I will be considered as a more sensitive being compared to men and better positioned to take

up responsibilities (inside and outside the families) that involve caring for others. Whereas if I'm a man, it is essential for me to ensure the economical safety and the protection of the (heteronormative) family. In the opposite progressive camp prevails the idea of gender constructivism. According to this idea there is no such thing as male or female innate traits. They are instead the constructs of society, and, as such, they are influenced by culture, religion and traditional customs which dictate what and how a man or a woman should be. It appears that there is a correspondence between conservatism and gender essentialism on the one hand, and liberalism and gender constructivism on the other.

Let's take a practical example to see how these different philosophical views played out. Let's consider the proposed inclusion in the Decision of the peculiar risks of gender-based violence faced by women in politics and female journalists. The conservative camp voiced the following criticisms: "Why do we insist to add to this decision the reference to Violence Against Women in politics and in the media sector? Why are we choosing typical male-careers as a reference point? Are we pursuing an agenda? Are we trying to force women into careers that are traditionally not for them? How about women working in hospitals as nurses, don't they also deserve being specifically mentioned given the risks they face?" These arguments revealed the philosophical stance of the conservative camp leaning towards gender essentialism. We approached this issue, again, through compromise. We referred to "women engaged in professional activities with public exposure and/or in the interest of society" (paragraph 15th of the Ministerial Council Decision). Basically we tried to find a way to accommodate both camps, by not referring to a specific profession, but rather to a specific enhanced risk deriving from a variety of different professions.

Two days ago, we've witnessed a textbook example of toxic masculinity, the one displayed by Will Smith at the Oscars' ceremony. This episode reflects a sticking point that we could not agree upon during the negotiation. Instead of openly denouncing the concept of "toxic masculinity" we reached consensus on a terminology that refers to: "negative attitudes, behaviors, and gender stereotypes that can put girls and young women at heightened risk of discrimination and violence". Behind this

language stood the idea that certain types of masculine identities are more likely than others to results in acts of gender-based violence.

I'd like now to talk about the OSCE MenEngage Network. For those of you that do not know it, it is a network of diplomats and military attaches that is loosely connected with the MenEngage Alliance, which operates all around the world. The Alliance is a very outspoken and critical movement which denounces the role patriarchal societal structures and toxic masculinity play in underpinning gender-based violence. As such, the Alliance embraces gender constructivist views which are at odds with the views held by the conservative camp. The OSCE MenEngage Network is not structurally affiliated with the Alliance. It consists of a group of men that support women in their struggles against gender-based violence. However, the commonality of name rendered the inclusion of the reference to the OSCE network in the Decision a difficult bet. Here again, it took the commendable work of a committed diplomat to take us out from the impasse. The Swiss Ambassador showed up during the negotiations, which were otherwise conducted by diplomatic counsellors. With a powerful speech, the Ambassador highlighted the despicable paradox of male diplomats threatening to sabotage the decision on women's violence over the inclusion or exclusion of a group of male diplomats. Instead, he suggested a pragmatic solution, namely to include a footnote (something which is rather rare in Ministerial Decisions), which would clarify the lack of affiliation of the OSCE MenEngage Network to the MenEngage Alliance. The suggestion was accepted and the Decision includes a footnote which reads: "The OSCE MenEngage Network is not an affiliated network of the MenEngage Alliance. The OSCE MenEngage Network is a closed network within OSCE."

Allow me to conclude by stressing the important success we achieved by adding to the Ministerial Decision an operative part alongside the preambular part. The operative part tasks the OSCE structures and institutions to implement the Decisions via programs, activities and monitoring and, as such, it necessitates the commitment of funds. Participating States are not very keen on investing additional funds to implement decisions. Instead, they are financially conservative and tend to agree only on Decisions that do not add financial burdens. So for the Italian team to be able to add paragraphs from 12 to 17 (the operational part) was an additional remarkable success story.

CASE STUDY

THE OSCE PRESENCE IN ALBANIA

Vincenzo Del Monaco

CONTENTS: 1. The structure of the OSCE Presence in Albania. – 2. How does the OSCE presence in Albania work? – 3. What is the role of an OSCE field operation compared to an embassy? – 4. What is the impact of the war in Ukraine on our activities?

I am honoured to be provided the opportunity to address such a qualified academic parterre. I would hereby like to start by expressing my gratitude to Ambassador Baldi for this meaningful initiative, as well as for his constant support to the activities of the Presence. My gratitude also goes to you all, dear participants, for your attention today.

I am asked to present my Field Operation and I would like to hereby start by saying that this year the OSCE Presence in Albania marks its 25th Anniversary. A quarter of a century in Albania, for Albania, with Albanians. I bear witness to you that both Albanian institutions and citizens offer us the best possible operating environment, conscious of the value the assistance the Presence provides, where and when our activities are needed, when they abide by our mandate and the Chair's priorities.

We are the only field operation in the OSCE family to be named presence and not mission. Moreover, it is a word that I particularly like: we are a presence, not a promise! Field operations are often connected to the notion or the idea of crisis and this is certainly not the case of Albania. As we all know, today Albania is a net contributor to peace and security. A country that is incomparably different, and for the better, to what it was in the aftermath of the fall of the communist regime. Also a country where additional reforms are needed, with the assistance of the OSCE and of other partners.

1. *The structure of the OSCE Presence in Albania*

First things first! Leading an OSCE Mission means first and foremost to manage and take care of the most powerful asset of the OSCE: its human capital, our staff members. In Tirana, we are quite numerous, 107 in total, of which almost 70% is local staff. We are a big team because of our two-fold nature: political and programmatic. In difference to other organizations, the Presence does not outsource much of its work. We work with our in-house expertise, which adds to our political reliability.

Internally, we are structured as follows:

- The office of the Head of the OSCE Presence, assisted by the Deputy Head of Mission, which includes the Political and Public Affairs Reporting Unit and the Programme Coordination Unit.

Further, we have four departments reflecting our programmatic areas of activity:

- Security cooperation, dealing for instance with serious and organized crimes, transnational threats, border management and security, and countering violent extremism;
- Governance in economic and environmental issues, including support to anti-corruption measures and anti-trafficking in human beings. Interestingly, I call your attention on the fact that we work on countering human trafficking within our second Dimension;
- Democratization, focussed on electoral reform, partnership with the Assembly, media development, engagement with civil society and support to gender equality;
- Rule of law and human rights, which tackles support to justice reform and legislative process, promotion of human rights.

2. *How does the OSCE presence in Albania work?*

The Presence clearly reflects the very nature of the entire OSCE, a highly political organization based on co-operation and multilateral dialogue. Our political vision translates into programmatic activities, covering the complete spectrum of our mandate. Every year we set our priorities – the programme outline – and offer them to the participating States

in Vienna for their endorsement. The same goes for our budget, to be approved by Vienna, against the backdrop of growing political difficulties given the overall picture in the OSCE, which make budget cuts almost unbearable for the correct functioning of our "infrastructure". On the other hand, field operations can count on extra budgetary funds provided by participating States keen to support ad hoc programs, which are tailored to the Host Country's needs. For instance, Italy is a very generous supporter of the Presence in a wide range of activities. I want to mention here the support: i) in the field of human rights protection, within the framework of our activities with the Constitutional Court; ii) in the field of active citizenship, through our engagement with youth; iii) in combating trafficking in human beings and corruption.

