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THE EUROPEAN PROJECT AS A PARADOX
TO THE STUDENTS OF THE
YOUTH FORUM OF ECPD
As prophets of their century Victor Hugo and Giuseppe Mazzini had foreseen the United States of Europe, like a return Eastwards of the movement from the enlightenment of the XVIII century and the shores of the French Revolution to the peoples of Europe of the principles of freedom and democracy.

Hard to die, as a deviation of untamed romanticism and patriotism, nationalism filled the philosophical gap of nihilism and inspired the opposed extremisms which devastated the continent in the first half of the century.

The mythical phoenix can be assumed as a symbol of a European aspiration to unity in what is generally called the European Project (EP), initially planned by political prisoners in the tiny island of Ventotene, in the Tyrrhenian Sea in front of Gaeta. Altiero Spinelli, then Jean Monnet, from different grounds lay the foundations of what became the European Community, first limited to the iron and coal industry, then extended to the whole economical field and finally completed by a Commission, a Council and a Parliament.

For 66 years the “European adventure” reached substantial goals hard to imagine at the middle of the century. The controversial participation of England, after 1973 played a relevant role in preventing a prominent leading influence of France and Germany in the balanced power of the stronger members of the Community. Though adversed to any form of political unity, the British membership resulted loyal and factual: a president of the Commission and a president of the Parliament, both English citizens, acted as representatives of supranational organs and their activity was duly praised. Moreover, a prime minister belonging to
the conservative party supported the Community so convincingly to be surnamed “Lord Heath of Europe”.

The British vision of the EU was strictly confined to an economical union, without implications in international affairs, nor in social or fiscal matters. The other governments tacitly agreed, while still officially proclaiming their belief in future political developments. The Britons were probably the first ones to realize that an economical union without a political background would be weak and vulnerable. The world crisis of 2008 revealed the truth and let them believe that such a semiplegic Europe could not go much far. Considering the real danger of some components of political integration, they chose to leave the Union instead to face the risk implied in it. Nevertheless, their reactions to the issue of the June referendum showed how they had been poorly informed of the consequences of the BREXIT and a few voters, deceived by the results, had in mind to repeat it.

The European crisis, apparently misunderstood by the supporters of the way-out, is not limited to the continent, largely being a world crisis caused by the wrong approach to the impact of the globalization. Instead the BREXIT succeeded in claiming at the unavoidable and urgent need to deeply reform the European institutions, obsolete nowadays as well as outdated and unproductive.

The postface of this book will consist in a sort of wide circle, presently closed by the British exit, which could eventually turn in a provisional stop, waiting for world developments unseeable at the moment: let us leave to the future the keys of our destiny, as mondial and not only European citizens!
The Ventotene Manifesto (1941), written in captivity by Al- tiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi, is the historical premise of the movement towards the unification of Europe in a federation of States. The continent was under nazi domination and the vision foreseen by Spinelli appeared at the moment as belonging to the reign of utopia. And yet, less than a decade later, in the aftermath of a Europe devastated by the Second World War, Jean Monnet formulated his programme of a stable peace based on a planned conciliation between France and Germany, as a first step to relaunch and improve the role of Europe in the world.

Robert Schuman, at a press conference held on May 9 1950 at the French ministry of Foreign Affairs, announced the Franco-German resolution to exploit jointly by the two governments the common resources in coal and steel: the historical declaration initiated the long, difficult and hazardous way to the unity of Europe. From the very beginnings the movement was considered a serious challenge to traditional national rivalries dividing the continent and to the century old myth of State sovereignty: such a deeply rooted dogma had survived the two “civil wars” of 1914–1918 and 1939–1945, while persistent feelings of nationalism and revanchisme opposed a strong wall to a suggested sovereignty shared by Nation/States associated in some kind of federal link.

Repeatedly since 1953 with the disapproval by the French parliament of the European Community of Defence France expressed defiance towards measures limiting any component of national sovereignty, mainly after De Gaulle reassumed power in 1959. To overcome the denial of the Defence Community and the first relevant European crisis Gaetano Martino, the Italian minister of Foreign Affairs,
with his five colleagues met in Messina and appointed Paul-Henri Spaak president of a Committee formed to give a renewed impulse to the efforts towards unification.

After a long negotiation at Val Duchesse, a castle near Bruxelles, on March 25 1957, two treaties were signed in Rome creating the European Economical Community and the Community of Atomical Energy (respectively known as Common market and EURATOM). I was present at that very formal historical event as a young diplomat at the Treaty Division of the ministry of Foreign Affairs, still located in Palazzo Chigi: the negotiation had moved from Val Duchesse to the Roman Campidoglio and it was particularly stimulating to agree on the final clauses of the treaties among celebrated masterpieces of old Greek an Roman sculptures.

There were four original versions of the text, in French, Italian, German and Dutch: I had been assigned to a small working group formed to supervise, linguistically as well as juridically, that the French and the Italian wordings were as possible identical. Besides such a formal role, in the morning of the 25th of March, I was asked to take care of the eight big volumes after the signatures, to avoid that journalists notice a few Additional Protocoles with blank pages already signed during the ceremony. The experts would have needed one or two more days to finalize the list of goods to remove from custom duties: it was consequent-ly decided not to postpone the stipulation of the treaties, which could have been considered as some kind of last moment disagreement.

The ceremony lasted rather long since it implied more than one hundred signatures by the twelve plenipotentiaries: then everybody left the large and splendid hall of Orazi e Curiazi leaving me alone with journalists and television envoy, mainly attracted by the State seals and the signatures on the last pages of the heavy volumes. To conceal the blank protocols I pressed the media representatives to photograph the originals hastefully, since they had to
be at the soonest deposited at the archives of the foreign ministry. An eventual serious incident was happily avoided: I safely loaded the treaties in a special case prepared by the ministry and I secretly left the Campidoglio square on an official car discreetly waiting for me near the equestrian monument to emperor Marcus Aurelius. My successful mission was unfortunately nullified by a leak from the printers of the treaties: on March 26, the daily communist newspaper “L’unità” informed that the two treaties were not internationally legal because they presented blank pages. The assumed political scandal was officially denied by the ministry of Foreign Affairs but the denial was in effect a veiled confirmation. The blank Additional Protocols were discreetly and privately undersigned afterwards without causing any discredit to the plain validity of the treaties. Historically they underline the firm and deeply convinced European feelings of the six founders of the Communities at their sound origin as well as their enthusiastic pride for the personal role played in the European Project.

The Treaties of Rome were rapidly approved by the six parliaments, the majorities of which supported the readiness of the governments to extend to the whole economical field the supranational impact which had proved so advantageous in the coal and steel production. The French government was among the first to ratify: on November 25, only eight months after the stipulation, Gaston Palewsky ambassador in Rome came suddenly to Palazzo Chigi to deliver the instrument of ratification of France. The agonizing Fourth Republic was aware that De Gaulle was firmly opposed to the principle of a supranational federal Europe and that any delay to ratify the treaties would imply a serious risk.

Six months later the General was asked by the French parliament to assume power as head of State to face the danger of a military coup d’état: in May 1958 De Gaulle began his second political career as first president of the Fifth Republic under a new Constitution giving him more executive
power. He did not dare to withdraw France from the Communities, but he resumed an obsolete nationalism based on the "grandeur" and tried unsuccessfully to bypass the European institutions with the "Plan Fouchet", finally disapproved by Italy and the other partners: the Gaullian vision anticipated a "Europe des patries, de l'Atlantique à l'Oural", under a French hegemony, with disengaged relations with the USSR, in evident antagonism with the Anglo-American supremacy within the Atlantic Alliance.

