125. It is because we have witnessed—I repeat, for the first time since the end of the Second World War—a meeting of minds between the Governments of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom to move together along the path of disarmament and peace, forgoing mutual suspicion and distrust. It is so, moreover, because no other international agreement has ever been signed so promptly by so many States. Lastly, it is because all of this has taken place in accordance with the repeated and consistent appeals made in the last sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

127. Thus, the presence of U Thant, our Secretary-General, at the Moscow ceremony on 5 August 1963 when the Treaty was signed, represented not merely an act of courtesy and respect for the administrative head of our Organization, but was a recognition and an acknowledgement of the part the United Nations had played in this conciliatory endeavour.

128. Let us look back together for a moment, and recall those not too distant days when the tasks and the possibilities of the United Nations were questioned, and the Secretary-General had become the main public target of severe attacks, and we will then readily appreciate the extent of our recent progress. The most conspicuous evidence of this evolution was offered during last year’s Cuban crisis, when U Thant and the United Nations were foremost in the efforts for the preservation of peace.

129. The Treaty of 5 August 1963 must be regarded, however, merely as a first step toward disarmament and peace. A very long road still remains to be travelled, and for the time being we stand only at the beginning. The expectation of public opinion everywhere for further progress is high, indeed, as high as everyone’s hope. This is the measure of our responsibilities. We are certainly not unaware of the considerable obstacles to be overcome in order to bring about such progress. But we also know that we can make substantial headway if we persevere together in the determination to seek the triumph of common sense and peace over selfishness and distrust. It will undoubtedly be a laborious and difficult victory, requiring patience, persistence and a gradual approach, but it is nevertheless within reach, because it is dependent exclusively on us. President Kennedy underlined this in his important address here on 20 September 1963, an address which won unanimous praise. I quote his words:

"The task of building the peace lies with the leaders of every nation, large and small. For the great Powers have no monopoly on conflict or ambition. The cold war is not the only expression of tension in this world, and the nuclear race is not the only arms race. Even little wars are dangerous in a nuclear world."

120th meeting, para 4.

130. If, for the sake of brevity, I now concentrate essentially on two subjects, disarmament and economic development, this is obviously not because the Italian Government intends to overlook other important items on our agenda. My delegation will state its views on such questions each time they come up for consideration. On the question of Charter revision, for instance, and particularly in connexion with the increase in membership of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, we advocate that those bodies be enlarged in a manner that will ensure—as is fair and equitable and, I should add, indispensable to the effective functioning of our Organization—and adequate re-
presentation of the countries which have more recently become Members of the United Nations.

131. We shall also exert our best efforts toward a solution of the difficult problem of the financing of peace-keeping operations, which is currently of utmost importance.

132. Neither will I digress at any length on the question of racial discrimination, in respect of which, as is known, our thoughts and our actions have always been inspired by the principle of absolute equality of human beings, which is the cornerstone of this Organization.

133. Likewise, I shall not dwell extensively on the problem of decolonization to which the United Nations has made such a noteworthy contribution in recent years. The process by which the non-self-governing peoples are achieving independence is now almost complete. Some cases, it is true, still remain unresolved; we are sure that they will be settled in accordance with the principles established in General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV). However, the main problem with which the United Nations will have to deal in the coming years will be that of ensuring the necessary economic and social well-being of the countries which have recently become independent. I shall return to this particular question in dealing with the problems of economic development.

134. On the subject of disarmament Italy has always maintained that, without losing sight of the final goal of general and complete disarmament, we must restore gradually mutual trust by means of prompt agreements which, though limited in scope, should be such as to pave the way for further and more comprehensive achievements.

135. The Soviet Union had hitherto opposed such an approach to the problem and, by proposing solutions certainly desirable but unattainable for the time being, appeared to favour the formula of 'all or nothing'. Now, with the Moscow agreement, the Soviet Union too appears to be convinced of the advisability of a gradual approach.

136. It will therefore be possible henceforth to apply this method by common consent to the disarmament negotiations. This represents a positive step indeed. The very experience through which a partial nuclear agreement was reached confirms that, by sensible methods of work and by mutual efforts of goodwill concentrated on the areas where the opposing points of view are not too far apart, it is possible to proceed towards positions from which the goal of general disarmament will no longer appear as remote.