3. *What is the role of an OSCE field operation compared to an embassy?*

I think that we fundamentally work to achieve the same grand design: promoting stability, bringing peace and security. Security is truly indivisible, as I have more clearly garnered thanks to my journey in the OSCE. In addition, security cannot be achieved only through dialogue and cooperation with institutions. Our efforts, our programmatic activities must embrace and actively involve the local level and a number of actors within civil society. This makes me often reflect on the fact that theories and views that were simply considered heretical years ago are now inescapable.

Both the OSCE field operations and embassies of democratic nations accredited in this region work towards reconciliation. There is also a strong Albanian commitment to weave the regional thread and work to attain reconciliation, mindful that reconciliation is a human truth, slated therefore to be threatened by its own frailty and whimsical winds of politics, requiring vigilant unremitting attention. I personally consider that contributing from the OSCE and from the periphery to our regional and collective security is probably one of the best ways to interpret and serve national interests. This is why, for this reason, I am grateful to my Government for providing me this great opportunity to support the OSCE.

We, the Presence, also co-operate and collaborate closely bilaterally with embassies in Tirana. In this same spirit of inclusiveness, together with the UN, Council of Europe and EU, we have initiated a fruitful strategic dialogue grounded on three "A's": joint Assessment, joint Advocacy, and joint Action.

Differences also exist, along a number of similarities, between our work, and the work of an embassy. For instance, field operations are not foreign "entities". Albania is part of the OSCE, it is not a third actor, and the Presence plays within the realm of the Albanian team. We offer a rich menu of services, without pushing for the promotion or protection of national interests. We do not have an economic agenda to advance. We do not have consular cases to solve. We do not seek any support to international candidacies, for the simple reason that these candidacies do not exist in the OSCE. For this reasons, I consider Field Operations a genuine partner of host countries.

Let me now turn to the substance of our work and share with you what we do in a number of very relevant areas. If we all agree that democracy is a sort of trident, then the OSCE Presence is a key factor in at least two of the three prongs.

1. First, in democracy everything starts with elections and parliaments. I am glad that we are recognized as the top partner of the Assembly and the Central Elections Commission, with a lead coordination role amongst our international partners. We have offered a valuable platform of dialogue to institutions, parties and civil society; pushed forward the debate on the implementation of the OSCE/ODIHR recommendations following the April 2021 general elections, and aided in particular the debate on how to address the Out of Country Voting. With the Assembly, we have worked hand-in-hand to enable it to reach pivotal progress with its strategic plan implementation, the development of human resources and technological advancement. We have welcomed further advancement of the gender sensitive law-making in the Assembly in line with its gender action programme supported by the Presence, and encouraged the reconstitution of the Alliance of Women Members of Parliament to steer the process forward.
2. Second, in the area of rule of law and human rights, it is worth

highlighting the Presence's close partnership with the Constitutional Court. We commend the commitment of the Court in working with us to implement a meaningful multi-year plan that will advance the Court's capacities to address its expanded competencies stemming from the justice reform and its outreach to citizens and civil society. Noteworthy is the Presence's crosscutting engagement on human rights, particularly through the enhanced resources on human rights monitoring provided to Albanian independent institutions.

3. Third, media. We have organized a competition for investigative journalists awarding journalists for stories tackling corruption in a number of sensitive areas. In addition, the national public broadcaster produced with our support three high quality new programs with integrated elements of investigative journalism. Notably, out of all corruption cases currently under investigation or already in Courts, the media initially reported seven of the most prominent ones. In close partnership with the Representative on the Freedom of Media, in 2021 the 8th South East Europe Media Conference took place in Tirana. The Presence reinforced this event with an initiative supported also by Italy, which brought together young journalists from the region, who produced "The Tirana Media Platform", outlining the challenges and solutions to be pursued for improved media freedom in the region.

Finally yet importantly, I would highlight our engagement on stimulating active civic engagement. The whole-of-society approach is deeply embedded in our programmatic activities, directed at strengthening trust in and facilitating access to institutions. It embraces the fact that today power is much more diffused than it was decades ago and that to address new challenges (pandemic, climate change, raising inequality) we need to mobilize a renewed set of actors and reach out more firmly to civil society.

For instance, we approached the active civic engagement by reaching out to the general public on voters' education with an emphasis on women and youth, thus informing them about critical developments and ensuring greater engagement and trust in the processes. We also enhanced engagement with more specialized profiles, professionals,

offering them additional tools to contribute to the development of the country, for instance in the field of human rights in the context of transitional justice, women's engagement in local level decision-making, individual constitutional claims, as well as through journalism, civic legal education or local safety councils.

4. *What is the impact of the war in Ukraine on our activities?*

In very general terms, field operations are tasked with observing the reality on the ground and informing the Chair, OSCE institutions and relevant organizations. More specifically, to respond to the question, as of today there has not been an immediate and direct impact from the war in Ukraine on our activities, unless we widen our view to include political dynamics in Vienna, with a number of ramifications, for instance of budgetary nature.

The agility of the OSCE field operations makes it possible to adjust swiftly to changing environments. In the future, we might unfortunately observe an enhanced circulation of small and light weapons in this region, supplying organized crimes groups and affecting the numbers of domestic violence cases. The level of economic indicators might have an impact on migration flows, therefore advocating for an enhanced regional cross-border police co-operation. I think that in this same spirit we should keep our eyes open on possible radicalization, driven by poverty and instability in areas within the OSCE neighbourhood. Let me also add that the ongoing war makes me reflect even more on the value of our engagement with civil society, media and journalists.

CASE STUDY

THE OSCE MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP AND THE TUNISIAN TRANSITION

Andrea Dessì

Today I will be talking about the Tunisian transition and the engagement of the OSCE with Middle-East North and African countries. Before I begin, I would like to give a general reflection on the frame of the topic we are dealing with.

We are analysing Tunisia as a case study of the Arab spring, as a revolution for a more democratic state, we are looking at its reforms, justice system and equality. Tunisia is not only the country that kicked-off the revolution but also the one that traditionally made the most progress in this field. However, starting from 2019, the trajectory of evolution and transition has taken a turn for the worst.

This is also central for the study of the OSCE Mediterranean partnership, since the beginning of the uprisings in Tunisia were an opportunity for the partnership to help through advice and engage in the internal transition to a democratic state based on the human rights. In addition, if we look at the level of the engagement with the OSCE MED Partnership, the one with Tunisia is by far the most important, expensive and concrete.