The further developments of the European Project in the following 66 years made of France the main, if not the sole responsible for having set aside what would have represented the beginning of a new era in the XXI century. On the other hand the "exception française", the less anachronistic definition of the former "grandeur", is not even acceptable to the other partners as well as any kind of predominance of a single State in the implementation of the Project.
Contents

PREFACE 3
Forewords 5

I. THE ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT 11
   1) Literature and history: Renaissance and
      Illuminisme, Hugo, Mazzini, Cattaneo 11
   2) The forerunners: Sforza, Briand, Stresemann,
      Coudenhove, Rougemont 12
   3) The founders: Spinelli, Monnet 13
   4) The first actors: Schuman,
      De Gasperi, Adenauer, Spaak 14

II. THE EUROPEAN TREATIES 15
   1) From the Community of Coal and Steel to
      the first stop-over: the Community of Defence 15
   2) From the Economical Community
      and the Community of Atomic Energy to the
      European Union 16
   3) The Constitutional Treaty and its failure 17
   4) The Treaty of Lisbon 18

III. THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF A SERIES OF
     PARALYZING PARADOXES 18

IV. A ROAD MAP FOR THE FUTURE 28
Postface 33
Annex 35
I. The Origins of the European Project

1) Literature and history: Renaissance and Illuminisme, Hugo, Mazzini, Cattaneo

The idea of a European civilization emerges at the end of the middle-ages, temporarily set aside by the geographic discoveries, then resumed by the fall of Constantinople to the Otomans. Greek and Roman antiquities gave a strong impulse to a cultural renaissance in philosophy, literature and poetry. In Italy Piccolomini, Ficino, Landino, Pico della Mirandola, followed one century later by Machiavelli and Guicciardini localized the city of Florence as a focal point, while in Germany, France, England, the Netherlands and other countries humanism developed and extended in all fields of knowledge and sciences until the XVII century with Galileo. A European diversified culture expanded all over the continent, culminating in the XVIII with Montesquieu, Voltaire and the encyclopedists, the Illuminisme as a whole.

Those are the ancient origins of the European Project (EP), left aside by romanticism and nationalism, deviated in imperialism and the devastations of the last century dictatorships and conflicts.

Even before, after the Napoleonian wars and the restoration of absolutism the idea of Europe reappeared in the revolutions of mid XIX century as a complement of democracy and freedom. After the creation of the “Young Italy” Mazzini (1805–1872) proclaimed in clandestinity at Bern in 1834 the “Young Europe” together with German and Polish exiled patriots. The common goal was a federal republican link founded on democracy and liberty.

Along the same path Victor Hugo announced in 1849 the day in which wars between European countries will be
absurd and impossible and France, Austria, Italy, England, Germany will strongly merge in a superior unity and form the European brotherland. One hundred years later Churchill, in a historical speech in Zurich appealed to “a kind of United States of Europe”! “If Europe must be saved from a definitive destruction, an act of faith in the European family is necessary. Great-Britain, the Commonwealth, America and – I have no doubt – Russia will be friendly to the new Europe and defend its right to live. So, I say to you: Stand up, Europe!”

Among the most convinced supporters of federalism ranks originally and vigorously Carlo Cattaneo (1801–1869): he was a philosopher, historian, economist, geographer. According to him history opens the way to a progressive federal integration and union is the result of an effort towards civilization.

The philosophical, literary and economical platforms were subsequently ready to build a new architecture in Europe, similarly supported by the fast and radical developments in sciences and technologies. The wars of the first half of the XX century and the fall of the empires of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Turkey opened the way to a new era for all the European peoples. Some personalities of high and original profiles did not hesitate to impose radical innovations, mainly inspired by a firm will of a stable peace and a consequent prosperity expressed by the populations.

2) The forerunners: Sforza, Briand, Stresemann, Coudenhove-Kalergi, Rougemont

The activities of the EP space in three generations at least: the great-grand-fathers, the grand-fathers and the fathers as historical founders.

Carlo Sforza (1872–1952) a republican though of aristocratic descent, had in mind a united Europe on democratic and free bases in the Mazzinian tradition. He was the last
minister of Foreign Affairs before the upsurge of Mussolini and maintained a life long hostility and contempt to him. The European faith and vocation of Sforza appear in the books he wrote on international relations.

Aristide Briand (1862–1932) played a deeper European role, based on the assertion, furtherly developed by Monnet, of a conciliation between France and Germany as a first step towards a Europe politically operational if strengthened by a stable peace and a democracy ruled by law. In such a conviction Briand acted positively at the Treaty of Locarno, signed in 1925 by France, Germany, England, Italy, Belgium and Czechoslovakia, to protect the Belgian borders from violence of any kind. An active member of the socialist party, Briand shared for long periods governmental duties, as foreign minister and premier during World War 1, succeeding to Clemenceau in years of dramatic hardship. At the Locarno conference and later he agreed on a similar belief with Stresemann, minister of Foreign Affairs in the Republic of Weimar. The Franco-German appeasement did not last long and was abruptly and scornfully denied by Hitler to cancel any trace of the Versailles Treaty.

After having agreed with the American secretary of State Kellogg a pact to abolish war as a mean of foreign policy, Briand presented to the League of Nations a draft of a European Confederation and, on September 5, 1929, pronounced a brilliant speech appealing the Europeans to gather in a federal union (see excerpt in Annex).

One year later, Alexis Leger, Saint-John Perse as a Nobel Prize in poetry, secretary general at the French foreign ministry, a close aide of Briand, proposed to the League a Memorandum on the organization of a regime of federal European union (excerpt in Annex).

Gustav Stresemann (1878–1929) had also a relevant impact in the reconciliation between the two banks of the Rhine and in laying the foundations of a European spirit: as leader of a coalition government of socialdemocrats and
people's party he settled a social agitation in the Ruhr and repressed the putsch of Hitler at Munich, as well as the start of a communist threat. Aligned to Briand’s views on Europe, he shared the success of Locarno, signed the Briand-Kellogg Pact in 1928 and supported the accession of Germany to the League of Nations.

Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi (1894–1972) published in German and Austrian newspapers a “ManIFESTE Paneuropéen” (1924). Denouncing the production of weaponry, the document stigmatizes a Europe superficially ignoring the future. The salvation could only be a political and economical association of democratic countries. No stable union in Europe is possible without a lasting peace on the whole continent. Open national borders and free exchange of goods “Common interests pave the way to a political community.” Or “It is not enough to criticize: we must collaborate to the creation of our political destiny.” The Manifeste was adopted by a congress held in Vienna in 1927, with the portraits of Sully, Comenius, Kant, Mazzini, Hugo and Nietzsche. But a first sign of ambiguity had so early emerged, with the proposal of several alternative assemblies, like a conference of States, a political committee and a secretariat: moreover, the French government did not renounce to the “absolute sovereignties”, nor the Britons their “firmness in isolation.”

Nevertheless, as a philosopher, writer, essayist Coudenhove created in 1950 the Centre européen de la culture et l’Institut européen, in 1978 the review “Cadmos”: he is undoubtedly a major personality in the EP.

Denis de Rougemont (1906–1985). In parallel and additional action and ambition to implement them, a second forerunner dominated that bright dawn of Europe. In the diversified scenery of conservative Switzerland Rougemont ranks among the most convinced supporters of a Europe fully integrated on federal links, mentioning the Swiss Confederation as an example.
3) The founders: Spinelli, Monnet

Altiero Spinelli (1907–1986) was a militant in the Italian Communist Party. Operating in clandestinity, he was arrested and confined in the small island of Ventotene. In captivity, together with the economist Ernesto Rossi and Eugenio Colorni he drafted a detailed scheme of a European Federation in a text known as “Ventotene Manifesto.” After the collapse of the fascist regime Spinelli became a strong supporter of the EP and an appreciated adviser of De Gasperi, before joining the European Commission and later the Parliament. At the very beginning of the Project, during the negotiations of the Defence Treaty he convinced De Gasperi that the unification of the armed forces could give way to a political integration: at Italian request an article of the agreement instaured a political committee aimed to some advanced steps along the political ground. Spinelli also presented a draft of treaty creating a European Union (1984): in a general indifference the Council not even discussed it.

Jean Monnet (1888–1979). Deputy Secretary General of the League of Nations from 1919 to 1923, exiled in London in 1940 he suggested a political union between France and England, supported by Churchill and Reynaud. In the immediate postwar period he chaired a committee aimed to increase the production of coal, iron and electricity, the Monnet programme (1947–1953). He successfully inspired Schuman in his plan, implemented with the first European Community (Treaty of Paris, 1951). As the first president of the High Authority on top of the CECA, he was bestowed of the tittle of First Citizen of Europe. In 1956 Monnet founded the Committee for the creation of the United States of Europe. Rather different in formation and background, Monnet and Spinelli were not only the prophets, but also the architects of the EP. The latter affirmed: “Europe may fail politically, but it represents a world cultural success. Consequently Europe must survive politically. Without Europe
the gap between past and present would put an end to the continuous advance of mankind."