137. Our endeavours must therefore be twofold. On the one hand, we should work to bring closer together the plans for general and complete disarmament thus far advanced at Geneva, which, unfortunately, still differ considerably on a number of substantive points. On the other hand, we should persist primarily in the search for speedy agreements in the sphere of collateral measures, which we regard as a particularly promising field. Naturally, even in this work on collateral measures, we should not forget the principles that are fundamental to every disarmament measure—namely, balance and control—without which all agreements would be impossible or ephemeral.

138. Among the collateral measures that have been proposed at Geneva, some are worthy of special mention. For our part, we have repeatedly emphasized the advisability of discontinuing the manufacture of fissionable material for military purposes and of transferring part of such material to peaceful uses. The advisability of measures for preventing war by mistake, of measures against war propaganda, and various other proposals on which, in our view, an agreement should not be difficult to reach. In this connexion, it has seemed to us very promising that both President Kennedy and Foreign Minister Gromyko have mentioned to this Assembly the possibility of an agreement to ban the placing into orbit of weapons of mass destruction. On this subject, the measures on which it is necessary and urgent to reach an agreement, President Kennedy said:

"We must continue to seek agreement on measures which prevent war by accident or miscalculation. We must continue to seek agreement on safeguards against surprise attack, including observation posts at key points. We must continue to seek agreement on further measures to curb the nuclear arms race by controlling the transfer of nuclear weapons, converting fissile materials to peaceful purposes, and banning underground testing with adequate inspection and enforcement. We must continue to seek agreement on a freer flow of information and people from East to West and West to East." [209th meeting, para. 50.]

139. By this I do not wish, however, to disregard the proposals put forward by other countries, including the Soviet Union, some of which are worthy of consideration and careful appraisal.

140. Within this cursory review of the problems of peace, may I also be allowed to elucidate one point with regard to the Atlantic Alliance. The Alliance has not and never has had aggressive intentions towards anyone and has actually proved its desire for peace even in difficult circumstances. That, moreover, has always been and remains the firm resolve of all its members, including West Germany, in respect to which baseless accusations have sometimes been made.

141. Italy became a member of NATO because it was convinced that in a world unfortunately still armed, only the balance of forces permits the maintenance of peace and discourages aggression, though always with the hope that a time would come when peace could be ensured, not by regional equilibrium of armies but through a global security system in a truly disarmed world. That is the goal we seek.

142. If in the world-wide peaceful vision of the foreign policy pursued by the Italian Government, the Atlantic Alliance has this essential function of playing a stabilizing role in Europe and in the building of Europe's political integration, its achievement, in our view, would provide the further substantial support for the maintenance of peace in the world by eliminating all anxieties in the European continent by overcoming those outdated forms of nationalism which lie at the root of a good many international conflicts. Thus, by striving for the political unity of Europe, Italy professes to be working for lasting maintenance of peace.

143. We are convinced that our faithful acceptance of the solemn obligations of the Charter, the purely defensive aims of the alliance to which we belong and the specific posture of all our policy represent the best guarantees to reassure any country of our peaceful intentions. Nevertheless, the Italian Government, always anxious to contribute to any improvement in the international situation, is, in principle, ...
favorable to any act or statement which would help to restore mutual confidence and ensure better prospects for co-operation among all peoples. This applies not only to the prohibition of outright military aggression, but in general to all actions or steps which, directly or indirectly, may represent a threat to the free existence of States or may affect their security and give rise to mutual suspicion.

It is our desire, in fact, that in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, all countries in the community of nations should feel, to an ever-growing extent, confidence in their future and free from any concern about possible threats, so that they may devote all their energies to the betterment and the uplifting, in every sense of the free life of their peoples.

It is now up to the General Assembly, in these substantially favourable circumstances, to give new impetus to the process of disarmament and to the Geneva negotiations. I believe we shall be successful in these efforts. As we have already done in recent sessions, let us give confidence and establish new guidelines to enable the negotiating body on disarmament to resume its work as soon as possible and to concentrate its efforts on those points on which a resumption is already in sight.

Let us, therefore, stress those issues which can divide us and those which divide us, and we shall undoubtedly be able to make further positive contributions to the favourable process that has begun.

The Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, in his statement here on 19 September 1963 proposed:

149. To convene in the first quarter or first half of 1964 a conference of States members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament with the participation of political leaders of the highest level [1208th meeting, para. 139.]

150. That proposal is not new; however, the context in which it is put forth is new. That is to say, it has been advanced in a statement the novel tone of which we found most gratifying. Notwithstanding certain controversial remarks with which we do not agree, Mr. Gromyko has emphasized the improved prospects opening up for the Geneva disarmament negotiations. We should be gratified to accede to this idea if sufficient progress in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, when it resumes work, will have brought about the appropriate conditions to enable a high-level meeting to bear certain fruit.

151. During the fifties we saw considerable progress in identifying the lines of action to be followed, as well as in achieving a better understanding of the requirements for an accelerated advance towards the attainment of conditions of complete independence for all countries of the world, also from an economic and social standpoint. It is, therefore, from this foundation that during the sixties, during the United Nations Development Decade, we should continue our efforts on a practical plane the programme for action, bearing in mind the importance of laying a solid basis which will allow all the peoples to build their own future with confidence. This year too, during our proceedings, frequent references will be made to the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1710 (XVI). We know that the general anxious expectation is expressed at times in a tone of optimism and at other times in a tone of pessimism. In fact the broadness and complexity of the objectives to be attained are such as to impose careful reflection, strict discipline and unceasing efforts in the field of international co-operation, if we want the Development Decade to represent the first great step towards the substantial programmed doubling of economic productivity and division of a world which the United Nations, instead, should seek to bring together in equality, prosperity and peace.

152. Even more than the mobilization of new energies, the result at stake requires essentially a qualitative improvement and an appropriate co-ordination of assistance, in a joint effort by the developing and the industrialized countries which would take into account all different components which must interact harmoniously in the various phases of the development process.

153. In this connexion I should like to stress a number of specific points with reference to which the United Nations can exercise a primary propellant function.

154. The first of these points is undoubtedly the formula of "trade and aid" which we have advocated and which we are gratified to see universally accepted in recent years. In this respect, I am especially pleased that only by harmonizing rationally organized assistance with adequate solutions to the principal problems of international trade will it be possible to make constructive progress towards the aims we are pursuing.

155. Fully aware that international trade can become one of the main instruments for improved development of the developing areas, we earnestly intend to contribute with all our power to the success of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development to be held next spring.

156. Italy, a member of the European Economic Community and thus well aware of the advantages of integration and of cooperation within countries, will strive to ensure that the Community itself will participate in the consolidation of international economic co-operation, inspired by principles intended to enhance the development of world trade and the gradual elimination of restrictions and barriers. Likewise we shall strive to ensure that the Community—-in the very spirit of the Rome Treaties—should look toward, to the world around it, in a liberal and constructive approach, avoiding selfish, inward-looking tendencies.

157. While we are all aware of the essential need to tackle these problems in a spirit of frank co-operation, we know equally well that the broadening of international trade and the granting of financial aid, however essential, are not in themselves sufficient to solve the
problems of development. Those instruments should be supplemented by technical assistance, which is indispensable for the establishment of the infra-structures necessary for industrialization and for the professional training of cadres in the developing countries. This is a field which lends itself to fruitful action by the United Nations, and a field in which Italy can offer its accumulated experience. Particularly valuable, in our view, is the work done by the United Nations Special Fund for pre-investment projects.

158. Still on the subject of international economic cooperation, I should like to recall that the Italian Government recently had the honour of being host in Rome to the United Nations Conference on International Travel and Tourism. That Conference was the first initiative of its kind in the United Nations framework. Indeed, we were gratified to note that the Conference reached a successful conclusion, laying the basis for the fruitful development of that important facet of cooperation among Member States.

159. Finally, I should like to draw attention to the statement made by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report [A/5504/Add.1] to the effect that the past year has been marked by a number of developments which will further the success and effectiveness of the United Nations. It is our firm hope that this new political and psychological atmosphere may open substantial and favourable prospects also in the economic field.

160. At this point I feel obliged to extend my statement in order to explain the Italian Government’s position on the problem of the status of the German-speakings inhabitants of the Alto Adige—a subject on which Mr. Kreisky, the Austrian Foreign Minister, spoke at length yesterday [1217th meeting].