During my presentation, I will tackle:

- The Tunisian revolution;
- The engagement with Tunisia from the first election of 2011;
- The strengths, weakness and efforts to try to further institutionalize and formalize the OSCE MED Partnership.

Beginning with the Tunisian revolution I will briefly overview what happened within Middle East and North Africa between 2010 and 2011 with the so-called Arab Spring. There was a sudden explosion of popular frustration, specifically for the socio-economic challenges within these countries. The first protest took place in southern Tunisia in late 2010 and it slowly spread in the whole country as a mass protest, mostly for the rise in prices of food. Once Ben Ali left the country

in January 2011 to Saudi Arabia the transition really began. Negotiations were initiated and they attempted to create an international legitimate government and to demonstrate that this transition was happening towards democracy on the bases of the demand of the population.

On this basis, the first real engagement that occurred between the OSCE, the OSCE MED Partnership and Tunisia was with the first free election held in the country in 2011. 75 OSCE members dispatched electoral monitor missions, coming from 21 member states that were sent to the country. The Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE was leading this electoral observation mission and this was important to position the OSCE as one of the key contributors to the political transition in the region.

Compared to the other partners, Tunisia was the only country that demonstrated a willingness to engage with the OSCE MED Partnership. It is important to underline that the OSCE MED Partnership can provide recommendation only upon the request of the MED partners themselves, so it differs from OSCE which presents a package of ideas and initiatives. On the contrary, it is the country itself that needs to request an assessment or an advice on a certain piece of legislation.

Between 2011, 2012 and 2013 there was a climax in the engagements at the level of the Secretariat, encouraging efforts to come closer to what was happening in Tunisia and to direct attention towards providing more space for debates within the OSCE's participating states. The engagement was strong also at Parliamentary assembly level, although the most concrete level of engagement occurred at the level of ODHIR. In a political transition, after a revolution or a regime change there is the need to set off a blueprint for a governing State, for an institution, for elections, for freedom of assembly laws, for women's rights, journalist freedom and so on. So, between 2012 and 2014, ODIHR provided upon request its advisory opinions and evaluations on a series of new draft laws that were being translated into law by the new parliament and the new government. These pieces of legislation range from how to bring about and ensure independent electoral bodies to coordinate with political parties, but also advice on how to structure the judicial system, how to develop the high committee for human rights and of course more concrete security elements in terms of fighting against terrorism and money laundering.

Let's remember that corruption, together with socio-economic issues, is one of the reasons behind the revolution in Tunisia.

It is not something that is set in stone and there is no insurance that the opinions and the advice given by the OSCE are taken onboard by the authorities in Tunisia. Nevertheless, many of these legislations were implemented and there was a genuine effort by the political parties in Tunisia to engage the OSCE in searching for international recognition.

In the first period and until 2013 the key party that emerged from the election in Tunisia was Ennahda, a self-defined Islamic party which aspires to gain legitimacy in the west and beyond the Middle East and North Africa. There was an effort by Ennahda itself to also engage a broad number of International Organizations to demonstrate its willingness and commitment to the democratic transition. There have also been a number of smaller initiatives that are hard to investigate and that are accessible online. In addition, there were also training courses in which civil society was brought to Vienna and other regions of the OSCE to have courses on freedom of assembly, electoral monitoring and dialogue with authorities. We do not have time to go into each single legislative opinion that was provided but these are a demonstration of which measure can be brought to the table to rebuild the institution in a more democratic basis. The enthusiasm of the OSCE in being able to concretely contribute to the Tunisian cause between 2012 and 2013 was joined by an effort by several OSCE countries to provide founding and resources to finally translate the founding documents of the OSCE, first the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the code of conduct, into Arabic. What the OSCE and the OSCE MED Partnership need is more of these efforts. The point here is that for the MED Partnership, especially for Tunisia, there are many International Organizations north (UN, NATO, UE and so on...) and unfortunately the OSCE is not in the top 5. This is a shame because if the OSCE is to bring its added value to the table it must increase awareness of what the OSCE is and its toolkit. Again, conceptually speaking there is an enormous number of areas that could be potentially explored within the OSCE, aspects such as technical support and training, observing mission and electoral monitoring. In addition, the more we discuss about soft issues (ex. climate change, asset recovery), the more perhaps we can slowly engage on more politi-

cal and sensitive topics such as security sector reforms. There is also the aspect of media freedom and freedom of assembly, which are not to be underestimated. After 2011 there was no longer an electoral observation in Tunisia but there were increasing efforts towards training personnel, the process of legislative advice and the opinion on the draft laws which are potentially very important. With the growing polarization of the Islamic party and the return of protests after the transition in Tunisia we saw a rise in the problems linked to the continuous decline of the economy but also to what was going on in other part of the regions. From 2014 to 2016 the Tunisian transition began to enter a problematic phase.

Let us now turn to the strengths and weakness of the OSCE MED Partnership. Many of these are perfectly explained in the work of Sandra Sacchetti. MED Partner States are committed to increasing the OSCE's engagement towards the MED Partnership. There have been a series of ideas, debated also at the level of the Secretary General, in line with the idea of increasing the importance of the Partnership. The most important has been the one proposed by Malta, to build a permanent centre or office of excellence for the Med region. The idea was raised in 2015-2016 and it aimed to create a permeant office in Malta specifically on the OSCE MED Partnership which would have also included a special representative for the partnership, based in the centre. Unfortunately, after a long and complicated negotiation processes among the 57 members (that need to agree on unanimity), the idea was set aside. There are a series of reasons behind the decision to give up this project and this abandonment reflects the weakness that still affects the OSCE MED Partnership. The first reason was a lack of funding or a lack of budgetary availability, especially since this project would have needed a medium-long time period to be implemented and realized. The funds of the OSCE unified budget are reserved for the OSCE area and cannot be used for initiatives with the partners. There was a fear that the tasks and functions of the centre in Malta would be the same as those already dealt with by other organizations such as the EU or UN or NATO when it comes to security. In addition, geographically speaking, reaching Malta was not as easy for all diplomats. There are 2 more elements that I think are important to highlight: 1) there was scepticism among the MED partners on this project, as they feared this centre would keep

them away from Vienna, where the Secretariat and the operational centre of the OSCE are; 2) the Partners did not demonstrate a high willingness to engage with the OSCE. This aspect is a contradiction because, on the one hand the MED Partner states would like to be recognised as full members and have equal rights, on the other some of them feel the diminishing of their influence in Vienna. Finally, there was no clarity on what the agenda of the centre would have dealt with. There was not a shared position in finding concrete avenues of engagement with these countries.

However, it is not all weakness or constrains. The value of the OSCE is not necessarily only in terms of concrete engagement (advice, monitoring etc.) but it is in what Emiliano Alessandri was talking about: the model, the idea, the history. The fact that countries get involved in long and deep conflicts and consent to sit at the same table and agree on several principles which allowed them to move from open conflict to conflictual cooperation. This would be an enormous step forward especially for the Middle-East North and African region. We must spread the idea that even if we are enemies and we consider the other a direct threat, we can still sit down and talk. The OSCE, as a forum for dialogue, is the real added value. It is not a coincidence that a number of initiatives in this field occurred in the last 3 years through articles and interviews promoted by Iraq, Russia, Iran; these are elements that should be exploited.