4) The first actors: Schuman, De Gasperi, Adenauer, Spaak

Robert Schuman (1886–1963). The attractive and original personality of Schuman appears to the visitors of his residence at Scy-Chazelles, near Metz. Born in Luxembourg, member of the French government in 1940, he soon resigned, opposed to the German occupation. Jailed, he could reach London. With Georges Bidault he formed a Christian-democratic party. Minister of Finance, he became prime minister. He recognized the independence of Vietnam and initiated a policy of approaching Germany by renouncing to control the Ruhr. Foreign minister in 1953, on May 9 1950 he had proclaimed the Schuman Plan and one year after he signed the treaty instaurung the European Community of Coal and Iron (CECA in French, ECCS in English), followed in 1952 by the Defence Treaty (CED/ECD). Minister of Justice in the cabinet of Edgar Faure (1955–1956), he chaired the European Movement and was the president of the European Parliament in Strasbourg from 1958 to 1960).

At the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome, as one of the few survivors of that historical event I was asked to commemorate the birthday of the EEC in the mansion of Scy-Chazelles, where an inscription at the front-door reminds that in the premises Schuman, De Gasperi and Adenauer had laid the foundations of a new Europe.

Alcide De Gasperi (1881–1954) was born near Trento when the region belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire and was elected to the Reichstag. An Italian citizen in 1918, he founded the People's Party, origin of the Christian-democrats. Emprisoned by the fascists, he was released at pope Pius XII’s request and became minister of Foreign Affairs in 1944, then Prime minister from 1945 to 1953. From the
earliest times De Gasperi shared the views of his French colleague on a politically united Europe and formed with Adenauer a stronghold of a European common power, made easier by their religious beliefs and the use of the same language.

Konrad Adenauer (1987–1967), born in Cologne where he became mayor in 1917. Opposed to the communists in 1918, he was dismissed by Goering in 1933. President of the catholic CDU, he was nominated chancellor in 1949 and ruled the Federal Republic of Germany until 1963. After the re-establishment of the sovereignty of Germany, he integrated the country in the European Communities and in NATO (London and Paris agreements of 1954). His close friendship with his two leading partners in Europe, Adenauer was a relevant actor on a unified political stage which operated a determinant impulse to unify Western Europe in a fast developing economical community from 6 up to 28 members in little more than half a century. With Spaak he was one of the signatories of the Treaties of Rome and their overwhelming presence at the ceremony of the Capitol was not overdue.

Paul-Henri Spaak (1899–1972). Foreign minister and head of the Belgian diplomacy in the exiled government in London, after having been Prime minister from 1933 to 1939. Again head of the government from 1946 to 1949, he was elected president of the first general assembly of the United Nations in 1946. Spaak was the most active and determinant negotiator of the Treaties of Rome. Foreign minister also from 1962 to 1965, he strongly opposed the Fouchet Plan. He ranks among the politicians of the highest profile in the most successful period of the EP.
II. The European Treaties

1) From the Community of Coal and Steel to the first stop-over: the Community of Defence (CECA, CED)

Some historians consider the Treaty of Locarno (October 1925) signed by France, Germany, England, Italy, Belgium, Poland and Czechoslovakia as a kind of preliminary to the European agreements of the second half of the century. By guaranteeing the borders of North Europe, the treaty was a first step towards a reconciliation between France and Germany.

The Treaty instauring a European Community of Coal and Steel (Paris, April 18 1951) originates the first of all institutions, with a High Authority of nine members independent from the governments but responsible to an assembly which can revoke them. A committee of ministers votes at majority and a court of Justice settles the controversies. Jean Monnet is the first president of the Authority, located in Luxembourg.

The problem of the German rearmament advises Monnet to negotiate a Community of Defence: the treaty is signed in Paris, on 27 May 1952. It includes a European army of 520,000 men, placed under the supreme command of NATO. The organs of the CED are similar to those of the CECA.

2) From the Economical Community and the Community of Atomic Energy to the European Union (CEE-CEEA, EU)

After the denial by the French parliament of the Defence Treaty the Italian government presented a draft of a treaty of political union, suggested by Spinelli to De Gasperi, but
never debated by the governments, moved as they were by the failure of the CED.

Less than three years later, on March 25 1957, two essential agreements were signed in Rome: the treaty instauring the European Economical Community (common market) and the treaty creating the Community of Atomic Energy (EURATOM). A common market is established for all industrial and agricultural products as well as a custom union, free circulation of persons, capitals and goods. Common policies on trade and agricultural matters are also recommended. Three executive organs are coexisting now: the High Authority of the CECA, the Commission of the common market and the Commission of EURATOM (development of nuclear industry, free circulation of researchers and materials). The power is shared with intergovernmental entities: Council of ministers of member States and federal elements, like the European parliament and the court of Justice. The parliament gathers together CECA, CEE and EURATOM.

To complete and improve the Treaties of Rome, on February 17, 1986 the Single Act was signed in Luxembourg: the goal is to widen the common market in a single one, by removing several regulations preventing a free circulation of goods, capitals and persons. The previous treaties are modified and a political cooperation is adopted. It was also decided that the single market had to be reached on January 1st 1993. To remove any obstacle to the travels within the borders of the Community, the Schengen agreements had been stipulated one year before, on June 14, 1985: a most relevant step towards the abolition of the old internal borders of the States.

The Single Act represents in effect a transition from the Treaties of Rome to new fields of integration, in monetary terms specifically. After long and animated debates on the launching of a common currency, the Treaty of the European Union was signed in Maastricht on February 7, 1992: the Community is upgraded to a Union, the organs of the institutions are restructured, and a monetary union, with the
euro as common currency drafted. Structurally, the executive organs of the Union are grouped in three pillars: the first one is related to the Economical Community and to the existing treaties, the second to foreign and security policies, the third to justice and internal affairs, as well as to a European citizenship. Besides, the citizens of one member State can vote at local elections of another partner to the Union. The operational fields of the EU are extended to environment, research, education, culture, formation, health and protection of the consumer. In all decisions a majority vote is introduced or developed.

3) The Constitutional Treaty and its failure

The Treaty of Amsterdam (Oct. 2 1997) includes some new improvements: the powers of the parliament and of the president of the commission are increased, a qualified majority is now required in matters of civil order and justice, but unanimity is still imposed in hard problems. Political integration is prudently left aside.

The proximity of new enlargements of the EU and the consequent urgency to reform the institutions were rather inadequately approached at the Treaty of Nice (February 26, 2001): from 2005 the Commission will be composed of one representative for each member State up to a maximum of 27 persons; the president elected at qualified majority by the Council and approved by the Parliament, with increased powers. A qualified majority is also extended to decisions concerning industrial policy, and free circulation of persons. The results of these agreements are considered unsatisfactory and the Council of Laeken decided in December 2001 to abandon the procedure of intergovernmental conferences and convene a convention aimed to elaborate a draft of Constitutional Treaty, in other words a Constitution for the EU. The agreement was signed in Rome, on October 29, 2004. An extremely long and complex text, largely based on the existing treaties, brings relevant innovations: a president of the Council, with more powers, is elected by
his colleagues for a period of two and half years, a minister of Foreign Affairs is created, who is also the vice-president of the Commission, formed by a number of commissioners equal to the amount of member States (but only half of them will vote in deliberations), a service of external relations is instaured and representations opened abroad, the six-monthly rotational term of presidency is abolished as well as the presidency of ministers chairing the different departments, now elected by their colleagues. These important reforms are debated at a conference in Rome and opposed by countries supporting the Nice agreements (Spain and Poland in particular). Refused by the French electorate in May 2005 and in June by a referendum in the Netherlands, the Constitutional Treaty never entered into force, though ratified by most of the other partners.

4) The Treaty of Lisbon

A long gap of more than two years was spent in useless recriminations on the growing inadequacy of the Treaty of Nice. As last resort, some reforms suggested by the draft Constitution were considered unavoidable and a Reform Treaty was signed in Lisbon on December 13, 2007. The rotating presidency of six months is re-introduced, but the office of president of the European Council maintained for a mandate of 30 months; instead of a minister responsible of the external and security relations a High Representative head of the relative services is now in charge, still vice-president of the Commission; a few more powers are granted to the Parliament: as a whole a rough copy of the denied Constitution, in which the symbols of the European Union (flag, hymn and motto: united in diversity) are not even mentioned by a sort of prudent reserve.