161. The Austrian Government complains that, during the past twelve months, no meeting has been held between the Foreign Ministers of the two countries. As a matter of fact, this is quite true, and the Italian Government, which is anxious for a speedy resumption of the bilateral negotiations with Austria, is the first to regret, not only this circumstance in itself, but above all the causes which brought it about. What, then, are the origins of the present situation?

162. When I met Mr. Kreisky a year ago in New York, at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, we agreed on the advisability of meeting again at the beginning of November. At that time I envisaged a continuation of the talks between the two Foreign Ministers that had taken place in Venice at the end of the previous July.

163. These talks had once more placed the Italo-American negotiations in a perspective of hopeful expectation while, at the same time, the Italian Government was working on the problem at the internal level by means of a Study Commission entrusted with the task of preparing—with the co-operation of representatives of the German-speaking inhabitants of the Alto Adige—proposals for specific legislative measures for the further improvement of the autonomous regional Statute. However, just before the scheduled meeting, we learnt that the composition of the Austrian delegation was not to be limited to the immediate associates of the Foreign Minister, but was to include members of the Tyrolean regional Government. While I would not wish to comment here on the political wisdom of such an innovation for a meeting that was to be held on the eve of the Austrian general elections, the mere fact that it had been made implied that the meeting would have a different nature from those held in Venice and New York. Hence Italy’s request to study the situation created by this element.

164. So the meeting did not take place at that time, mainly on account of the impending Austrian general elections, which meant that several months would elapse before a new Austrian Government was formed. It is true that, in the meantime, the previous Government had remained in office as a caretaker government, but it had none the less resigned, and it is hardly surprising that we should have wished to deal with a Government that would be representative of the new Parliament. By the time such a Government had been constituted in Austria, general elections were about to begin in Italy, requiring a further lapse of time before the new Italian Cabinet was established. On the very day that my country’s Parliament passed a vote of confidence in the new Government, I hastened to ask Vienna to indicate a date for the meeting of the two Foreign Ministers. It was in reply to that Italian proposal that Austria expressed the wish to send a senior official to Rome in order to discuss the agenda for the proposed meeting. We promptly agreed to this suggestion. However, the arrival of Ambassador Waldheim in Rome, towards the end of July 1963, coincided exactly with the resumption in Alto Adige of the terrorist activities which had practically ceased during the previous twelve months.

165. In spite of these far from encouraging occurrences, the basis was laid in Rome for an agreement on the agenda for the planned meeting. This circumstance, however, brought about a negative reaction on the part of those who had an interest in sabotaging Italo-Austrian relations. In fact, the acts of terrorism steadily increased so that in recent weeks the total number of incidents reached a very high figure. This could not fail to affect adversely the climate of Italian public opinion as it was impossible not to associate those terrorist activities with the lack of effective preventive action in neighbouring Austrian territory to preclude the crossing of terrorists and their weapons into Italy. In the Italian Government’s view Austria is explicitly bound to undertake such preventive action under article 9 of the State Treaty, which requires her to prohibit and suppress all activities on the part of organizations engaging in actions hostile to any Member of the United Nations. In this situation Italy felt that it would be preferable to propose that the meeting in question should be held in September, at the beginning of the session of the United Nations General Assembly. If the Austrian Government had accepted our proposal, the meeting in New York would already have taken place and our willingness to negotiate could not have been questioned. The Austrian Government, on the other hand, prefers a date in October, and insists that the meeting be held in Europe.

166. At this stage, may I be allowed to emphasize two circumstances. The meeting between the two Foreign Ministers was recommended by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 1497 (XV) of 31 October 1960 and resolution 1681 (XVI) of 28 November 1961. However, these resolutions are predicated on three points, the last of which recommends that both parties refrain from any action which might impair their friendly relations. This third point cannot be divorced from the first.

167. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the Italian Government could not fruitfully resume negotiations
with the Austrian Government if Vienna should fail to take due account also of the last point in the General Assembly's resolutions. Thus, while we regret, as I said before, the fact that the surveillance at the Austrian border is not exercised in such a way as to constitute a serious obstacle to the crossing into Italy of terrorists with their warlike equipment—notwithstanding the Italian Government's repeated appeals to the Austrian Government for co-operation to that end—I should also like to recall and strongly deplore the recent statements by Austrian authorities against the Italian judiciary. It is not the first time that this has happened, and it has been seen recently how the Council of Europe vindicated the Italian judiciary with respect to similar accusations made by Austria on previous occasions. The Italian Government considers that the misrepresentations of fact and the unfounded allegations contained in certain statements by Austrian authorities are incompatible with paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 1497 (XV) of 31 October 1960. Above all, we cannot but indignantly reject the statement alleging the existence of evidence to the effect that prisoners of Alto Adige have been tortured.

168. The second matter to which I should like to call your attention is that, throughout this entire period, the Italian Study Commission for the problems of Alto Adige has continued, and has almost completed, its work aimed at solving the substance of the problem at the internal level. This effort made by the Italian Government—under the co-operation, as I already mentioned, of qualified representatives of the German-speaking inhabitants—should crown our endeavours to eliminate the sources of contention over the implementation of the Paris Agreement of 5 September 1946.3/  

169. However, I should like once again to stress that, provided no further attempt is made to vitiate the atmosphere between the two countries, we are still prepared to hold a meeting with the Austrian Foreign Minister in October. We hope that this resumption of negotiations will result in a speedy settlement of the entire controversy.

170. To conclude my statement, may I say that those among us—and if I am not mistaken, they are not few in number—who have considerable political experience know full well that it is better for responsible statesmen to exercise utmost care in their language so as to avoid the risk of being deluded by events. Nevertheless, I do not hesitate to voice here my optimism on the results of our deliberations at this session.

171. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The representative of Cambodia has the floor to exercise his right of reply.

172. Mr. NONG KIMNY (Cambodia) (translated from French): My purpose in asking to exercise my right to reply is not so much to answer the representative of Thailand as to set the record straight about certain opinions just expressed by him that might cast doubt on the objectives of Cambodia's policy towards its neighbours South Viet-Nam and Thailand.

173. This policy remains what it has always been: one of peace and co-operation. In his statement this morning the representative of Thailand said:

"Cambodian leaders would do well... to contribute to this historic trend of regional co-operation, rather than stay out of it and even aggravate it by the recent decision to cut off official ties with South Viet-Nam, thus adding further disunity and instability to the region."

174. It seems to me that in passing this judgement criticizing a foreign-policy decision by Cambodia, the representative of Thailand is jumping to conclusions without stopping for a moment to study the causes of this break in the relations between my country and South Viet-Nam. As the head of the Cambodian delegation explained in detail in his statement on 25 September (1213th meeting), Cambodia took the painful decision to break off political relations with South Viet-Nam because the Saigon regime has committed a series of crimes against the Khmer people, against the Cambodian minority living in South Viet-Nam, and against the Buddhist community in South Viet-Nam.

175. For years Cambodia's frontiers have been systematically violated, our peaceful inhabitants attacked and murdered without provocation, our air space violated almost daily. No country in the world—and I am sure that I can include Thailand in this—could agree to maintain normal relations with such an aggressive neighbour.

176. The representative of Thailand deplores the disunity and lack of stability in our region; but he cannot lay the blame for that at Cambodia's door; if he will study the reasons which impelled us to sever relations, he will easily see that the fault can only be that of the Government of South Viet-Nam.

177. The second point on which I should like to reply to the representative of Thailand is this. The Thai Minister said that Thailand adheres to the majority of international treaties and agreements as well as the obligations which might result therefrom. If Cambodia could do likewise there would be no problem between our two countries.

178. We are happy to note these words, but do not understand the doubt expressed by the Thai Minister about Cambodia's attitude towards international treaties and agreements concluded between our two countries. I can solemnly affirm here, on behalf of the Royal Government of Cambodia, that one of the constant elements of Cambodia's foreign policy has been strict and absolute respect for international treaties and agreements and for the obligations resulting therefrom.

179. Lastly, my delegation would wish to share with the Thai delegation the opinion that if, in any future negotiations in which we may be called upon to participate, each party undertakes to respect the sanctity of international treaties and agreements, the difficulties between our two countries can be overcome.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.