CASE STUDY

THE ITALIAN CHAIRPERSONSHIP OF THE OSCE IN 2018

Alessandro Azzoni

I will always cherish my experience as chairperson of the Permanent Council in Vienna in 2018. Sometimes we diplomats say: "it is worth a career". In this case, I would not say it is worth a career, but at least half a career definitely. Also, because the chairmanship experience is not just 1 year. It is the result of a long and articulated process, the formation of a team, the identification of themes and priorities that your chairmanship will be focusing on. The chairmanship is a 3-year experience. For 3 years you are part of the Troika, in the year before the chairmanship you chair the Mediterranean Group and the year after the chairmanship you chair the Asian Group. These are both huge experiences in themselves, particularly the Mediterranean Contact Group, for 2 reasons. First, because usually Mediterranean partners are more challenging than Asian partners. Second, because it is a preparation, the final rehearsal for the chairmanship.

How was the OSCE back in 2018?

It was still characterised by the violent events of 2014, when the outbreak of the crisis in Donbass shook the OSCE from a semi-lethargy. In 2017, when we started the preparation for our chairmanship, the OSCE was still looking for ways to adapt its soft tools, its 90s' tools, to an international reality that was far more complex and turbulent than the one in the 80s.

The OSCE still had to take note of the changing scenarios, of the new East-West conflict, which we are dramatically facing today. The polarization did not start on the 24th of February, but well before that, think of Georgia in 2008 and its continuation in 2011, 2012, and so on.

But still, in 2017 the OSCE was still at a crossroad. Not least for the growing assertiveness of Russia and some other countries, but also because of the attitude of some Western countries which did not understand that the so called "idyll of the 90s" did not exist. What is true is that the 90s were, in a way, the great time for multilateralism. We

believed that through multilateral tools we could solve everything and that all came to a dramatic end. Nevertheless, even in 2016/2017 the OSCE was at a crossroad and the question in front of us was "what to do?"

I labelled the OSCE the Organization of Crossed Destinies, paraphrasing the Castle of Crossed Destinies of Italo Calvino, because each crisis intersects with each other, making it an example of how much the world is complex, conflictual and interconnected.

How can we restore an organization kidnapped by a consensus rule that allowed any participating State, notwithstanding their tiny budget shares, to play a role. Anybody could play the role of the institutional spoiler and could use the OSCE not as a stage for a dialogue, but as a battleground to conduct a relatively cheap political fight against other countries.

We interpreted our chairmanship in 2018 as a part of a multiyear exercise.

Sometimes I called the German, Austrian and Italian chairmanships of 2016, 2017 and 2018 the "Sacred Roman Empire"'s 3-year chairmanship, since these countries were more or less in the old Sacred Roman Empire. It is a joke, but not so much because we, Germany, Austria and Italy and Slovakia later, were part of a strip of countries going from North to South of Europe, the real Mitteleuropa in my opinion, and as Mitteleuropa we were forced to try to find and to keep the dialogue open between the West and the East. This was the first consideration that pushed the German chairmanship in 2016 to ask Italy to consider a candidature to the chairmanship.

This consideration immediately struck the then minister of Foreign Affairs Paolo Gentiloni, who decided to make the bid for the chairmanship in 2016.

The situation the OSCE was facing, the kind of attitude between the West and Russia, was not considered to be in favour of the Italian national interest, which is primarily to keep the direct lines open between the North and the South, the East and the West because we are a hub country, we're in the middle of everything, so we must get other countries involved. Whenever there is a lack of dialogue between the shores of the Mediterranean, it is a problem for Italy.

The idea was to rediscover the spirit of Helsinki, which allowed for dialogue even in the worst days of the Cold War. We looked very hard

for a chairmanship slogan and finally we found it in "dialogue, ownership and responsibility". We thought dialogue alone was not enough, we also needed to enhance the ownership of the organization and responsibility within the organization.

We started with one concept because we thought, and I am quoting a German colleague, "that the instruments and the tools of OSCE were not thought for good weather conditions but were thoughts and invented for and in bad weather".

So we realized that we should have taken these tools up to where they could and to use them even in bad weather conditions. No diplomat can afford to define any presidency unsuccessful, even in the most unsuccessful cases.

In spite of being a multifaceted organization, the OSCE was born in order to solve conflicts. However, this mandate is given by the Participating States. If there is not a political will to solve a conflict, we cannot ask an international organization to step in and take the lead.

The OSCE is an empty box, it can work as far as the countries put some power inside. So do not ask what the OSCE can do for you, but rather what you can do for the OSCE.

We found the OSCE in a new phase after the establishment of the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. Nevertheless, the situation after 7 years of crisis was very tense. The civilian casualties were on the rise, military dynamics prevailed everywhere and more than 750 OSCE observers operated under very risky conditions.

At the very beginning of the crisis, the OSCE offered a unique forum. The Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine was set up in 4 weeks. The negative side of the OSCE is the need for unanimity, while the positive side is that, when there is unanimity, you're immediately operational. This is what happened with the SMM in Ukraine. When our chairmanship began, the OSCE had already used all possible means to facilitate a peaceful resolution. We found ourselves managing a very complex mechanism, formed by successive layers and stratifications, the functioning of which was largely linked to the rule of consensus.

It was a demanding legacy, especially in a moment of stalemate. Still we operated through two guidelines. First, we aimed to strengthen the visibility of the Trilateral Contact Group and of the working

group set up within it. Second, we emphasized the OSCE operational tools, aiming also toward generating confidence building measures by enhancing the coordination between the OSCE Secretariat structure, the CPC (Conflict Prevention Centre) and the Special Monitoring Mission. We found that there were some missing links and we tried to create them, through a "bottom up" approach to fix the problems of the common people, such as electricity or water pumps.

In Vienna, it is often said that the OSCE countries are divided over everything and yet they always manage to find a way to make the organization work. Indeed, while the political positions on the big issues remain irreconcilable, an agreement on how to make things work, albeit with difficulty, can be reached. We thought that sometimes shifting the focus off the debates on the political scenarios and focusing onto the practical and operational aspects helps to create the conditions for a dialogue, even in the most complex issues. As Lamberto Zannier, former Secretary General of the OSCE, once said "it is easier to actually do things than to decide upon doing things". It sounds paradoxical but it is quite true. Take for instance the SMM. The SMM was born as a small observation unit and quickly became the largest civilian and unarmed operation conducted by the OSCE with 1300 people, 750 of observers and 44 different states. It is important to acknowledge the daily work carried out by the observers and not to forget them, in particular Joseph Stone, who tragically died when his car hit a mine.