Afterwards several agreements were negotiated in specific fields concerning budget and financial matters. The present survey does not include the treaties related to the admission of new members, from the 6 founder States to the present 28, 19 of which belong to the monetary union (the eurogroup).
III. The Negative Impact of a Series of Paralyzing Paradoxes

All along the 22 years of the actual stop-down the political union of Europe was analyzed and considered rather superficially and with hostility, using the same terms than the euroskeptical and Europhobic factions: multiplicity of languages, diversity in wealth, historical origins and rivalries, instability of borders, movements of populations, growing nationalisms from romanticism to racism and dictatorial regimes of the XX century. Each argument can be controverted and transformed in a positive lever.

The long-lasting stagnation in the dark waters of the pond, originated and then aggravated by hasty enlargements, was caused by three relevant reasons: 1) Postponement of further steps forward to a political integration. 2) Accession of new members to strengthen economical cohesion. 3) Political and geo-strategical security wall, facing the still alarming behavior of Putin’s revanchisme after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and former allies turned to advanced position of NATO.

The results of memberships of neutral countries (Austria, Sweden, Finland) were more profitable than the following extensions of weaker States in order to promote backward economies left alone in a delicate situation. The gate to a political implementation of the EP being closed, the enlargement became an easier issue, but also a sound paradox.

Many years before, some ambiguity was implied at the start of the EP: it was reported that, after his talks with Monnet Schuman omitted to inform in detail the Prime minister Bidault. They did not share the same views and the Foreign minister was probably not certain that his partner fully and entirely agreed with the radical programme announced in the speech of May 9. Was it a first symptom of discordance
at the top of the cabinet? When I noticed that in front of Schuman's house the starred flag was fluttering alone, I asked the mayor of Scy-Chazelles why; he replied almost offended: "Here, Sir, we are in Europe!" And at their strong blame the local authorities could not forget the refusal of De Gaulle to consent the presence of old Adenauer at the funeral of Schuman: "Au fond il était un boche", he exclaimed in his xenophobia. And yet he had stipulated a few weeks before a Franco-German treaty of reconciliation, as a bilateral peace agreement between the two peoples: another choking paradox in the heart of the Community.

Some years earlier, after the signature of the Treaty instauring the European Defence Community (CED/EDC), a coalition of communists and conservatives, singing together "La Marseillaise" at the parliament, refused to ratify the agreement. That first most unfortunate denial of the EP made many observers affirm that times had not come to extend the new relations between the two banks of the Rhine to the armed forces, not even at a European multi-national and integrated level.

At a distance of 52 years, with a majority of voters, the European Constitution was similarly refused (2005 referendum), and the two opponent groups assumed the responsibility to cause the second most serious crisis of the Project. The socialists were once more divided and the issue of the votes, according to the supporters of the Constitutional Treaty, was a sign of adversity to the internal policy of Chirac, he himself not convinced of the opportunity of the treaty. In both denials the reasons given were superficial alibis to conceal the scarce European feelings of the electorate.

From the beginning the positions of Paris were often different, if not opposed to those of the Commission and the European Assembly. The most acute disagreement was due to the short-viewed and proud nationalism of De Gaulle. In November 1957 the French ambassador urgently deposited the ratification of the two treaties signed seven
months earlier: the return of the general at the presidency was considered imminent and his opposition to any programme of supranationality was known.

When he resumed power in January 1959 a long succession of unilateral moves hostile to the EP hampered any positive development of it: not daring to recede from the Communities, he prevented those accomplishments which would not bring a concrete benefit to France nor affirmed its supremacy over the organization. De Gaulle’s adversity to the goal of a united Europe above the nations met with a large and relevant field with the aspiration of the Britons to join the Communities. Invited to become a part of them, London had contemptuously refused and tried to form a second association, the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), including Ireland, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark, on which the United Kingdom would exert an economical hegemony. Compared to the indeniable and fast success of the Common Market, EFTA was a weak and pale geographical neighbor. England changed therefore its mind and applied for EEC membership. De Gaulle refused, opposing that London wanted to become an outpost, a “cheval de Troie” of the American supremacy over the continent. Such a policy corresponded to the withdrawal of France from NATO as a political organization, without renouncing to its military commitment. The general president did not attenuate his firm aversion against an Atlantic Europe, and later again rejected a second British application which followed while the EEC rapidly progressed.

On a wider scale De Gaulle planned a Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Ural mountains, enlargement of a France “from Dunkerque to Tamanrasset in Africa”: the design was to compensate the loss of a colonial Empire with a dominant position in Europe. Fearing the ghost of a political giant, he instructed Christian Fouchet, a career diplomat to promote a different kind of union, compatible with the national sovereignties. The Gaullian plan was immediately denied by Italy and the Belgians, thinking that London
would act as a counterweight to the influence of Paris and the strategical reliability of the United States was essential to face the aggressivity of the Soviets in the Cold War. Besides, keeping England out of EEC would not prevent Washington to control and condition the Europeans.

In a different scenery detractors of the general could believe that he was to a certain degree blackmailing the West in admitting a supremacy of Moscow over Central and Eastern Europe: when he officially visited Romania in 1969, to Ceausescu asking a French support in his controversial relation with Brežnev he warned that friendship between Bucharest and Paris had to transit through the USSR.

Another Gaullian intolerance emerged in the debated issue concerning the delicate field of the agricultural common policy (PAC/CAP), where the interests of French farmers were neglected, according to him: in 1965 he decided to withdraw his delegate at the talks and the French seat remained empty for six months, until a compromise is reached by presidential authority. One more imposition dictated by Paris to the other five members of the Communities, while in all fields EEC was registering positive unexpected gains.

The senile stubbornness of De Gaulle deceived and offended also the skeptically tolerant Italian public opinion when he arrogantly said that France was not on sale, like Yemen or Italy. As to the personal anger he felt for the British people it was partly due to the little consideration they showed to him during his stay in London as an exiled defiance often nourished by the French towards their neighbors beyond the Channel, dated from colonial rivalries and disputes. This historical antagonism did not help the EP.

The implosion of Yugoslavia and the conflicts in the Balkans revealed once more contrasting reactions among the governments: Germany, France and Italy recognized soon the self declared independence of Slovenia and Croatia, later that of Bosnia and Macedonia, finally Montenegro.
However, in spite of some forms of political cooperation within the Communities first, the EU later the approach to the Western Balkans crisis was openly dominated by the American diplomacy. A similar lack of unity prevailed when Kosovo became unilaterally independent: the countries without turbulent national minorities recognized the “fait accompli” by the self proclaimed government of Priština, while others like Spain, Romania and Slovakia did not comply with Washington and opposed the same denial of Moscow and Peking.

Another serious mischief in planning the EP’s sceneries concerns Turkey. As early as in 1963 Ankara had signed the first Association agreement with the 6 founders of the Communities. The country already enjoyed a privileged position at West as member of NATO and of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. The Kemal's revolution aimed to modernize and laicize the Turkish people, as well as the 5 century long and tumultuous relations with Europe represented a pledge of common interest for the future. The geo-strategical location, as a natural bridge between the continent, the Near and Middle East, the Mediterranean and the approaches of Asia, has a whole political weight even higher and more delicate than the importance of Great Britain.

While the accession to the EU of former members of the Warsaw Pact could be interpreted as a “camouflet” to Russia, the Turkish candidature was evidently disturbing Berlin and Paris. The large presence of Turks in Germany, not integrated enough acceding to Mrs. Merkel, did not help the application of Ankara; in France an increasing number of Muslim citizens represented a similar deterrent. Besides, considerations of political prestige were and still are determinant: in case of full membership, Turkey would become demographically the second nation in the EU. The French could not avoid to follow the Germans in this field but are not ready at all to rank the third, after the Turks. Ankara was backed by the Commission, London and Rome for opposite reasons: according to the British, Turkey would oppose any
political integration, while Rome does not share this opinion and believes that Ankara favours more integration.

In my talks with Turkish colleagues in their capital in 1978 and 1979 they insisted to justify their candidature on two points: since the battle of the “blackbirds field” in the XIV century won by the invasors over the Serbs the Ottomans paid more attention to Europe than elsewhere: in 1402 Bayazid Yildirim refused to surrender a besieged Ankara to Tamerlan, claiming he had left for ever the plains of Eastern Asia and was attracted by the West. Moreover, with India and Japan Turkey was nowadays the only democracy in Asia. Batu, Subasi, Bleda, Özgül and other diplomats had met in me a positive listener, but the ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome was preoccupied not to hurt the Greeks by openly supporting the candidacy.