We had moments of crisis in Ukraine towards the end of our chairmanship, particularly in November when the self-proclaimed pro-Russian Republics, the so called Republics of Donetsk and Lugansk held local elections against the Minsk agreement. A few days later 3 Ukrainian Navy ships were blocked by Russian units and the Russians Navy arrested 24 Ukrainians sailors.

We had some problems, but luckily we managed to make things work in Ukraine during our chairmanship. We kept the link between Vienna and Kiev, trying to avoid what was perceived in the previous years as a kind of a missing connection between headquarters and the SMM.

We tried to establish and strengthen this link also by regularly inviting the three chairs of the Trilateral Contact Group to come over

and speak to the Permanent Council about the problems in security, economics, and humanitarian issues and so on.

We invented a format, not the usual Troika, but the "Quadriga" by inviting, not just the Troika members, which were Austria and Slovakia with us, but also the future Albanian chairmanship of 2020. It was interesting because the perspective of a multiyear chairmanship and the existence of a link or a Leitmotiv, which is passing from one chairmanship to the other, is a good thing.

Transnistria is not a frozen conflict but a frozen negotiation, because there have been no actual fights since 1992.

Our approach in this situation was the same. We applied a bottom-up approach, trying to select some problems which were affecting people. For instance, car plates. Cars with the Transnistrian plate could not leave Transnistria and go to Moldova, they could only go the other way.

We managed to reach an agreement for the mutual recognition of car plates between Moldovan authorities and the authorities issuing car plates in Transnistria. Thanks to two reasons. Firstly, we selected a very high profile specialist, the late Minister of Foreign Affairs Franco Frattini, who could travel to meet the right people. Secondly, we met "the right people", i.e. even people without formal powers but with real and concrete power. In some occasions we could call them "oligarchs".

As I said, when solving conflicts, we need the political will of the parties. The Donbass conflict could have been solved by the Russian leadership in 24 hours. The same leadership that decided to invade Ukraine. But there was no political will on their part.

If political will is missing, are international organizations useless? Of course not. On the contrary, we need international organizations or regional organization to be more attentive, efficient and financially autonomous. We sometimes ask ourselves what are the costs of international organizations. What about the cost of not having them? As a matter of fact, I'm deeply convinced that without the Special Monitoring Mission the deaths in the Ukrainian conflicts between 2014 and 2022 would have been 10 times the number that we had. But if you compare what's happening since the 24th of February, and what happened in the previous 8 years, you can hardly say that the existence of the Special Monitoring Mission was meaningless.

Going back to our chairmanship, I will talk about some of our successes. Let me point out three decisions in particular:

1. The decision regarding the Mediterranean. It was a political task which was given to us by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs. That is the reason why we invested so much in the previous year on the Mediterranean Contact Group. The reason is clear: we are a Mediterranean country;
2. The decision against violence on women;
3. The decision on the safety of journalists.

Let me give you a little premise. For four years the OSCE did not manage to find consensus on any decision on human dimension. After four years we managed to find consensus on two of them: the decision on combating violence against women and the decision on the safety of journalists, helped in this by a great Representative of the Freedom of the Media: Harlem Désir.

What was decisive in relation to the freedom of media was that the usual enemy of freedom on the media, Russia, was actually in favour of having such a decision. They could not admit it, but they were in favour because they wanted to use that decision to safeguard the work of people from Sputnik and Russia today in the West.

So, we did not agree with the final objective, but we did agree with the way to achieve that objective, which was to have a consensus decision on the safety of journalists.

I have learnt so much from my experience in the Chairmanship, more than from my previous 25 years. We tried to involve everyone, to make every member country understand that we were not working for our own glory, but to strengthen the OSCE and for a common good. We did not abuse of the chairmanship's power or look for shortcuts and we tried to exert leadership without seeing ourselves as the owners of the Truth.

The constant commitment of every member of my team was evident. The other delegations saw it. They knew that they could always find somebody from the chairmanship who would try to solve the problem.

I hope we will soon see the end of the war in Ukraine and that this will mark the first step towards the end of the crisis of multilateralism. We must, as I said before, strengthen the multilateral system, not weaken it.

These are my closing remarks. The CSCE before and the OSCE after were born in difficult times. Abandoning what the international community was able to build in the past, without substituting it with something more and not less efficient, with a very famous quote in diplomacy, would be more than a crime. It would be a mistake.

APPENDIX I

SHORT BIOGRAPHIES OF LECTURERS

Maria Alcidi

Maria Alcidi is a qualified attorney and a Research Fellow at the Max Planck Foundation for International Peace and the Rule of Law. She holds a Master's degree in Human Rights and Democratization from the Global Campus of Human Rights. Since 2019, she has been involved in the training of Afghan Women Judges and after the Taliban's takeover of Kabul in August 2021 in their exfiltration to safety. She has worked for more than 10 years with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, on rule of law, human rights, and the rights of ethnic minorities. She has extensive field experience in post-conflict areas such as Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. Her main areas of interests are gender studies, restorative and transitional justice, and the interplay between legal disciplines and humanities.

Emiliano Alessandri

Emiliano Alessandri is a transatlantic affairs expert, with a focus on European and Mediterranean security. Since 2013, he has covered Mediterranean and migration affairs for the OSCE Secretary General. Between 2017-present, he has been a visiting professor at the College of Europe in Bruges. He is a visiting scholar with the Middle East Institute in Washington.

Emiliano was a resident senior transatlantic fellow with GMF between 2010-2013, working on Mediterranean affairs and Turkey. Previously, he held research positions with the Institute of International Affairs (IAI) of Rome and the Center on the U.S. and Europe (CUSE) at the Brookings Institution. Emiliano is scientific board member of the NATO Defense College Foundation and is an editorial board member of the *International Spectator*. He holds a PhD in international history from the University of Cam-

bridge and a Master's degree in international economics and U.S. foreign policy from the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).

Guido Almerigogna

Guido Almerigogna has served as an Advisor to the Secretary General of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, based in Copenhagen. He assumed this position in 2019, seconded by the Italian MFA. Previously, Guido worked as a Research Assistant in the PA's Vienna Liaison Office where he mostly focused on the counter-terrorism portfolio. He also worked shortly in the Office for Press and Institutional Communication of the Italian MFA and for two years in the governmental side of the OSCE, as a trainee at the Delegation of the European Union to the OSCE and at the Delegation of the Holy See to the OSCE and other International Organizations in Vienna.

He holds a Master's degree in Advanced International Studies from the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna and a Bachelor's degree in International and Diplomatic Affairs from the University of Trieste.

Alessandro Azzoni

Ambassador Alessandro Azzoni is currently Deputy Director General for Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

He joined the Diplomatic Service in 1991. Throughout his career he has held many important positions abroad and in Rome. He was Consul in Barcelona, Spain (1994-1998), Deputy Head of Mission in Dakar, Senegal (1998-2001), Chief of Staff of the Directorate General for Multilateral Political Affairs of the Italian MFA (2001- 2004), Counsellor at the Permanent Mission of Italy to the International Organizations in Vienna, Austria (2004-2008), Deputy Head of Mission in Ankara, Turkey (2008-2012), and Head of European Foreign and Security Policy Division at the Directorate General for Political Affairs and Security of the Italian MFA (2012-2016). He was the Permanent Representative of Italy to the OSCE in Vienna from July 2016 until December 2020. Amb. Azzoni holds a degree in Political Science from the Cesare Alfieri University in Florence.