After having mistrusted Ankara with an ambiguous response: status of candidate officially granted and start of negotiations, the issue was paralyzed by the unsettlement of the Cyprus controversy, a behavior considered humiliating for the Turkish pride and sense of honour and dignity. Convinced, as I still am of the sound European feelings of the most reliable and responsible part of the Turkish opinion, I do trust them fairly more than other new members of the EU, mainly if not only attracted by the financial support of Brussels.

The admission of Cyprus to the Union was a mistake even more evident and unjustified: the Secretary General of the UNO had drafted a plan for the re-unification of the island. A large majority of the Turkish minority had approved it by referendum, while the Greek speaking population rejected it. And yet, in a maintained division of the country, Nicosia became a full member of the EU. Once more, the support given by France to the Greek lobbies was determinant, as a serious backwards step in the relations between Turkey and the Europeans. Those blows to the Turkish aspirations were not the last ones: in his belief that Ankara in the EU would mean its end, Giscard said that an eventual
agreement to extend the Union to Turkey should be approved by referendum. Such a discriminating procedure was never applied to any other government.

Once the Maastricht Council over, the results were considered so satisfactory that a pause of rest appeared necessary: the Community was upgraded to a Union, its structures were improved and the foundations of a common currency laid. New steps towards some forms of a political integration were consequently postponed to further meetings. In effect many observers already believed that it would be much more hazardous to face new challenges in open contrast with the deeply rooted dogma of national sovereignty. Only some of them personally hoped that the opportunity to exploit the heap of the EP could help to reach new goals.

Unfortunately the following meetings at The Hague and Amsterdam were politically unsuccessful, as if the freshly born EU were still too young to walk on its own legs, or the fast run had left the Europeans breathless. The scenario worsened at the summit of Nice (December 2000), the worst of all EU gatherings. In the meantime the 9 member Community had been enlarged and some of the new partners presented national political claims: Spain and Poland, in particular asked more weight in the calculation of respective votes. A more or less fair compromise was reached through the wise mediation of the Italian premier Giuliano Amato.

Since any step forward was blocked by resurgent nationalism, the Council of Laeken decided in December 2001 to convene a Convention aimed to elaborate a Constitution to be approved before new enlargements of the EU. Other tasks were pending, as a reform of the treaties and the implementation of the common currency. Chaired by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, with Amato and Guy Verhofstaeidt as vice-presidents the Convention met intensively until July 2003. The goal was not to open the way to a political unity but to stabilize and strengthen the Union of an increasing
number of independent and sovereign States, in contradictory terms which could not be more evident.

Instead of a concise and clear Constitution, the issue of long and controversial debates was a giant document unifying and summarizing all the previous treaties. A majority of the governments part to the Constitutional Treaty, signed again at the Roman Campidoglio, without the enthusiasm of 47 years before, had ratified or were ready to do so. An obstacle hard to overtake came once more from France: most socialists were disagreeing and the right was rather cool. A referendum held in May 2005 rejected the Constitution, in a move directed more against Chirac than to the treaty itself. Soon after the Netherlands followed, leaving the British government in the comfortable posture to jump over and postpone the crucial problem of a similar referendum.

The opponents to the EP loudly rejoiced, celebrating a success for democracy: the supporters began to believe that the true issue did not depend to a question of times ripe or not, but to more serious considerations: internal problems and electoral expectations prevailed in each member country over common European opportunities. A new treaty, where not a single mention to political integration was included had been refused by two countries among the original founders of the Communities: from grey the sky of the Project had become desperately black. Under German presidency a “reflection” stop-over was approved, based on the necessity to rescue and possibly improve the goals attained by the Union.

To add complexity to the crisis, the fast and superficially negotiated enlargements increased the difficulties of the EP. From 6 the members became 9 (England, Ireland, Denmark), the 12 (Greece, Spain, Portugal), then 15 (Austria, Sweden, Finland), then 25 (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, Cyprus, Malta) then 27 (Romania, Bulgaria) up to 28 with Croatia. The new partners had different historical, cultural,
political, economical and social profiles: some were still neutral, others member of the Commonwealth, or of the former Warsaw Pact. These last ones enjoyed their recovered independence and were mainly attracted by financial help (NATO partnership providing for their security).

It is now clear that the last enlargements were implemented too early, in a stage of critical weakness of the EP due to a growing discrepancy between a fast economical improvement and a long political stagnation.

While nothing happened during the “reflection pause”, a rather unexpected economical and financial crisis hit the EP. Initiated in the United States with the subprimes scandal, a deep depression fell on the Eurogroup and its vulnerability, aggravated by the persistent lack of a defensive political wall. The old proposal of a two speeds, or a variable geometry Europe was already performed, since only 19 countries shared the common currency. In such a critical position the euro survived, confirming its questioned vitality. But Euroland had still to face the problem of Greece and its tricky economy, giving a further sign of wise reliability.

The gap had been so long and unproductive that it was decided to negotiate a new treaty to replace the last deceiving one and put an end to its negative results. Some reforms suggested in the draft Constitution were introduced, almost discreetly, in the treaty signed in Lisbon: a president of the European Council, appointed for 30 months, new powers to the Parliament, a High Representative for external affairs (instead of a minister), who is also vice-president of the Commission, double function submitting him to the control of the Council.

The main attention of the Council was then turned to the serious budgetarian imbalances of some members of the Eurozone – Spain, Portugal, Italy and France – the economical difficulties of which are not similar to those of Greece, but irritating for the virtuous partners of the North. Rigid measures of economy were imposed, in open conflict with
stagnation in productivity and unemployment. The europhobic movements found convincing reasons to their propaganda and progressed among a public opinion deceived or indifferent, as well as the media.

The 50th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome had been celebrated in 2007 with some pride: as a survivor of the ceremony of March 25, 1957 I was repeatedly interviewed and the University of Vienna invited me to commemorate the event. Afterwards, the crisis landed to the continent and the political weakness of the EU dramatically jeopardized the fragility of the EP. The atmosphere of a precocious “fin de règne” assailed the member States, while mixed feelings of irritation, deception and pessimism dominated. The institutions of Brussels were criticized as “eurocrats” and the federalist movement found inadequate.

The young generations, and the students in particular, were more reactive and took significant initiatives. In November 2003 already, the Gorizia Campus of the Trieste University organized an international conference titled “For a new Europe in the global context”, and proclaimed a Gorizia Manifesto for a federal Europe. The draft Constitution was considered as a first step, though not decisive at all. Later on, the European highschool Uccellis of Udine adopted a similar document addressed to the European institutions and governments. In March 2010 the University and the Municipality of Florence debated in a “Trial to Europe” appointing me as public prosecutor. In primary and secondary Italian schools the EP is still alive and operating, at least in celebrating the “Day of Europe” (May 9) and the symbols of the Union: flag, anthem and motto “United in diversity”.

When some initial improvements began to emerge from the gloomy situation a new crisis arose, with economical, political, social and above all humanitarian components: the migration of refugees from years of wars and social disasters in Syria, Libya and Sudan, added to the chaotic conditions in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Near and Middle East in general. Such a huge and uncontrolled movement of
populations should have been foreseen long before. The Council and the governments lazily and unreliably considered the issue pertinent to the countries where the people landed: Italy, Spain and Greece. In effect and more fairly it was a large size problem since the refugees hoped to emigrate to Germany, England and the Scandinavian countries.

Not only in England many observers consider as an indeniable failure the endless crisis of the EP. Since the governments of Mrs. Thatcher, who wanted her money back, the British public opinion is clearly divided between opponents and supporters of the Project. To an external observer the presence of the United Kingdom in the Union seems an unquestionable asset: no political integration is in sight and the EU is becoming ever more an Anglo-Atlantic Community under the geo-strategical shield of the United States. Moreover, the financial supremacy of the City is an uncontrovertible reality. The reasons of the opponents are mainly psychological, based on the myth of an old insular Empire ideologically surviving through centuries. And yet exceptions are not unfrequent: when the Britons believe in Europe they are sincerely firm in their conviction.

The long and inaccessible road towards a real political unity has been interrupted by the unwillingness to extend indefinitely compromissory solutions, and by a stubborn limitation of innovations to the economical and financial fields or in secondary matters inconclusive on the whole structure of the institutions.

The so called Jean Monnet method, based on horizontal extension of unified sectors of activities (customs, borders, circulation, communication, agriculture, industry, trade, etc.) could work as long as a small group of member States had not yet perceived their increasing decline as sovereign nations in a globalized world. At that stage peace and democracy seemed satisfactory goals, fully compatible with independence and sovereignty. Controversial governmental conferences succeeded the old method: but the end of the cold war, the fall of the USSR, the implosion of
Yugoslavia, the re-unification of Germany, the commercial crisis of 2008, terrorism as an international threat, uncontrolled mass migrations from wars and revolutions, are stressing ever more the isolation of the European countries, their vulnerability, their loss of international prestige and their military weakness.

The stagnation of the EP is not essentially linked to the fast mutations of the world scenery, but to the lack of leadership and ambition of the ruling classes, more attracted by local success than by a European position of popularity, which is often considered an obstacle to their personal freedom of action. The relation between politicians and voters largely ignores the existence of a EU and its fundamental problems, implying indifference, if not hostility against Europe as a whole, from the eurocrats of Brussels to the controversial debates of the Council. In electoral campaigns the European issues are totally missing and the EU decisions used as scapegoats to justify mistakes of internal policy.

Even among the founders of the European Communities, the governmental circles show scarce interest for the EP and are rather defiant, if not suspicious to the source of power growing within the Brussels bureaucracy. The Project is often considered a prerogative of the diplomats operating in the foreign ministries and the embassies. Moreover, nothing or little is done to support attractively, mainly at school level and with young generations, the idea of a politically united Europe. And presently, all Europhobic groups find open doors and empty spaces to their active propaganda. Moreover, in all debates on international affairs any mention to European politics in missing, as well as in all electoral campaigns of the 28 members: the EU is a closed society of eurocrats and diplomats, instead of being a Europe of the peoples.

In a span of 66 years the concentration and summing up of a relevant number of paradoxes, from the denial of the Defence Community to the failure in finding a common
solution to the overwhelming migrations are the main roots of the European crisis which apparently ignores the generous vision of diplomats, historians and politologues attracted by the diversified potentialities of Europe and inspired by the cultural legacy of the old continent in civilizing the whole world.

In such a gloomy and depressed atmosphere, which does not help to overcome the economical situation of some member countries, the initiative announced on January 22nd, 2015 by the governor of the European Central Bank and called “Quantitative easing” denotes once more the supranational autonomy and authority of the Frankfurt institution and its peculiar role in supporting and promoting the EP against recurrent storms and tides.

The bold and imaginative plan of Mario Draghi consists in the purchase by the Bank of private and State bonds up to an amount of 1.140 billion euros from March 2015 to September 2016 by monthly “tranches” of 60 billion each: such an enormous amount of liquidity is equal to 10% of the gross national product of the Eurozone countries. This ambitious and unusual move of the Eurobank was warmly welcome by the market and stock exchange circles, but raised some perplexity with the German chancellor, who finally agreed on it for European solidarity.

To secure safety measures against the risks of the operation some safeguard procedures have been introduced: the bonds acquired by the Banks must be proportional to the financial quotas of the major subscribers to the capital of the Central Bank: 25% for Germany, 20% for France, 17% for Italy, 12% for Spain. Moreover, the national banks of the member States must buy the bonds issued by their respective countries. In case of emergencies, the States concerned will endure 20% of the loss, while 80% will be supported by the Central Bank.

The initiative aims to promote growth and competitiveness in the stagnant European economy by fighting against
deflation, instability and unemployment. The final goal is to promote social developments rather than speculative operations and banking profits. The full implementation of this generous programme will lay on the factual responsibility of the national banks and on the ultimate control and involvement at the highest political level.
The approach consisting in promoting the EP exclusively along economical and financial goals is summarized by an endless series of paradoxal contradictions resulting in a long stagnation and economical and political crisis, a loss of international prestige confirmed by the incapacity to agree on a common front to face the serious challenge of an unexpected flow of refugees from Africa, Asia, the Near and the Middle East.

Due to the increasing electoral weight of the opponents to the EP, no national government dares to admit that most problems confronting the EU are aggravated by political inefficiency and vulnerability. Even more than in the past the Union is a political dwarf, without any political influence on the international stage. Such a sound weakness is the result of a disproportional division of powers between the governments of the member States and the European institutions: the supreme power is retained by the Council, dominated by the major countries; the Commission is frequently summoned not to exceed from its purely consultative nature; the Parliament is little more than a reproduction at a larger scale of the national assemblies of the member countries. Only the Central Bank and the Court of Justice are enjoying full autonomy and a status of supranationality, but their political influence in the balance of power within the EU is rather limited.

Since the double denial of the Constitutional Treaty by the electorate of two founder countries of the Union, any political implementation of the EP is considered totally outdated, as well as further noticeable steps in the economical field, like the emission of Eurobonds to face the problem of foreign debt. In such an atmosphere of strictly controlled financial rigidity, the French newspaper “Le Monde”,

IV. A Road Map for the Future
after a similar move by the German association “Glienike”, published in February 2014 an appeal titled “For a political union of the euro”, written by a group of French intellectuals. Based on the assumption that the institutions of Brussels have become obsolete and their reform necessary to impose clear regulations to a growing globalized capitalism balanced by social improvements, the appeal aims to prevent taxes evasion by multinational firms in creating special funds from their income taxes to finance investments in priority fields like environmental protection, infrastructures and formation. According to the authors globalization should be confronted to social justice and specific plans of development. As to the public debt of some members of the Eurogroup, such a hard burden must be mutualized to avoid financial speculations.

A stimulating parliamentary innovation would consist in the creation of a bicameral parliament: a first chamber of 28 deputies elected by the members of the group, and a second one formed by representatives of the different national assemblies (for instance: 40 Germans, 30 French, 30 Italians and other national deputies, proportionally to the size of the various populations involved). The aim is to promote a common parliamentary sovereignty shared by the national parliaments of the Eurogroup. Contemporaneously, the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Economy and Defence would meet periodically and cooperate with the new parliament to the formation of the initial core of a EU founded on a federal structure. To complete such a Copernican reform new political duties are conferred to the Commission and the role of the Council is downgraded to that of a kind of consultative senate.

Totally ignored by the political circles, influenced as they are by the Europhobic opposition, this appeal reveals that a tiny minority of the public opinion is well aware that a sound reform of the institutions is now unavoidable to prevent a serious collapse of the EP.
The growing importance of right and extreme right parties and movements in Hungary and Poland, now in Austria, but also in the Netherlands, Germany, France and Italy, strongly opposed to further steps in European integration, suggests the opportunity of the former “functional approach” with which Jean Monnet succeeded in unifying separately different fields of activity. In the present loss of external prestige and popularity of the EP the only possible stand is to safeguard the “acquis communautaire” until the moment in which the EU leaders understand that without more integration the decline of the EP would become unstoppable and definitive, with the most serious historical issues for Europe.

Considering some major priorities where a supranational cooperation could be implemented the following areas are concerned:

1) Regional cooperation: some large neighbouring regions of Europe have common interests in intensifying and eventually diversifying their productive activities and social development in a spirit of mutual solidarity. To enhance such positive goals a full support must be given to the Committee of the Regions within the EU.

2) The present initiatives of the European Central Bank to prevent deflation not less than inflation should also be supported by all means to the benefit of small and medium size industries, the main victims of the economical crisis. The firm opposition of some conservative groups to the daring, open minded programmes of Mario Draghi is the last noticeable paradox of the EP.

3) On the same economical ground the issue of Eurobonds to mutualize the public debt of some members of the Eurozone would also stimulate a feeling of financial solidarity within the EU. The German government is still opposed to the idea.

4) The most urgent and hazardous problem of the EU is actually to find a commonly agreed solution to the
continuous huge flow of migrants from Asia, Africa, the Near and Middle East in general. To prevent or at least regulate it, a joint supranational control of the external borders of the EU has become pressing and unavoidable: left alone, the single member States are unable to concile the political, economical and social components of the migrants' drama with the humanitarian traditions of Europe.

5) A special care should be devoted, more than in the past, to convince the public opinion that the assumptions of the opponents to the EP are wrong, backwarded, anachronistic and that nationalism and xenophobia are the worst weapons against globalization, which can be much better faced through a well balanced promotion of mankind, based on economical and social struggle against unemployment, poverty and starvation. Such highly humanitarian goals, cannot be approached with the obsolete and insane cult of national absolute sovereignty, which is now little more than a myth.