Stefano Baldi

Born in Città della Pieve (Perugia) on 8 April 1961, graduated in Economics and Commerce from the Sapienza University of Rome. Joined the Italian Diplomatic Service in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in 1989.

He is the Permanent Representative of Italy to the OSCE in Vienna since 4 January 2021. He was Ambassador of Italy to Bulgaria from 2016 to 2020 and previously worked at the Farnesina as Director of the Diplomatic Insitute from 2011 to 2016. From 2006 to 2010 he held the position of First Counselor at the Permanent Representation of Italy to the European Union in Brussels, as Relex Counselor responsible for the legal and financial aspects of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). He also served at the Permanent Representations of Italy at the United Nations both in Geneva and in New York. His most recent research focuses on management for diplomats, social media for international affairs, cultural diplomacy and books written by diplomats. He is the author and editor of over 30 books.

Mario Alberto Bartoli

Born in June 1971, Degree in Law in February 1996 with a thesis on Transparency in the financial markets. Joined the Italian Diplomatic Service in December 1999. Served in Rome as Deputy Head of the South-East Asia Division from 2000 to 2001, as Deputy Head of the North-East Asia Division from 2008 to 2010 and Head of the same Division in 2011, as Head of the OSCE Division from 2019 to 2022, as Head of the Central and Western Africa Division from 2022 to present.

Served abroad as Deputy Head of Mission at the Italian Embassies in Estonia, Philippines, Indonesia and Finland. Proficient in English and French, good knowledge of Russian, basic knowledge of Bahasa Indonesia.

Arianna Briganti

Arianna Briganti is a development economist specializing in International Development, Good Governance and Gender Justice. She has been working internationally for different bilateral and multilateral organizations in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe. With the intent of supporting State institutions, she develops more inclusive and transparent policies while implementing programs that focus on good governance and sustainable socio-economic development. Since 2019, she has been leading the department of Good Governance at the OSCE Presence in Albania, tackling issues that range from governance in economics and anti-corruption mechanisms, environmental and local governance as well as anti-trafficking in human beings. She also contributes to the realization of human capabilities that encourage innovative forms of personal and social evolution, rooted in gender equality and equity. As a post-doctoral researcher in the field of Global Development, Gender Studies, and Living Theory Education, she holds a PhD in International Development, a MSc in Development Management and a MSc in Economics.

Cristiana Carletti

Cristiana Carletti is Associate Professor of International Public Law at the Department of Political Science of Roma Tre University. She received several professorship assignments for basic training Courses of International Organization and Human Rights Protection, International Law and Peace Processes and International Development Law. She was further tasked with other teaching assignments for high specialization courses, Masters and PhD lectures. She is senior legal expert at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Interministerial Committee for Human Rights and she has been a member of several governmental delegations taking part in international conferences and events as well as attending official meetings within inter alia the UN, CoE, EU, OSCE and OECD systems. She has also been a member of the EIGE Experts' Forum and has worked as a senior consultant at the Department for Equal Opportunities – Prime Minister's

Office. She is author of several books and articles on specialized reviews covering topics such as IOs law, peace and security, development cooperation, human rights, counter-terrorism, children rights and women rights.

Maddalena Dalla Mora

Maddalena Dalla Mora started her career at the OSCE through the Junior Professional Officer Program, working at the Secretariat at the Conflict Prevention Centre, and at the OSCE Mission to Serbia. Subsequently, Maddalena joined the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine as a Monitoring Officer. Firstly, she spent more than a year in Luhansk (non-government controlled area), taking part to patrols on the contact line and then joining the Operations Cell at the regional level.

After the closure of the Mission in 2022, Maddalena joined the Action Against Terrorism Unit at the Secretariat as an Associate Programme Officer, focusing on policy and co-ordination.

Since March 2023, she joined the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, working on anti-corruption. Maddalena holds a Bachelor's degree in International Relations and Diplomatic Affairs obtained at the University of Bologna and a Master's degree in Advanced International Studies awarded at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna.

Andrea de Guttry

Full Professor of Public International Law, Director of the International Training Programme for Conflict Management at the Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa, Italy. Director of the online Master in Electoral Policy and Administration. Director of several technical assistance and electoral assistance projects in Guatemala, central America, Colombia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somaliland, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Burundi, Central and Eastern European Countries. Professor de Guttry has authored more than 100 publications, many of which are devoted to issues related to elections. Among his most recently edited books are "The 1998–2000 Eritrea-Ethiopia War

and Its Aftermath in International Legal Perspective. From the 2000 Algiers Agreements to the 2018 Peace Agreement" (Asser/Springer, 2021) and "The Duty of Care of International organization towards their civilian Staff. Legal issues and implementation challenges" (Asser/Springer 2018).

Vincenzo Del Monaco

Vincenzo Del Monaco, is currently Deputy diplomatic advisor to the minister of enterprises and Made in Italy. He was Head of the OSCE Presence in Albania in 2021 and 2022. He has been serving, for 23 years, in the Italian diplomatic service. Prior to joining the Presence in Albania, Del Monaco was Italy's Ambassador to Armenia and, previously, Italy's Ambassador to Montenegro. He has also served in Beijing; at the Italian Permanent Representation to the European Union, in Brussels; as well as in the cabinet of the diplomatic adviser to Italy's former President of the Republic, Giorgio Napolitano.

He graduated with honors from La Sapienza University in Rome; holds a Master of Laws degree in Higher European Law Studies from the College of Europe in Bruges; as well as the degree from the École Nationale d'Administration.

Andrea Dessì

Andrea Dessì is the Head of IAI's Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa programme. Andrea is also a Non-Resident Scholar at the Strategic Studies Implementation and Research Centre, Başkent University, Ankara.

He has extensively worked on US and European foreign policy towards the Middle East with a particular focus on the diplomatic and military history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, US policy towards Israel and Washington's alliance frameworks in the Middle East. His research interests include security studies, the geopolitics of the Middle East and the intersection between global and regional trends and developments.

Andrea holds a PhD in International Relations from the London

School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), with a thesis on the US-Israel relationship during the 1980s.

He has worked with IAI since 2011 and has contributed to a number of EU-funded projects and research tasks (FP7 & H2020).

Massimo Drei

Minister Massimo Drei is an Italian career diplomat. He took up his current position of Deputy Permanent Representative of Italy to the OSCE in Vienna in September 2021, after serving for four years as Deputy at the Delegation of the European Union to the OSCE.