6) Peace in the West Balkans. Long ago, when Yugoslavia began to implose, the Italian monthly review “Limes” published an article titled “Euroslavia” anticipating that the former six republics would join hopefully the European Communities together and simultaneously. Such a wishful thinking at that moment has become a virtual reality: after Slovenia and Croatia the enlargement of the EU to Serbia is now a priority and the elections of April 2016 seem to be a favourable step to this end. Macedonia, Bosnia, Montenegro should also join the Union, and Albania must complete the geopolitical unity of the Balkans. The special situation of Kosovo should also find a provisional settlement to reach peace, stability and development in that strategically important area of the EU.

To promote inter-ethnic reconciliation, religious tolerance, development, stability and human security in the region the European Center for Peace and Development, as an organ of the University for Peace of the United Nations, has
performed in the last decades of conflicts and turbolences a fundamentally competent and most beneficial role which history will duly praise in the future.

7) The young generations and particularly highschool and university students, researchers and teachers are the most reliable and ultimate groups to apply for a sound reliance of the EP. These circles are not influenced by the nationalist and anti-European propaganda: they instead increase their contacts and exchange of opinions and experiences well beyond their cultural duties. Since several years the Erasmus programmes are a valuable and prominent investment to promote among young people a growing European conscience able to extend and amplify strong feelings of a common European citizenship as well as a shared ambition to make of the EP the core of a planned and beneficial humanism of the third millennium.

The present inability of the EU to find a commonly agreed solution to the migratory emergency, more delicate and controversial than the economical crisis, is the irrefutable demonstration that the main component of the EP constant decline is essentially political and cannot be overcome as long as a real unitarian European conscience does not prevail in the public opinions of the member States. Nothing was done by the governments in the last decades to promote such feelings beyond the recall of the official symbols of the Union: the flag, the anthem and the motto “United in diversity”. It was evidently not enough for such a delicate task.

The federalist movement openly failed in promoting some initial European patriotism, nor the national parliaments behaved as operational diffusers of a sound political vision of Europe, federal or not. The institutions of Brussels – Commission and Parliament – have limited political capacities, strictly controlled and dominated as they are by the Council, firmly opposed to any real supranational sovereignty shared by the member countries in a federal vision of the supreme power. Since its very beginning the EP
was hampered by a discreet, almost prudish ambiguity: the words “political unity” were prudently omitted in the preambles of the treaties as if they were blasphemous to the sacred myth of national sovereignty. Really the top of all paradoxes present in the historical developments of the EP is the absence of any explicit mention to concrete political links which should rationally be implied in any union of States aiming to a growing unity. An even more striking paradox is the possibility to freely violate the principles of freedom, democracy and rule of law and still enjoy the economical assistance of the EU. The unblamed political situation in Hungary and Poland is confirming that the EU, as declared some years ago by Jacques Delors, is still a “unidentified political object.”

And yet the EP is a major and most original event from the second half of the XX century: the EU has economically united 500 millions Europeans in a period of long lasting peace and political stability based on democracy and freedom; a common currency adopted by 19 countries, a supranational Central Bank and an independent Court of Justice established and operating with beneficial effects; a Parliament of 28 nations democratically elected. Considering that such incommensurably valid goals have been reached without a unifying political power, the result is not the least of all paradoxes implied in the EP.

To those who were complaining for the slow approach to a real political unity Jean Monnet used to remember that historical maturation can require long periods and wise patience, but it is also incontrovertible that History cannot wait for the goodwill and the incertitude of the Europeans.

More than two decades ago Denis de Rougemont wrote that Europe could politically fail, but it nevertheless represents a success and is therefore entitled to survive. After him Vaclav Havel, a former president of the Czech Republic, declared that hope is not the conviction that something will have a positive result but the certitude that it has a special significance independently from the final issue.
In some peculiar situations paradoxal events can stimulate historical creativity: such an opportunity should not be underestimated for a political relaunching of the European Project through radical reforms of the institutions. If the risk of a progressive implosion of the European Union is a virtual threat, it is highly desirable for the survival and the prosperity of a continent challenged by the innovations of the third millennium, that the young generations react against indifference and lack of qualified leadership: the future of Europe is firmly linked to concrete and imaginative efforts towards a successful federal integration.

Locarno, April 30, 2016
Among the first conquerors of the British Isles Tiberius, Claudius Capital named Britannicus ranks in a prominent position, celebrated in literature by a tragedy of Jean Racine (1669). 14 centuries later, an unknown migrant looking for a safe refuge, crossed the Channel walking along the underground railway linking England to the continent.

Such a long span of time was imperviously shortened by the referendum of June 23, 2016 which put an end to 43 years of the United Kingdom’s participation to the European Project. It seldom happens in history that a geographic mutation modify so deeply and extensively the life of a people. After a somnolent stop-over of more than two decades, the EP burst in a seismic wake rather unexpected by the most cautious observers. An immediate high tide submerged the internal British field more violently than the relations between London and the EU. The amplitude of the earthquake revealed that the decried European crises is apparent more than real, since the decision to leave unveils what the status of member means in the everyday life of the citizens.

The resignation of the prime minister was followed by that of the incumbent, the fall of the opposition’s leader and the apparition of candidates to the posts vacant to a new political era to such a large measure.

The scenary seems favourable to revitalize a gloomy European Council more and more paralyzing towards the other institutions of Brussels. At a moment when any idea of new enlargements was considered totally out-dated within the Commission and elsewhere, the British move reminds the expectations of other candidates, Turkey first, partly related to the military operations in the Near-East.
The present turmoil would advise to study all possible issues, taking enough time to evaluate any suitable development and all imaginative alternatives. As a reasonable and realistic standing point we should avoid the mistake to state “what we are not, what we do not want”, according to the poet Eugenio Montale in the pre-war period of the European trouble history.

Though not easy to foresee the issues of the Britons’ opting out, first some hand consequences can be expected:

1) It is not ascertained that the withdrawal be the origin of a revival of the EP, as it happened at the fall of the Defence Community, or of the Constitution's disapproval;

2) Other defections could follow, eventually compensated by late enlargements. Orban will ask the Hungarian electorate if they agree to refuse the principle of free circulation within the limits of the EU. A positive issue of the referendum next October would mean an exit of Budapest, confirming the ineptitude of the present country to abide to the democratic firmness of the Union, a fundamental component of the EP. Slovakia, ruled by Fico, could follow and maybe others: such developments would underline the paradoxal superficial hurry of some 2005 enlargements;

3) The capacity of negotiation of the EU will decrease, as well as its international prestige towards its main partners: USA, Russia, China, Japan in the delicate approach of the renewed inter-Atlantic trade relations;

4) The new situation will provide Putin with new reasons to proclaim his plan of a "global village": an Asian Europe ever more disengaged, offering to Moscow the means to extend its hegemony on the continent, through bilateral agreements, beginning with France, to face the military presence and the American political influence in Europe;

5) At internal level there will be an increased merging of populist anti-European movements and Russia, with
personal implications. It would be dangerous to imitate England and become, not protected by the same autonomy, a satellite of Moscow, with some economical advantages.

It would be erroneous not to expect that the choice of Great Britain could invest the whole EU. Once the great European personalities disappeared, second plan politicians like Sarkozy or Berlusconi soon showed their incapacities to follow the path of their predecessor in times rather different and scenarios deeply changed. The growing gap between the institutions and the peoples of Europe has increased the accumulation of paradoxes in a sort of inextricable net. The Parliament acts as a tribune of all anti-European groups, the surviving public opinion is deeply deceived, and it would be hazardous to find germs of a European political o merely civil conscience. The reaction of the British electorate is not the last nor the least of all these symptoms: in some way we all feel like the Britons. Let us react more positively, provided we do not loose the chance to open the way to a new enjoyable era of mankind.

More time must not be lost, since globalization is noisily knocking at the door. Together with a revival of the Monnet’s method, the scheme of a multi-speed Europe has to be reexamined to find a close association with Great Britain, as well as with Turkey when democracy is reestablished. Serbia and other candidates must not be forgotten if we refuse the scheme of an exclusive Kafkan castle unified continent protected by high defensive walls. Within a larger Europe a core of “old-timers” are forced to proceed, open the way and explore the shores, not in defiance of globalization, but to approach it under the most profitable angle: this road map is the only safe and positive issue to transform the exit of the Britons in an undeniable success.
1. Excerpt from the speech of Aristide Briand, minister of Foreign Affairs of France, pronounced at the League of Nations on September 5, 1929.