Massimo Drei joined the Italian Foreign Service in 1988. He held various positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Directorate General for Development Cooperation, the General Secretariat, and the Directorate General for Political Affairs. He served abroad in Ottawa, Durban, Washington D.C., Saint Petersburg, and Vienna.

He studied Political Sciences at the University of Florence and International Relations at Syracuse University (New York) on a Fulbright Scholarship.

Luca Fratini

Ambassador Luca Fratini is a diplomat from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Italy. He started his diplomatic career in 1992 and served in many countries on many continents, and in the international multilateral environment.

Since February 2020, Ambassador Fratini has held the position of Director of the Office of the Secretary General of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Secretariat in Vienna.

He has held, *inter alia*, the position of Consul in Locarno (Switzerland); Deputy Ambassador in Harare (Zimbabwe) and Rabat (Morocco); Deputy Head of the Near East Department at the MFA; Head of the Political and Press Office in Paris (France); Ambassador of Italy to Ghana and Togo.

From 2013 to 2016, he served as Deputy Permanent Representa-

tive to Rome-based UN Agencies. From 2017 to 2019, Ambassador Fratini was Deputy Permanent Representative of Italy to the OSCE in Vienna and Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee during the Italian Chairmanship in 2018. In 2019 he was appointed by the Slovak Chairmanship as Chair of the Informal Working Group on Civil Society Participation to OSCE events.

Ambassador Fratini holds a degree in Economics (cum laude) from the LUISS University of Rome. He has been a speaker and moderator in a number of international conferences.

Giulia Manconi

Giulia Manconi is an international civil servant with over seven years of experience in multilateral diplomacy. Her focus areas are sustainable development, energy security and green energy. She currently serves as Associate Energy Security Officer at the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna, where she develops and implements projects on the protection of critical energy infrastructures, the energy transition, and women's empowerment in the energy sector. Prior to that, Giulia was the lead economic and environmental advisor and one of the main negotiators of the 2018 Italian OSCE Chairmanship Team. She holds a Master's degree in International Politics and Security from the University of Bologna and, among other experiences, she was a trainee at the EU Delegation to the OSCE and at the Italian Embassy to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Denise Mazzolani

Denise Mazzolani is a criminal lawyer, specialized in organized crime and corruption cases. She is the Deputy Head - Adviser on Cybercrime of the Strategic Police Matters Unit at the OSCE Transnational Threats Department. She joined the OSCE in 2012 and worked as Head of the Security Co-operation Department of the OSCE Mission to Serbia from 2014. Before joining the OSCE she practiced criminal law and worked for the UN and the Italian Ministry of For-

eign Affairs on criminal justice and police reform initiatives in Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Sri-Lanka, Nigeria and El Salvador. She holds a Master Degree in EU Policies and Regional Development from the Bologna Business School and a Master Degree in EU International Humanitarian Action (NOHA) at the University of Rome "La Sapienza". More recently she completed the UNITAR-IPI fellowship programme in peace-making and preventive diplomacy.

Matteo Mecacci

Matteo Mecacci has been Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) since December 2020.

Prior to that, he spent 7 years as President of the International Campaign for Tibet. He headed the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission to Georgia in 2013 and was a Member of the Italian Parliament, Foreign Affairs Committee and of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly from 2008– 2013. From 2000 to 2008 he was Representative to the United Nations in New York of "No Peace without Justice" and the "Transnational Radical Party". He holds a JD in International Law from the University of Florence.

Roberto Montella

Roberto Montella assumed his duties as Secretary General of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly on 1 January 2016 following his election at the 2015 Annual Session.

He was re-elected by the Standing Committee in 2019 for a second five-year mandate starting 1 January 2021. He previously served in the International Secretariat as Director of Presidential Administration.

Montella has held positions at OSCE field missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Serbia and Montenegro, fulfilling a range of advisory, peace-building and management functions. He also served as Head of the OSCE South Serbia Regional Office and Head of the European Center for Minority Issues in Kosovo.

Montella has taken part in dozens of election observation missions

in the OSCE area and the Middle East, including as Co-ordinator of Long Term Election Observers for The Carter Center. He has served as political advisor to an Italian senator and PACE Vice-President, among other advisory roles. He also holds campaign-related and corporate experience.

In addition to his native Italian and French, Montella is fluent in English and Serbian.

Vito Mosè Pierro

Vito Mosè Pierro is First Secretary at the Permanent Mission of Italy to the OSCE, where he is responsible for the Mission's work on the OSCE economic-environmental and human dimensions, as well as the coordination of Italy's voluntary contributions to OSCE extra-budgetary projects. Vito joined the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in 2014. He served as Deputy Head of the Human Rights Unit in Rome from 2014 to 2017 and as Political and Cultural Affairs Officer at the Embassy of Italy in Riyadh (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) from 2017 to 2021. Prior to joining the Italian diplomatic service, Vito worked at the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change and at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in London.

He holds an MA in European Interdisciplinary Studies (The European Single Market major) from the College of Europe (Natolin) in Poland and a master's degree in international relations and diplomacy from the University of Trieste (Gorizia) in Italy.

Lorenzo Rilasciati

Lorenzo Rilasciati is a senior international affairs executive with over twenty years of experience in governmental and international organizational affairs, political advice, international negotiations, programmatic policy formulation, sustainable development and ESG with focus on fragile and conflict-affected countries.

He is currently serving as Senior Economic Officer in the Office of

the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities. Previously, Lorenzo Rilasciati served as Head of the Planning and Coordination Unit (OSCE), International Affairs Officer (EEAS), Legal Advisor (Ministry of Environment of Italy).

Helga Maria Schmid

Helga Maria Schmid was appointed to the post of Secretary General of the OSCE in December 2020 for a three-year term.

She first joined the diplomatic service as Assistant Private Secretary to the Minister for European Affairs (1990–1991). Since then she has held several prominent diplomatic positions during her career.

Early on, she was Political Adviser to Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and Head of Cabinet to Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer; and just prior to her appointment as OSCE Secretary General, she was Secretary General for the European External Action Service.

From 2011 to 2016, she was the Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs for the European External Action Service. Preceding that, she was the Director of the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (Policy Unit) of the High Representative for the CFSP in the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union in Brussels.

Ms. Schmid has an MA in English and Romance languages, literature, history and politics (1980–1987) from Munich University (Ludwig Maximilians Universität) and the Sorbonne in Paris. Her mother tongue is German and she speaks fluent English and French.

Lamberto Zannier

Ambassador Lamberto Zannier of Italy was OSCE Secretary General for two consecutive three-year terms, from 1 July 2011 until 30 June 2017, and OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities from 19 July 2017 until 18 July 2020. He is currently an Adviser for the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.

He joined the Italian Foreign Ministry as a career diplomat in 1978. From June 2008 until June 2011, he was UN Special Representa-

tive for Kosovo and Head of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). From 2006 to 2008 he was Coordinator for CFSP and ESDP (now CSDP) in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dealing inter alia with EU foreign policy issues and with Italy's participation in EU operations. From 2002 to 2006, he was the Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre of the OSCE, where he focused on political-military issues, as well as crisis management, and was responsible for managing the OSCE's field operations.