“It think that some federal link must exist among peoples geographically grouped in Europe. I shall strive to create such a link. It is clear that the association will operate mainly in the economical field. It is the most urgent problem. I believe that a successful result can be reached. But I am also certain that politically and socially, without altering the sovereignties of the nations involved, such an association would be a benefit for all.”

2. Excerpt from the Memorandum for the organization of a regime of European federal union, presented by Alexis Leger, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France to the League of Nations, on May 1st, 1930.

“The time was never so adequate nor pressing to inaugurate a constructive deed in Europe. The solution of the main problems, material and moral, following the last war will soon deliver the new Europe from what has burdened its psychology as well as its economy. Europe is now ready for a positive effort to realize a new order. A decisive moment in which a vigilant Europe can decide its own destiny. Be united to live and be prosperous: such is the strict necessity which the nations of Europe are facing henceforth. Apparently the feelings of the people are clearly expressed on the matter. The governments must now assume their responsibilities to avoid the risks of material or moral disorderly initiatives from other sources to be opposed for the benefit of the European community and for mankind.”
3. Excerpt from a Declaration approved in Geneva by representatives of the movements of the European Resistance against Nazism (France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Norway), Spring 1944.

After the assertion that all countries of the world must overtake the dogma of an absolute State sovereignty to form a sole federal organization, the document precised:

“Peace in Europe is the keystone of peace in the world. Only a federal union will consent to settle the issues of borders delimitation in areas of mixed population, which will not be any longer reasons of nationalistic disputes and will be turned in problems of administrative competence. ...

The federal union will be essentially based on:

1. A government not responding to governments of different member States but to their peoples, on whom it will exert a direct jurisdiction within the limits of its attributions.

2. An army under the command of this government, with the exclusion of any other national army.

3. A supreme court competent on all questions related to the federal Constitution and aimed to settle the controversies between the member States or between them and the federation.”

4. Excerpts from Denis de Rougemont’s “28 siècles d'Europe” (Christian de Barillat ed. 1990).

“Do not be in such haste, the politicians repeat to the federalists since the XIV century for the misfortune of Europe and the world. The 'maturity' requirements for a federation, undetermined as they appear, are playing a favourable game to the enemies of Europe, as long as they are supported ... Europe is not a territory but a common conscience: its progressive affirmation, first implicitly then explicitly is today the identity of the Europeans.
Politically Europe may have failed, but culturally it represents a world success: for this sole reason Europe has the right to survive politically. Without Europe the gap between past and present would mean the end of the continuous improvement of mankind.”

5. Excerpt from the "Manifesto of Ventotene" by Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi (1941).

“With propaganda and action, seeking to establish in every possible way the agreements and links among the single movements which are certainly being formed in the various countries, the foundation must be built now for a movement that knows how to mobilize all forces for the birth of a new organism which will be the grandest creation, and the newest, that has occurred in Europe for centuries; in order to constitute a steady federal state, that will have at its disposal a European armed service instead of national armies; to break decisively economic autarchies, the backbone of totalitarian regimes; that it will have sufficient means to see that it deliberations for the maintenance of common order are executed in the single federal states, while each state will retain the autonomy it needs for a plastic articulation and development of a political life according to the particular characteristics of the people.

If a sufficient number of men in European countries understand this, the victory is shortly to be in their hands, because the situation and the spirit will be favourable to their work. They will have before them parties and factions that have already been disqualified by the disastrous experience of the last twenty years. It will be the moment of new men: the MOVEMENT FOR A FREE AND UNITED EUROPE.”

6. Excerpt from an interview between Albert Camus and some Greek writers in Athens (April 28, 1955).

After having declared that Europe appeared as a prisoner in ties preventing her to breathe, Camus added: “The
The real problem is to know if we want to survive as a civilization. It is not a simple rational will. If I say that I still want to live, it is not because I perfectly know who I am, but because I deeply feel who I am as a being and because I wish to continue to be myself. Not the reason is the first to rise, but the instinct to survive. If the young people of today in Western countries do not have such an instinct, they must find it again: here is the problem. They will not find it again by trusting those who will tell them in what they must believe and operate. They will find it again if they believe in themselves: I mean in their experience of life and reflexion.


“Today nobody can foresee the profile of Europe tomorrow, since it is impossible to foresee the mutation born from the mutations of the future. ... But time is passing fast and Europe is late on the way along which it is deeply committed. We cannot stop when all around us the whole world is moving. ... The sovereign nations of the past cannot provide any more the frame within the problems of the present can be settled. And the (European) Community itself is nothing more than a stage towards the world organization of tomorrow. ... I never said that the present procedure will result one day in some United States of Europe, but I cannot imagine today – so imprecise is the wording of the debate – which political frame will be realized: a confederation or a federation. What we are elaborating, through the action of the Community, is something unprecedented. Such Community is based on institutions which must be strengthened, well knowing that the effective political authority which the European democracies will create in the future is still to conceive and realize.”

8. Full text of the Appeal launched in Gorizia on October 3rd 2015 by the European Academy of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, the Europa Union Deutschland (Land Berchtesgaden) and the Europahaus of Klagenfurt.
THE APPEAL

The representatives of the Accademia Europeista del Friuli – Venezia Giulia met in Gorizia on October 2nd and 3rd, 2015 to express their faith in a political as well as economical and social unity of Europe, that appeal to all the peoples of the continent, the political parties and the democratic movements to promote a democratic, free and humanitarian union of peoples, inspired by a brotherly solidarity and the denial of any barrier based on discrimination of race, language or religion that could hinder the noblest vocations of mankind. The European Union is presently at a dead end and has to be restructured to avoid any further stagnation or implosion, with a dramatic loss for the entire civil world. The promoters of the meeting are confident on the result of their initiative, which should not be assumed as a last call for salvation, but as a contribution to a concrete reliance of the community: the sound of the European conscience never failed, and the common hope is that the appeal will be backed by all the peoples of Europe and welcomed by their governments.

9. Letter addressed by the Author to Mr. David Cameron
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, on June 30, 2016

Mr. Prime Minister,

I do hope you will find enough time to read these few lines: as unbelievable as it would seem, I express feelings of gratitude, as a convinced European since long, for your decision to ask the opinion of the Britons, and beyond them of all the other Europeans about the future of our beloved land.

Since too long, the opinion of 500 million tax-payers had not been requested. Their response could not be clearer: such an “unidentified political object” (Jacques Delors) is unfortunately a failure, for a series of reasons as well as a summing up of paradoxes. You certainly have a limpid vision of what I mean.
The main task of the European leaders is the strong, inalterable will to remain in power as long as possible, at any imaginative cost. The sound priorities of the nations, the legitimate aspirations of the people, as unemployment, underdevelopment and poverty, are generally under evaluated or simply ignored.

Your referendum has dramatically revealed the deep gap separating the politicians from their voters and your sacrifice is the parliamentarian extension of gentle Jo Cox’s martyrdom. Unavoidable for the whole Europe, the referendum is a hard and due punishment inflicted to 27 governments + 1, yours, the sole seeming aware of the seriousness of the crisis.

Let me consider your, Mr. Prime Minister, one of the few heads of European governments deserving this honourable title, and I express my sincere admirations as a European speaking the languages of both Dante and Shakespeare.

I firmly believe that your political action is not over, since the historians will rank you among the few brave who tried to understand the sound value of globalization and its positive implications.

Please agree, Mr. Prime Minister, the assurance of my highest consideration and sincere esteem.

Pasquale Baldocci
Former Ambassador of Italy
PASQUALE BALDOCCI, born in 1931 at Tunis in a family of Florentine ancestry settled since 1821 in the Ottoman Empire. Graduated in political sciences at the University of Rome and at the Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University, he served in the Italian diplomatic career in Yugoslavia (Zagreb), Paris (OECD), USA (Saint Louis), Copenhagen, Bucharest, Ankara, Switzerland (Basle and Berne), Tanzania and the Islamic Republic of the Comores as ambassador. Director of the Italian-African Institute in Rome from 1993 to 1996, presently director of ECPD external relations and diplomatic studies and lecturer at the Universities of Trieste, Florence and Perugia, author of articles published in “Rassegna europea”, “Nuova Antologia”, “Revue des deux mondes” and the essay “Through the diplomatic looking glass” in cooperation with Stefano Baldi, as well as five volumes of lyric poetry. Retired since 1992 from the diplomatic service, he is still president of the Institute of research prevision and international studies (ISPRI).