Amb. Zannier holds a law degree and an honorary degree in International and Diplomatic Sciences from the University of Trieste, Italy.

APPENDIX II

MOST COMMONLY USED ACRONYMS AT THE OSCE

Acronym	
ABL	Administrative Boundary Lines
ACMF	Advisory Committee on Management and Finance
AML	Anti-money laundering
AIAM	Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting
API	Advanced Passenger Information
APCG	Asian Partners for Co-operation Group
ASRC	Annual Security Review Conference
ATU	Action against Terrorism Unit
BMSC	Border Management Staff College (Dushanbe)
BSMU	Border Security Management Unit
BSS	Biological Safety and Security
CBMs	Confidence Building Measures
CCA	OSCE Court of Conciliation and Arbitration
CCC	Common Corporate Costs
CD	Constituent Document for the OSCE
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Treaty on)
CFT	Combating the financing of terrorism
CiO	Chairperson-in-Office
CLS	Conference and Language Services (part of OSG)
CMT	Crisis Management Team
CoC	Code of Conduct
CoE	Council of Europe
COMMS	Communication and Media Relations Section
CPC	Conflict Prevention Centre
CRMS	Common Regulatory Management System
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSBMs	Confidence- and Security-Building Measures
CSO	Committee of Senior Officials
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSS	Chemical Safety and Security
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
CT	Counterterrorism
DD	Draft Decision
delweb	Delegates' Website
DHR	Department of Human Resources
DMF	Department of Management and Finance
DC	Draft Convention

EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	Economic and Environmental Committee
EECP	Entry-Exit Checkpoints
EED	Economic and Environmental Dimension
EEDIM	Economic and Environmental Dimension Implementation Meeting
EEF	Economic and Environmental Forum
EESC	Economic and Environmental Subcommittee (now EEC)
EOM	Election Observation Mission
ES	Executive Structures
EU	European Union
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EU PSC	European Union Political and Security Committee
ExB	Extra-budgetary
FAI	Financial/Administrative Instruction
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FAU	Fund Administrative Unit
FSC	Forum for Security Co-operation
GAP	OSCE 2004 Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality
GBV	Gender-based violence
GEAP	Gender Equality Action Plan
GFP	Gender Focal Point
GID	Geneva International Discussions
GUAM	Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova
HCNM	High Commissioner on National Minorities
HDC	Human Dimension Committee
HDIM(s)	Human Dimension Implementation Meeting(s)
HDS	Human Dimension Seminar
HLMDS	High-Level Military Doctrine Seminar
HLPG	High Level Planning Group
HoM(s)	Head(s) of Mission(s)
ICTs	Information and Communication Technologies
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IFC	Informal Financial Committee (now ACMF)
ILP	Intelligence-Led Policing
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (Treaty)
IPRM	Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism
IPSAS	International Public Sector Accounting Standards
IRMA	Integrated Resource Management System
ISB	Informal Subsidiary Body

IWG	Informal Working Group
JCCC	Joint Control and Coordination Commission
JCG	Joint Consultative Group (CFE Treaty)
JPO	Junior Professional Officer
KVM	Kosovo Verification Mission
LS	Language Service Section (of Conference and Language Services)
MAU/CLS	Meetings Assistance Unit of Conference and Language Services
MC	Ministerial Council
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MGCC	Minsk Group Co-Chairs
MOs	Monitoring Officers
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
N4	Normandy Four
NAM	Needs Assessment Mission
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCEEA	Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities
OC	Organized Crime
OCEEA	Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities
OCGc	Organized Crime Groups
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OIO	Office of Internal Oversight
OM	Observer Mission
OMIK	OSCE Mission in Kosovo
OS	Operations Service (part of the CPC)
OSCC	Open Skies Consultative Commission
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSG	Office of the Secretary General
OSR/CTHB	Office of the SR/Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings
PA	Parliamentary Assembly
PBPB	Performance Based Programme Budgeting
PBPR	Programme Budget Performance Report
PC	Permanent Council
PCU	OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine
PESU	Programme Evaluation and Support Unit (part of the CPC)
PMD	Politico-Military Dimension

PNR	Passenger Name Record
PO	Programme Outline
POiB	OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek
POiN	OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan
PR	Personal Representative
PrepComm	Preparatory Committee
PSO	Protective Services Officer
pS(s)	Participating State(s)
PSS	Policy Support Service (part of the CPC)
REC	Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe
RevCon	Review Conference (in the year of an OSCE Summit)
RFOM	Representative on Freedom of the Media
RoP	Rules of Procedure
SALW	Small arms and light weapons
SBD	Scenario-based discussion
SC	Security Committee
SCA	Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition
SHDM	Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting
SG	Secretary General
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
SPMU	Strategic Police Matters Unit
SR	Special Representative
SRA	Security Risk Assessment
SRSR	Staff Regulation and Staff Rules
SS	Shared Services
SSC	Shared Services Center
SSG/R	Security sector governance and reform
TNTD	Transnational Threats Department
TOC	Transnational Organized Crime
ToT	Training of Trainers
TRRIP	Transparency, Risk Reduction and Incident Prevention
UAVs	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
UB	Unified Budget
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UXO	Unexploded ordnance

VERLT	Violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism
WAE	Weapons, Ammunitions and Explosives
WEU	Western European Union
WG	Working Group
WGSI	Working Group on Security Issues
WPS	Women, Peace and Security
ZNG	Zero Nominal Growth
ZRG	Zero Real Growth

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La collana "Memorie e studi diplomatici", diretta da Stefano Baldi, è dedicata a valorizzare figure ed attività della diplomazia italiana attraverso testimonianze e ricerche condotte da studiosi e storici.

This publication is based on selected interventions from a cycle of seminars titled: "The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) as a model for multilateral regional diplomacy of the 21st century", organised in 2022 by the Permanent Mission of Italy to the OSCE with some Italian Universities.
The initiative took place from March to May 2022 in virtual format, with the aim to promote the knowledge and the study of the role and activities of the OSCE and to strengthen cooperation between diplomacy and the Italian university system. All the lectures were given by diplomats of the Permanent Mission and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, by Italian officials serving at the OSCE and by university professors and experts of the Organization. Around 60 university students from nine Italian universities took part.
The book includes contributions by Massimo Drei, Vito Mosè Pierro, Tullio Baietti, Luca Fratini, Lamberto Zannier, Matteo Mecacci, Denise Mazzolani, Lorenzo Rilasciati, Emiliano Alessandri, Roberto Montella, Mario Alberto Bartoli, Helga Maria Schmid, Guido Almerigogna, Arianna Briganti, Maddalena Dalla Mora, Giulia Manconi, Andrea de Guttry, Cristiana Carletti, Maria Alcidi, Vincenzo Del Monaco, Andrea Dessì and Alessandro Azzoni.

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Photo by the editor

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